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Abstract 
ABSTRACT 
This research programme investigates the phenomenon known as the escalation of 
commitment: the tendency to persist with troubled projects despite evidence 
suggesting that setbacks within the project could lead to its eventual failure. The 
tendency to escalate commitment to troubled information systems projects by 
investing greater amounts of time, money and effort than originally anticipated, have 
been shown to be strong, persistent and contrary to economic rationality. 
We postulate that project support, escalation and failure are determined primarily 
through a decision-maker's reaction to Zones of Tolerance (ZOTs), defined as the 
extant set of boundary conditions within which variations from expectations are 
recognized but carry no significant utility or disutility to the decision-maker. Within 
a Zone of Tolerance, variations from expectations are considered comparatively 
small and (importantly) acceptable. We examine how the presence of a Zone of 
Tolerance affects project managers' willingness to tolerate budget variances (in both 
. 
cost and time) and project slippage within information systems developments. This 
willingness to tolerate resource expenditures in excess of original expectations is 
dependent upon the qualities of the behavioural, environmental and resource 
constraints imposed within a project setting. 
Experiment 1: Proof of Concept 
In the first study, we empirically demonstrate how decision-makers tolerate minor 
variations from expectations, and how, if these seemingly minor variations are 
allowed to cascade and compound over time, they create the historically antecedent 
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conditions typical of escalation of commitment episodes. Paradoxically, we found 
that comparatively low budget overruns (which tend to be tolerated) lead to greater 
total resource commitments than high budget overruns (which tend to be corrected). 
Experiment 2: Extension of Concept- Projects Over Time 
In this experiment, we investigated the importance of time to a decision-maker's 
tolerance. We examined a number of characteristics of a project's performance that 
may change over time, namely (I) the effects of the stability of budget variances 
over time; (2) the magnitude of budget variances over time; and (3) the change in 
risk preference over time. Confirming our conjectures regarding the effects of ZOTs 
and Time on the treatment of escalating courses of action we found a significant 
effect of ZOTs and a main significant effect of time on the evaluation of projects and 
the continuation decisions made by subjects within the decision task. Contrary to 
prior escalation studies examining risk preference in loss conditions, this study 
shows that losses faced within escalation episodes can engender risk aversion, 
particularly if decision-makers operate under conditions where escalation is the less 
risk)( option when controlling project setbacks. 
Experiment 3: Project Portfolios 
In the final experiment, we hypothesise that ZOTs inhered within the decision 
context lead to increasingly suboptimal resource allocations between troubled and 
untroubled projects over time. Applying linear programming, we both theoretically 
and empirically demonstrated how tolerance for troubled projects draws resources 
away from well-performing projects within a portfolio. Consistent with our 
expectations, decision-makers in ZOT conditions permitting absorption of cost 
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increases fail to detect early variations from expectations and failed to correct 
escalating projects. By contrast, subjects in low ZOT conditions tended to be more 
aware of increasing costs and generally attempted to correct said variations, leading 
to better resource allocations overall. 
This research programme takes a significant step towards understanding how 
tolerance of seemingly minor setbacks affects future tendencies to persist with 
challenged courses of action and demonstrates ways in which the structural and 
organisational constraints on decision-making affect the way in which troubled 
projects are handled. We hold the micro-decisions of project management practice 
'under the microscope' and significant questions are posed about the effectiveness of 
conventional project management tools and techniques in controlling behavioural 
tendencies that contribute to sub-optimal resource allocation. It is argued that such 
practices need to be held to account against the realities of human judgement and 
decision-making behaviour, and it is shown through these empirical studies that 
manipulating Zones of Tolerance has significant effects of human judgement within 
the,organisational context and represent, in some cases, stronger controls against 
escalation of commitment behaviour than conventional project management 
techniques. 
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Chapter I - Introduction 
--- CHAPTER 1 ---
INTRODUCTION 
Tolerance and Persistence in Escalating Projects 
On 28 December 2006, CNN interviewed then Chair of the US Homeland Security 
Council, Fran Townsend and quizzed her on the failure to capture Osama bin Laden. 
A CNN correspondent asked Townsend, "I know you are saying there [are] 
successes in the War or Terror, and there have been, but [the failure to capture 
Osama bin Laden]- that's a failure." To which Townsend responded, "I'm not sure 
that it's not a success that hasn't occurred yet." 
At what point do decision-makers exhaust their tolerance and withdraw their support 
for a course of action that is experiencing persistent, cascading and compounding 
setbacks? Consider the following cases, and in doing so, consider the extent to which 
' the decision-makers involved remained tolerant of the escalating setbacks that would 
have contributed to the magnitude of the situation: 
British Columbia's decision to hold a world's fair, Expo 86, experienced 
rapidly increasing deficit projections from $6 million in 1978 to over $300 
million by 1985, yet the Vancouver provincial government remained 
steadfast in its commitment to hold the fair (Ross and Staw 1986). 
13 
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Ross and Stew ( 1993) detail the development of the Shoreham nuclear power 
plant which was abandoned after twenty-three years of construction at a loss 
of US$5 billion despite original estimates of completion within seven years at 
a cost ofUS$75 million. 
In "one of the major fiascos of business history" the London Stock Exchange 
abruptly cancelled the £500 million development of 'Taurus', an initiative to 
automate electronic transmission of trade settlements after five years of 
development, even after it was commissioned and supported by the securities 
industry and the Bank of England (Dummond 1999). 
After I 0 years of development and an incalculable amount of spending into 
the tens of millions of dollars, Keil (1995b) details the case of a configuration 
management system with a nom du guerre of CONFIG, which was cancelled 
in 1992 after years of escalating costs with little to no benefit to the 
organisation. 
In 1994 American Airlines was forced to settle a $165 million lawsuit with 
Rent-A-Car, Marriot Corp and Hilton Hotels after a hotel and car reservation 
system collapsed and was eventually aborted. 
The Channel Tunnel between the UK and France, originally estimated to cost 
$7 billion was finally opened in 1994 at a final cost of $13 billion. 
EuroDisney's costs of development rose from a projected $2.25 billion to a 
final cost of over $4 billion between 1989 and 1992. 
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Faced with a failing course of action that is taking place within a complex 
and multi-faceted decision context, decision-makers are compelled to look 
beyond the economic side of a decision. Consequences are often not dictated 
by objectively 'rational' economic agents. Fear, regret and aversion to loss 
are strong psychological forces. The mores of culture and organisations do 
not, in the main, tend to forgive failure easily. 'Winning' managers, sports 
stars, mountain climbers and people of all ilks are rewarded when their 
struggle through adversity leads to achievement. Society does not reward 
those who abandon a challenged course of action, even if all evidence 
suggests that abandonment is the best way forward. 
The Escalation Problem in Context 
This research p~ogramme investigates the phenomenon known as the escalation of 
commitment: the tendency to persist with troubled projects despite evidence 
suggesting that setbacks within the project could lead to its eventual failure. The 
tendency to escalate commitment to troubled projects by investing greater amounts 
of time, money and effort than originally anticipated, have been shown to be strong, 
persistent and contrary to conventional economic prescriptions. 
If it becomes evident over time that a course of action is failing, the rational 
decision-maker is compelled to make the often agonising decision to abandon it 
(Keil and Montealegre 2000). These decisions are difficult for two reasons. The first 
is that in real-world situations it is often difficult to ascertain the criteria for success 
and failure against which a course of action should be judged. Secondly, significant 
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amounts of resources and reputation may be lost to the decision-maker if a decision 
to abandon the action is made, particularly if prior decisions to support the venture 
were public, freely given and irrevocable (Ross and Staw 1986). Often, the 
reluctance to make such a difficult decision leads people to persevere with courses of 
action that are demonstrably likely to fail, often spending (and subsequently losing) 
more than expected in the process. 
Within a project management context, commitments to projects are manifest through 
continuous investments and support throughout the course of their development and 
implementation. Maintaining the commitment of senior management and the project 
organization is a necessary component of project success (Sauer 1993; Schmidt et al. 
2001; Yetton et al. 1999; Yetton et al. 2000; Sharma and Yetton 2003). However, 
strong commitment to a project's development may become aberrant if investments 
of time, money or effort are doggedly extended for projects that exhibit signs of 
inevitable failure. 'Escalation' occurs when commitment to a project is maintained 
even though it has begun to exceed time, budget or quality constraints, or fails to 
become adopted by its intended users. The preponderance of escalation literature has 
drawn on Cognitive Dissonance theory (Festinger 1957), Prospect Theory 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979), Agency Theory (Alchian and Demsetz 1972, 
Eisenhardt's 1989, Harrison and Harrell 1993) and Arkes and Blumer's (1985) sunk 
cost effect as the descriptive theoretical bases for why decision-makers would 
cognitively and counter-factually prefer to direct projects towards their inevitable 
failure than to rationally terminate them before more resources are lost to it. 
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The Extent of the Problem in Information Systems Projects 
Information systems development projects are notoriously prone to failure. It is 
estimated that just 16% of all information systems (IS) development projects are 
delivered on time and on budget (Johnson, 1995). Keil, Mann et a!. (2000) suggest 
that between 30% and 40% of IS projects experience some form of escalation. The 
efficiency with which IS projects meet their time, cost and quality objectives in a 
project setting has not improved with time, despite the improvements in 
development technologies such as reusable components and object-oriented design 
that (at least in theory) should make IS developments and implementation less time 
consuming and more efficient, customisable and better suited to meeting 
organisational requirements (Welke 1994). There should therefore be few technical 
reasons, argue Lyytinen and Robey (1994), for organisations to "experience the 
backlogs and d~lays that plagued systems development 20 years ago" (p85). 
Yet information systems (IS) research literature abounds in case studies and surveys 
whic'h detail the endemic and unresolved problem of the failure to develop IS 
projects within their requisite time and cost budgets (Abdel-Hamid 1988; 
Drummond 1999; Keil 1995a, !995b; Keil, Cule et a!. 1998; Keil, Mann et a!. 2000; 
Keil et a!. 2003; Lyytinen and Robey 1999; Montealegre and Keil 2000; Newman 
and Sabherwal 1996; Sauer 1993; Schmidt eta!. 2001; Zhang eta!. 2003). Time and 
cost overruns during IS project developments have been a persistent and pervasive a 
problem for as long as the technology industry has existed. Benko and MacFarlan's 
(2003) book "Connecting the Dots: Aligning Projects With Objectives in 
Unpredictable Times" reported estimates that technology spending in the United 
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States' was equivalent to around half of all US capital expenditures, with US$2.5 
trillion spent on technology in the years 1997-2001 alone. Of this, they estimate that 
US$1 trillion was invested in underperforming investments over the five years to 
2003, a total deduced using a reported estimate that 80% of all IT projects "are 
conceived and funded in a fragmented manner, with little in the way of overall 
planning" (Benko and MacFarlan 2003, p2). 
Escalation of Commitment Defined 
Escalation of commitment is defined by Brockner ( 1992) as the "tendency of 
decision makers to persist with failing courses of action". Colloquially, it is often 
referred to as 'throwing good money after bad' (Staw and Ross 1987a). At its 
simplest level, escalation of commitment is manifest through time and cost overruns 
in excess of expectations that are embodied in budgets and projects plans. There are, 
obviously, two definitional aspects of this nomenclature that need explanation: 
'commitment' and 'escalation'. Kiesler and Sakumura (1966) view 'commitment' as 
the &pledging or binding of the individual to behavioural acts". Once individuals 
bind themselves to an action, they argue, "the effect of commitment is to make [that] 
act less changeable". Keisler and Sakumura (1966) assert that commitment is often a 
product of "the explicitness of the act, the importance of the act, the degree of 
irrevocability of the act, [and] the number of acts performed". Within an 
organisational context, commitment to projects is manifest through continuous 
investment and support throughout the course of their development and 
implementation. Maintaining commitment to projects from management and project 
stakeholders is a necessary component of project success (Sauer, 1993). However, 
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strong commitment to project development may become aberrant if investments of 
time, money or effort are made to projects once they begin to fail. 'Escalation' 
occurs when commitment to a project is maintained even though it has begun to 
exceed time, budget or quality constraints, or fails to become adopted by users 
(Ghosh 1995). 
In Brockner's (1992) widely cited definition of escalation of commitment, the term 
'failing' is used to denote a project in which negative information has become 
known that directly affects the viability of the project. Many sources and types of 
negative information have been employed to denote a project as 'failing'. Arkes and 
Blumer (1985) test escalation using a scenario in which a competitor has released a 
superior product to the one the decision-maker's organisation is in the process of 
creating. Ross and Staw (1986; 1993) employ case studies in which disruptions to 
development, political wrangling and shifting scope and requirements extend the 
project well outside of its initial cost and time projections. A common finding of 
many of these investigations is that there may be exogenous shocks to the project -
unfor5een occurrences that mar the feasibility of the initial project estimates. Abdel-
Hamid (1988) also points to complications arising due to underestimation of cost and 
time during planning that are only realised well into a project's development. 
Responding to these events is difficult, especially when there is extant commitment 
to the project, often in the form of irrecoverable sunk costs and the personal 
responsibility of actors whose reputations are bound to the success or failure of the 
project. 
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Much of the early literature casts escalation as robustly irrational. Failing projects, 
this literature argues, should be abandoned without regard to the amount of sunk 
costs incurred. However, many escalation situations occur because the conditions of 
the project, and the likelihood of eventual success or failure are ambiguous. This 
notion finds support with Keil, Mann et a!. (2000) who state, 
"For a variety of reasons, these [negative performance status projects '} 
peiformance problems may or may not be visible to the key decision maker 
responsible for the decision of whether or not to continue the project" (p634) 
This led Keil, Mann et a!. (2000) to redefine escalation of commitment as occurring 
"when troubled projects are continued instead of being abandoned or redirected" 
(p633, emphasis added) adding that project escalation is seen to occur specifically 
when there is a negative project status, which is associated with those projects that 
experience problems and setbacks in cost, schedule, functionality or quality (Keil, 
Mann et a!. 2000). This definition of escalation as commitment to troubled projects 
will be used within the scope of this research programme. 
Ambiguity in the Definition and Clarification 
The term 'escalation of commitment' has been has been used to define projects that 
are 'failing' (Brockner 1992) or 'troubled' (Keil, Mann eta!. 2000). These terms are 
not synonymous. Brockner's (1992) definition of 'failing' describes this state as 
existing when negative information is available that questions the viability of the 
project. Keil, Mann et al.'s (2000) definition of 'troubled' projects is characterised 
through negative performance status. In both accounts, escalation of commitment is 
not necessarily defined through a project's inevitable failure. 'Inevitable failure' is 
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an amorphous notion and, to date, has not been fully characterised within success 
and failure literature. 
Many projects are continued despite negative project status yet result in what are 
considered to be successes. Take the example of the Sydney Opera House, which 
was originally projected to cost A$7 million. Fifteen years and A$107 million later 
the Sydney Opera House is an iconic piece of architecture and could not, despite its 
cost and time overruns, be considered a project failure (Lim and Mohamed 1999). 
However, the Opera House was completed despite 'negative project status' evident 
throughout its construction, as time and cost overruns became apparent and as 
conflict arose between the architects, government and the community. To this end, 
assuming negative information connotes failure does not take into account that 
continued support is the primary determinant of project success (Sauer 1993). 
The Working Definition of Escalation Within This Research Programme 
Thus we conform to Keil, Mann et a!.' s (2000) definition of escalation in this 
reseilrch programme1• We see escalation as occurring when projects experience 
setbacks that require an increase in commitments by stakeholders beyond that which 
was originally anticipated. When setbacks occur that raise the level of commitments 
in previously unanticipated ways, they create decision dilemmas in which decision-
makers must decide whether continuing their support of a project is worthwhile. In 
cases such as these decision-makers are left with a number of alternatives: (I) to 
1 Prof. Mark Keil, from Georgia State University is the most prolific investigator into the 
phenomenon of escalation of commitment to information systems projects. Indeed, he is one of the 
most prolific investigators of the phenomenon within the entirety of escalation of commitment 
literature. This research programme extensively cites his oeuvre and is heavily influenced by his and 
his colleagues' findings. It will become evident throughout the course of this thesis, however, that 
while heavily influenced by his work, this research represents a significant departure from it and from 
the historical narrative that exists within escalation literature. 
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fully or partially tolerate setbacks and spend more resources than originally 
anticipated (i.e. to escalate their commitment); (2) address the setback by continuing 
their commitment at their planned levels (i.e. to correct the project); (3) to reduce 
their commitment to the course of action (i.e. to de-escalate the project) (Keil and 
Robey 1999); or (4) to withdraw their support from the course of action completely 
(i.e. to abandon the project). The objective of this research programme is to 
investigate how tolerance affects a decision-maker "s choice between these 
alternatives. 
Research Programme: Zones of Tolerance to Escalating Projects 
The basic premise of this research is that decision-makers react to Zones of 
Tolerance (ZOTs) in situ of the decision context and may (at least in the minds of 
decision-maker~) rationalise continuation of troubled projects using the existence of 
these Zones as evidence that the costs of continuation are less than the cost of 
correction, de-escalation or abandonment of a project. It will be argued that many of 
the factors contributing to the continuation of troubled projects that are identified in 
previous literature are in fact either components of, or manifestations of, Zones of 
Tolerance, defined as the extant set of boundary conditions within which the costs to 
the decision-maker of variations from expectations are immaterial, negligible or 
zero. In other words, when ample tolerance for variations from expectations exist 
within the organisational and structural constraints imposed upon a project's 
development, decision-makers often feel justified in continuing troubled projects 
despite significant and repeated setbacks. Further, it is conjectured that correction, 
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redirection or abandonment of projects may tend to take place only once these ZOTs 
are breached. 
The purpose of this research programme is fourfold: 
I. To provide workable definitions of the escalation of commitment 
phenomenon and associated concepts; 
2. To postulate and empirically verify the effect of tolerance to escalating 
projects that is manifest through the extant organisational and structural 
constraints present within the decision context, 
3. To postulate the effects of some common project setback metrics, such as 
cost and time overruns, on this tolerance; 
4. To investigate the effect of some universal project characteristics (such as 
alternatives, time, risk and opportunity costs) on the escalation phenomenon 
and tolerance. 
Appendix A xxx lists the overarching research questions, the guiding theoretical 
propqsitions, specific hypotheses and results. 
This chapter began by advancing a workable definition escalation. It proceeds to 
define and characterise tolerance and to make some general conjectures about the 
types and qualities of Zones of Tolerance. The following chapter will go on to 
examine previous literature and, in doing so, will highlight some of the contradictory 
findings evident and speculate upon the difference between the intentions versus 
interpretations of seemingly irrational decisions to continue projects despite setbacks 
that represent variations from initial project expectations. 
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Thirty years of literature examining escalation identified a multiplicity of factors that 
are found to contribute to the phenomenon without much progress towards a 
definitive solution to the problem (Verner et al. 1999). Case studies, surveys and 
experiments have ranged in focus from the idiosyncratic features of IS/IT projects 
that make them more amenable to escalation, examinations of the roles and effects of 
organisational constraints as well as a broad ranging investigation into the 
phenomenon from research fields as diverse as information systems research, 
psychology, organisational behaviour, judgment and decision-making literature. 
Examining the extensive and varied perspectives on the escalation phenomenon is an 
interesting, yet difficult task, particularly since these ranges of perspectives arise 
from examination of escalation cases and scenarios that are couched within myriad 
different contexts. The predominant consensus within the literature is that the most 
significant sources of escalation arise through the sunk cost fallacy and the need for 
self-justification in the face of negative information. Beyond this, many investigators 
of escalation case studies employ a classification schema that identifies factors 
contributing to escalation vta project, psychological, social and 
organisational/structural factors. For the sake of faithful reporting of previous 
findings, and in keeping with the traditions of investigation into this area, this 
literature review will maintain those classifications. 
What should become clear from review and critical appraisal of prior investigations 
that follows is that escalation of commitment to troubled projects is a context-laden, 
ambiguous and multidimensional phenomenon. However, the purpose of this 
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research will demonstrate how tolerance for setbacks to ventures of this kind 
predominantly arises through decisions made in reaction to the organisational and 
structural constraints that undergird all project management decisions within these 
contexts. Zones of Tolerance, it is argued, represent the extent to which these 
setbacks from expected outcomes are absorbed by these constraints. 
The Objective of This Research 
The research investigates the extent to which decision-makers tolerate variations 
from their expectations, and how they behave once their tolerance has been eroded. 
It postulates that decision-makers take cues from the decision context to determine 
Zones of Tolerance (ZOTs), the extant set of boundary conditions within which 
variations from expectations are recognized but carry no significant utility or 
disutility to the (}ecision-maker. We empirically demonstrate that decision-makers do 
not correct variations from expectations (such as setbacks to a project) within ZOTs 
and correct them outside ZOTs. 
The Research Question 
In making decisions to continue, redirect or abandon troubled projects, one is faced 
with a fundamental question: 
When managing a project facing setbacks, to what extent am I willing to 
tolerate variations from my prior expectations, and what do I do once my 
tolerance has been breached? 
25 
Chapter I- Introduction 
Tolerance for variations from expectations, it would seem, is an underlying 
determinant of a decision to persist with troubled projects, ultimately determining 
support for the project and its eventual success or failure. The questions posed in this 
research programme are therefore: How do setbacks erode a decision-maker's 
tolerance and their willingness to support as project? What influences tolerance? 
And where do the limits of this tolerance lie? 
Over thirty years of escalation of commitment literature have largely assumed that 
escalating commitment to troubled projects is fundamentally irrational and driven by 
base impulses of loss aversion and fear of failure. This research sets out to question 
these assumptions by examining the micro-decisions to tolerate small setbacks which 
cascade and compound over time to engender large-scale failures, heavy cost 
overruns and, on the face of it, grossly mismanaged projects. In sum, it is argued that 
imminently rational decisions to tolerate minor setbacks may become the precursor 
to imminently irrational decisions to persist once those minor setbacks cascade and 
compqund into larger setbacks that lead to eventual project failure. 
Using the context of escalating commitment to troubled projects, this programme of 
research explores the nature of decisions within failing courses of action. 
Specifically, it addresses a question that is simple in expression but complex (indeed 
perhaps unsolvable) in resolution: 
When faced with a failing course of action, at what point does one's tolerance 
for setbacks evaporate, and what happens when it does? 
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The Scope and Purpose of This Work 
The basic premise of this research is that decision-makers react to conditions within 
the decision context that contribute to the existence of Zones of Tolerance (ZOTs). 
These ZOTs in situ of the decision context may (at least in the minds of decision-
makers) rationalise continuation of troubled projects using the existence of these 
Zones as evidence that the costs of continuation are less than the cost of correction, 
de-escalation or abandonment of a project. It will be argued that many of the factors 
contributing to the continuation of troubled projects that are identified in previous 
literature are in fact either components of, or manifestations of, Zones of Tolerance, 
defined as the extant set of boundary conditions within which the costs to the 
decision-maker of variations from expectations are immaterial, negligible or zero. In 
other words, when ample tolerance for variations from expectations exist within the 
organisational and structural constraints imposed upon a project's development, 
decision-makers often feel justified in continuing troubled projects despite 
significant and repeated setbacks to the project. Further, it is conjectured that 
correction, redirection or abandonment of projects may tend to take place only once 
' 
these ZOTs are breached. 
An Overview of the Empirical Studies in this Programme 
Using three scenario-based simulations, the research investigates numerous 
determinants of Zones of Tolerance. 
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Experiment 1: Proof of Concept 
In the first study, we investigate whether project support, escalation and failure are 
determined primarily through the limits of a decision-maker's tolerance (termed here 
'Zones of Tolerance', or ZOTs) for variations from expected outcomes. Our 
conjecture is that decision-makers display certain degrees of tolerance due to 
manifest ambiguities within the decision context. We demonstrate empirically how 
decision-makers tolerate minor variations from expectations, and how, if these 
seemingly minor variations are allowed to cascade and compound over time, they 
create the historically antecedent conditions typical of escalation of commitment 
episodes. Paradoxically, we find that comparatively low budget overruns (which tend 
to be tolerated) lead to greater total resource commitments than high budget overruns 
(which tend to be corrected). In addition, we find that alternatives to the decision to 
escalate commitment to troubled projects have no significant effect on the said 
decision, contrary to prior studies (Arkes and Blumer 1985, Conlon and Garland 
1993, Shaubroek and Davis 1994, Keil eta!. 1995). 
Experiment 2: Extension of Concept- Projects Over Time 
In this study we added the additional constructs of time, variance stability and risk. 
We found significant influences of time, variance, and ZOTs on the affective states 
of decision-makers. While budget variances had an effect on decision-making, this 
effect was largely influenced by the stability of those variances over time. 
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Experiment 3: Project Portfolios 
This study examines the influence of tolerance for setbacks, the extent to which 
alternative resource allocations are available and the way in which projects change 
over time. We hypothesize that ZOTs inhered within the decision context lead to 
increasingly suboptimal resource allocations between troubled and untroubled 
projects over time. The study compares objectively optimal resource allocation 
strategies against decision-makers' actual allocation decisions in a portfolio of two 
projects. 
Consistent with our expectations, decision-makers failing to correct early variations 
from expectations can be shown to significantly diverge from optimal allocations 
when ample tolerance exists within the decision context. Conversely, when there is 
low tolerance for variations within the context, we see earlier detection and 
correction of v_ariations from budgets and more optimal resource allocation 
behaviour overall. A second interesting finding is that decision-makers tend to make 
allocation decisions that are closer to optimality when the organisational constraints 
manit'est low tolerance and, counter-intuitively, when provided with loose, rather 
than strict, resource constraints. This is possibly due to a belief that loose resource 
constraints connote the ability to freely move resources between projects. 
Philosophical Basis of This Behavioural Research 
"Man is a rational animal who always loses his temper when he is called upon to act 
in accordance with the dictates of reason. " -Oscar Wilde 
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The phenomenon of escalating commitment to failing courses of action represents a 
break-down in rational decision-making process. When courses of action are 
undertaken, they typically begin with imminently rational objectives and strategies. 
However real-world ambiguity, constraints and risks often cause unintended and 
unanticipated setbacks, particularly when the course of action is large in scope or 
complex in nature. When such setbacks occur, they create dilemmas for the decision-
maker: should they proceed with the course of action despite its setbacks, escalating 
their originally anticipated commitment of money, time and effort? Should they 
change their course of action, by redirecting their efforts, reducing the scope of their 
objectives or reducing their resource commitments in the face of these unanticipated 
risks? Should they abandon their commitment entirely, often losing the committed 
resources spent to date and perhaps jeopardising their reputation, future access to 
resources, or indeed their jobs? 
Rational economic theory offers some advice (Harsanyi 1986), but this advice is not 
much help to a decision-maker operating in a world where economically sound 
principles are often trumped by organisational dynamics and cultural mores. Take for 
instance the theory of sunk costs (Arkes and Blumer 1985), the economic tenet that 
previously incurred and non-recoverable costs should not be factored into a decision 
to spend future resources. While objectively rational, this principle bears little 
authority in real-world decision-making. The case of a failing war, for instance, it 
would be very difficult to explain to a nation that the lives and treasure already lost 
to a conflict no longer matter in future decisions. 
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At its core, the fields of decision theory and behavioural economics explore the often 
contentious association between behaviour and rationality. Much of the literature 
cast decision-makers as fickle, emotion-driven creatures varying their tastes, 
preferences and behaviours in inconsistent (i.e. irrational) ways. Stable preference 
sets and expected utilities based on known risks and outcomes are the prevailing 
assumptions that undergird most literature into rational economic behaviour. On the 
other hand, loss aversion, self justification and incomplete preference sets are among 
the modus operandi of the irrational decision-maker, their behavioural optimality 
weakened by these salient, though disruptive, influences on manifest behaviour. 
Herbert Simon and his contemporaries, notably James March, Richard Thaler and 
Gerd Gigerenzer among others, have written in apologia of decision-making that 
ostensibly deviates from fundamentally 'rational' economic behaviour. The real 
challenge, they argue, is ambiguity - ubiquitous and insurmountable in the 'real 
world', 
"Rationality implies a complete, and unattainable, knowledge of the exact 
• consequences of each choice. In actuality, the human being never has more 
than a fragmentary knowledge of the conditions surrounding his action, nor 
more than a slight insight into the regularities and laws that would permit 
him to induce fUture consequences from a knowledge of present 
circumstances." (Simon 1976, p81) 
Rational choice theory can be unworkable under conditions of real-world ambiguity. 
Specifically, the tripartite challenges posed by time dependence, incomplete 
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information and a shifting tastes and preferences violate many of the basic 
assumptions required for many rational choice theories to remain tractable. 
Despite the confounding effects of ambiguity on decisions, rational choice theories 
are the building blocks of optimal choice by first principles. Jon Elster (1993) sums 
up the importance of rational choice theory thus: 
"Rational choice theory is far more than a technical tool for explaining 
behaviour. It is also, and very importantly. a way of coming to grips with 
ourselves - not only what we should do, but even what we should be. " (Elster 
1993, pl79) 
The escalation of commitment phenomenon ~ a commonly occurring and pervasive 
behaviour - is particularly conducive to the examination of the boundary conditions 
between rationality and irrationality in choice behaviour, since the very nature of the 
problem allows us to take decision-makers through a series of decisions that begin 
with an unambiguously orthodox and rational course of action that gradually 
deteriorates to the point that persisting with the same course of action becomes an 
una~biguously irrational (Drummond 1998). This decision domain allows us some 
unique insights the fuzzy boundaries between rational and irrational choice and even 
the ethical implications of such decisions (Keil and Robey 200 I, Street et al. 1997). 
Contributions to Theory and Practice 
This research programme takes a significant step towards understanding how 
tolerance of minor setbacks affects future tendencies to persist with challenged 
courses of action. Using both behavioural decision-making apparatus and by 
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applying linear programming (in Experiment 3), these studies theoretically and 
empirically demonstrate how tolerance for troubled projects is extended when 
variations from expectations manifest within Zones of Tolerance. Furthermore, it 
demonstrates ways in which the structural and organisational constraints on decision-
making affect the way in which decisions are made and troubled projects are 
handled. 
The third study makes another conclusion hitherto never discussed within escalation 
of commitment literature. It theoretically and empirically demonstrates the ways in 
which troubled projects draw resources away from well-performing projects within a 
portfolio. It validates a hitherto unapplied method of measuring the extent to which 
decision-makers are departing from an objectively optimal decision strategy during 
escalation of commitment dilemmas. 
The practical applications of this research are discussed in the later chapters. In brief, 
project management practices are held under scrutiny within this research and 
significant questions are posed about the effectiveness of conventional project 
management tools and techniques. It is argued that such practices need to be held to 
account against the realities of human judgement and decision-making behaviour, 
and it is shown through these empirical studies that manipulating Zones of Tolerance 
have significant effects of human judgement within the organisational context and 
represent, in some cases, stronger controls against escalation of commitment 
behaviour than conventional project management techniques. 
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--- CHAPTER 2 ---
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Rationality 
On its face, escalation of commitment to failing projects appears robustly irrational. 
It would seem apparent to draw the conclusion (as has been done extensively in prior 
research) that continuing investments in projects that are failing would represent a 
departure from rationality - a preponderance of loss aversion, fear and regret on the 
part of the decision-maker that overwhelms their more rational instincts to cut their 
losses and reconcile themselves to sunk costs. 
For the most part, decisions to invest time, money or effort in a course of action are 
initiated through real value propositions that are seen to be both realisable and 
significant. Interpreting the evidence reported in IS case study literature on 
' 
escalation, it appears evident that small deviations from objectives (such as time and 
cost budgets) are tolerated rather than redressed, particularly during the early 
setbacks of a troubled project. In this case, small negative variances from 
expectations are insufficiently salient indicators of future trouble, and decision-
makers would not act to protect or reinstate their asset positions or to challenge their 
cognitive perceptions of the correctness of their decisions. This tolerance may create 
the typically antecedent conditions by which decision-makers may become prone to 
larger variances down the track. Case study literature into the escalation 
phenomenon (Drummond 1994, 1995, 1997, 1999; Keil 1995b; Montealegre and 
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Keil 2000; Ross and Staw 1986, 1993) suggests that the greatest contributors to 
departures from expectations arise both gradually and internally through issues with 
resource planning, estimation and controls rather than the profound exogenous 
shocks: 
"{T}he typical escalation episode can be seen as beginning with the bright 
promise of future outcomes through a given course of action. The course of 
action gradually but progressively becomes a losing proposition {. .. as} 
countervailing forces tend to build up over time, making it more difficult to 
withdraw than would be expected only if economic results were considered." 
(Ross and Staw 1993, p. 203, emphasis added) 
Why do project managers acquiesce to unfavourable budget variances to the extent 
that they do? It could well be argued, in many cases, that the costs to the decision-
maker of tolerating project slippages are lower than the costs of revising and 
correcting those slippages. In cases such as these the self-interested or opportunistic 
decision-maker would be best served by allowing variances up to the point at which 
the cpst of project slippages exceeds the benefits of not correcting them. A decision-
maker faced with these circumstances would tolerate slippages to the point where 
support for these variations from expectations would be violated by constraints on 
the project, such as management I stakeholder support, or project constraints such as 
resource limits and deadlines. When variances are compounded to an unreasonable 
degree, these time and cost overruns lead to entrapment episodes subsequently may 
compel decision-makers to operate against the economic, social and moral incentives 
and disincentives available to them. 
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The pervasive problem of time and cost overruns is compounded by a seemingly 
cavalier attitude to budget overruns by IS project managers that has been supported 
in a number of studies (Ewusi-Mensah and Przasnyski 1991; Yetton eta!. 2000). 
Ewusi-Mensah and Przasnyski (1991), in a survey of!S project managers, found that 
"in most abandonment cases the issue of cost and/or schedule overruns, although a 
consideration in some cases, is not a major contributor" (p81 ). Yetton et a!. (2000) 
confirm this in their survey which found that project managers do not actually 
consider budget variances as critical to project performance. 
Overarching Research Questions 
While tolerance may be extended to setbacks, a decision-maker's willingness to 
persist with a course of action may be limited by the organisational and structural 
constraints inhe~ent within the environment. Management support for a project may 
be negated and effectively vetoed by the tolerance and slack available within the 
decision context. For instance, management may wish to continue a project, but if no 
resources exist to pursue the course of action, the project may have to terminate 
regardless. Ample evidence exists within previous literature to support this 
conjecture, and this research programme's objective is to isolate and manipulate the 
tolerances of both decision-makers and the organisational/structural tolerance of the 
decision context (as well as the interaction effects between the two). These 
organisational and structural constraints on escalation decisions are discussed later in 
this section. For now, however, the critical questions for this programme of research 
can be stated thus: 
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RQl: To what extent are setbacks tolerated by a project's constituents? 
RQ2: To what extent can setbacks be absorbed by the environment within 
which the project is undertaken? 
RQ3: Is there an interaction between a decision-makers tolerance of 
project setbacks and the extant conditions evident in the 
organisational environment? 
It will be argued within the remainder of this chapter that the extent, limits and 
consequences of tolerance for project setbacks are the key underlying factor in the 
continuation of troubled projects and the key determinant of project escalation. 
Tolerance and Its Limits 
What is Tolerance? 
To what extent do we tolerate setbacks and where does that limit lie? Consider the 
following dilemma: 
You are sitting in a restaurant waiting to meet a blind date. You realize that 
she is running ten minutes late. Is it reasonable to castigate her for tardiness 
if she turns up now, or would you accept there is a margin of tolerance for 
her arrival time? Unsure of whether she will turn up at all, but knowing that 
she is arriving by your city's notoriously unpredictable train system, how 
long would you wait before your tolerance runs out and you decide to go 
home? 
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To complicate matters, would you be likely to wait as long if you knew there 
was a gathering of your friends nearby that you could attend should you 
choose to abandon the date? In other words, would the availability of an 
alternative to your date lead you to have less tolerance for his or her 
tardiness? 
The preceding scenario illustrates the basic premises of this research programme. 
Firstly, we can see that small variations from expectations would not necessarily lead 
to large manifestations of dissatisfaction with the status quo course of action. We 
often tolerate small variations from our expectations and consider these variations as 
an inevitable consequence of an ambiguous decision context with imprecise 
estimations of investment requirements. Furthermore, if after waiting for half an 
hour your blind date shows up, is highly appreciative of your patience and the date 
was worthwhile, then your persistence would be considered rational, indeed 
rewarded. If your date fails to appear, your support must inevitably be withdrawn at 
some,point. Thus, the rewards and penalties of persistence can often only be known 
post-hoc. The second part of the scenario exemplifies how the existence of 
alternatives to challenged courses of action can often complicate the decision-
making process, and may reduce our tolerance for variations from our preferred 
outcomes. 
Tolerance for Project Escalation 
The basic premise of this research is that project support, escalation and failure are 
determined primarily through a decision-makers reaction to degrees of tolerance 
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(ostensibly termed here as 'Zones of Tolerance', or ZOT's) for variances from 
expectations that are a product of conditions within the decision context. A ZOT is 
the margin to which outcomes are allowed to deviate from expectations without a 
change in support for the course of action. Within a Zone of Tolerance, variations 
from expectations are considered comparatively small and (importantly) acceptable. 
We therefore posit a Zone of Tolerance (ZOT) as the extant set of boundary 
conditions within which variations from expectations are recognized but carry no 
significant utility or disutility to the decision-maker. 
While Zones of Tolerance were originally proposed within the forecasting field 
(Lawrence and O'Connor 2005), it is contended that ZOTs are phenomena that 
influence decision-making in a wide and varied number of decision contexts. 
Specifically, we examine how the presence of a Zone of Tolerance affects project 
managers' willingness to tolerate budget variances (in both cost and time) and 
project slippage within IS developments. This willingness to tolerate resource 
expeQ.ditures in excess of initial expectations is dependent upon the qualities of the 
behavioural, environmental and resource constraints imposed within a project 
setting. 
Origins and Evidence of the Zone of Tolerance Proposition 
Loss Functions Containing Zones of Tolerance 
The concept of a Zone of Tolerance represents a specific case of organisational 
context where the cost to the decision-maker of tolerating variations from 
39 
Chapter 2- Literature Review 
expectations are zero, negligible or relatively less tban tbe costs of correction. The 
existence of Zones of Tolerance was originally proposed by Lawrence and O'Connor 
(2005) and couched within tbe forecasting field. Specifically, ZOTs were examined 
within tbe context of forecasting in tbe presence of symmetric and asymmetric loss 
functions. They argue tbat forecasts depart from their expected values when they are 
influenced by, and face systematic bias from, asymmetric loss functions evident in 
the decision context. They state tbat, 
"[i]n a less-than-perfect world where errors are inevitable, the 'cost' to a 
forecaster (or a decision maker) of an under-forecast may not be the same as 
the 'cost' of an over-forecast, and if the error falls within the tolerance zone, 
the cost maybe zero." (Lawrence and O'Connor 2005, p4) 
Simple exemplars of tbe effect of asymmetric loss functions range from the blind 
date illustration above (where tbe costs of waiting longer are potentially less than the 
costs of not waiting long enough) to Lawrence and O'Connor's (2005) analogy of 
carrying an umbrella when there is a chance of rain: 
"For example, if people consider that they would rather take an umbrella 
and not use it compared to being caught in the rain without it, it would be 
beneficial for a weather forecaster to err on the side of forecasting rain, even 
if the chance was minimal. In this case, the cost of not forecasting rain when 
it occurs is greater than the cost of forecasting rain when it does not occur. 
In this example, there is a difference between a forecast error and the 'cost' 
of it to the individual users of the forecasts. " (p3) 
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Within an organisational context Goodwin (2005) offers an illustration of 
asymmetric loss functions evident in a production environment: 
"{J]n decisions on the weekly production levels of a product, the costs 
incurred though over producing by a given amount, such as extra 
stockholding costs, may be less than the costs of under producing by this 
amount. "(p386) 
Lawrence and O'Connor (2005) empirically demonstrated the effect of these 
asymmetric loss functions by exposing subjects to both 'kind' and 'unkind' loss 
functions2 when asked to perform monthly forecasts on a product's sales with 
varying levels of loss function symmetry. They found that subjects' forecast errors 
were significantly higher with the presence of a Zone of Tolerance around their 
forecast estimates than when it was absent. They also found that decision-makers 
exhibit adaptive learning behaviour by adjusting their forecast estimates in the 
direction implied by the loss function and conclude that introducing a forecast error 
tolerance may reduce judgemental forecast accuracy. 
The empirical findings of Lawrence and O'Connor (2005) find corollaries and 
support with the resource allocation behaviour research of Harvey Langholtz and his 
colleagues both within and outside an organisational context. Langholtz et al. (1994) 
conducted an empirical investigation in which two environments of resource 
constraints were compared. Subjects having to make investment decisions in which 
resource constraints are known and limited ('harsh environments') became 
2 The 'kind' and 'unkind' manipulation of the ZOT construct used by Lawrence and O'Connor (2005) 
as well as the 'benign' and 'harsh' manipulations ofLangholtz et al. (1994) loosely correspond to the 
•high' and •tow' ZOT levels (respectively) used in the experiments within this research programme, 
albeit with a different problem context and operationalisation. 
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significantly more conservative in their decision-making strategies from those who 
made decisions in 'benign environments', where "survival was never threatened" 
(p47). This would suggest that survival reference points do indeed exist where 
resource exhaustion is a real and salient possibility if the investment does not 
produce optimal results. 
Not all research indicates that asymmetric loss functions contribute to poorer 
resource allocation decisions. Goodwin (2005) conducted a study into forecast 
accuracy in a production scheduling task. He found that decision makers who were 
either unaided or aided by statistical point forecasts made significantly better 
decisions in the presence of asymmetric loss functions where the costs of shortages 
were more expensive than the costs surpluses. Lawrence et al. (2006) put these 
observed differences from the Lawrence and O'Connor (2005) down to the 
possibility that "minor differences in the task" may have contributed (Lawrence et al. 
2006, p498). In sum, the research into asymmetric loss functions seems to suggest 
that the ecologically rational decision-maker is often compelled to bias their 
estimates of future outcomes by adapting decisions towards the direction implied by 
the loss functions present in the decision context, regardless of whether this 
adaptation is economically rational or not. 
Zones of Tolerance in the Presence of Loss Functions 
We have earlier defined Zones of Tolerance as the extant set of boundary conditions 
within which the costs to the decision-maker of variations from expectations are 
immaterial, negligible or zero. While the findings of forecasting literature are based 
on explicit loss functions, we can extrapolate this construct to both explicit and 
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implied 'Zones' inherent within problem space that serve to create an organisational 
context in which decision-makers are apt to adapt their tolerance. As Lawrence and 
O'Connor (2005) state "Arguably, the presence or absence of a specified region of 
acceptability will induce different attention to the accuracy of the forecast and the 
effort put into such activity" (p6). This would imply that ZOTs are in fact conditions 
in situ of the decision context, rather than an innate quality of decision-makers 
themselves. This definition of tolerance departs somewhat from those put forward by 
Norton (1975) among others who describe tolerance for contextual ambiguity as an 
innate quality of decision-makers themselves (as well as Fox and Tversky 1995, 
1998). 
In summary, it is our conjecture that Zones of Tolerance are extant conditions within 
the decision-context that can be influenced through both explicit and implied gain 
and loss functions. Within a ZOT, decision-makers find it apt to absorb variations 
from expectations and correct said variances when inside a ZOT. 
How ZOTs Are Relevant to the Escalation Problem 
How Is Tolerance Manifest? 
Studies of the effects of ZOTs and loss functions on decisions within the forecasting 
domain have different intrinsic characteristics to those in a project management 
domain. Goodwin (2005) states that, in forecasting tasks, knowledge of the effects of 
decisions is presumed ex ante "since, in practice, the losses are often known, or 
taken as given, [and therefore) the most appropriate role of judgment is to estimate 
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the probability distribution of demand" (p389). Empirical evidence from forecasting 
tasks containing asymmetric loss functions have typically comprise of two 
components known (or knowable) prior to the decision- the probability distribution 
of future outcomes based on forecasts together with a history of prior forecasts and 
the losses associated with each production-demand combination. 
Within a project management context, as distinct from a forecasting context, both the 
probability distribution of future outcomes, as well as the losses associated with each 
outcome are rarely if ever known with any certainty. In other words, future outcomes 
are characterised by ambiguity (Einhorn and Hogarth 1986a, 1986b ). Much of the 
efforts to ascertain these metrics either quantitatively or qualitatively are hampered 
due to significant amounts of ambiguity within the decision context. We surmise that 
given the particular decision context investigated within this research programme 
(namely project environments where setbacks have occurred) that several 
conjectures may be made about the nature, scope and salience of Zones of Tolerance 
that demarcate and distinguish themselves from the conception of Zones of 
Tole~ance as initially defined by Lawrence and O'Connor (2005). In doing so, one 
can identify three distinguishing factors common to many of the environmental and 
structural contexts prevalent in escalation of commitment dilemmas, namely: 
1. Ambiguity 
2. Expectations as reference points 
3. Setbacks absorbed within a ZOT and corrected outside a ZOT. 
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Ambiguity 
Gingrich and Soli (1984) as well as Busemeyer et a!. ( 1986) investigated resource 
allocation behaviour in ambiguous and benign environments where survival was 
never threatened and their findings have direct implications on the nature and scope 
of this work. Busemeyer et a!. (1986) empirically investigated resource allocation 
behaviour when there were no local optima. In other words, the decision context 
contained sufficient ambiguity such that no optimal decision was apparent or 
discoverable. They examined how adaptive learning behaviour influences the 
allocation of resources with the caveat that, in reality, where situations contain no 
local optima, "optimal policies cannot be specified without perfect knowledge of the 
objective function". They state further for many real life decisions, 
"only imperfect and vague information about the objective function is 
available [... and] optional allocation rules are often very difficult to 
calcula!e, and it seems unreasonable to expect that the typical naive subject 
knows the optimal solution a priori" (pp319-320). 
In cases such as these "it makes very little sense to test whether or not subjects 
perform optimally" (p340). 
Even with the benefit of 30 years of escalation research, there has not been a single 
successful model of forecasting escalation prior to its eventuation. Previous research 
investigating the phenomenon have essentially descriptive cases of escalation or 
prescriptive models of remedying escalations situations once they occur. Ambiguity 
prevents decision-makers from discerning optimal strategies for resource allocation a 
priori, particularly since future outcomes are difficult to ascertain with any certainty, 
and these outcomes are mutable depending on action. Ambiguity within these cases 
45 
Chapter 2- Literature Review 
is too confounding to the decision-maker to unambiguously denote projects as 
inevitably failing or certain to succeed. 
Ambiguity in Context of Previous Literature 
Ambiguity relates to the absence of ex ante knowledge of the extant probability 
distributions of outcomes and loss functions that manifest within the decision 
context. Within organisational contexts, ambiguity impedes the decision-maker's 
capacity to completely access knowledge of future costs and benefits of decisions ex 
ante. Significant amounts of ambiguity may be present in any predictions of future 
outcomes that are reliant on human action. Simon (1976) avers that ambiguity about 
future outcomes and the loss and gain functions that are attendant upon them limits 
decision-makers in their capacity for rational choice: 
"Rationality implies a complete, and unattainable, knowledge of the exact 
consequences of each choice. In actuality, the human being never has more 
than a fragmentary knowledge of the conditions surrounding his action, nor 
more than a slight insight into the regularities and laws that would permit 
him to induce future consequences from a knowledge of present 
circumstances." (p81) 
Ambiguity is manifest in many ways, but has a prevailing effect on the inability to 
assess consequences arising in the future. The eventual consequences of present 
behaviour are often only known post hoc. Decisions about the investment of effort 
made in previous time periods necessarily limit the available options of future ones. 
As time passes, investment in one alternative relinquishes the ability to invest in 
others, ambiguities are reduced and environments altered. Furthermore, temporal 
ambiguity can often conflict with strategy to the extent that time has a binding effect 
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on future behaviour and actions by narrowing the availability of alternatives. In other 
words, there is entropy to strategy over time. 
"This time-binding character of strategies deserves the greatest emphasis, 
for it makes possible at least a modicum of rationality in behaviour, where 
without it, this would be inconceivable. For example, an individual who has 
spent seven years of his life preparing to be a physician and ten more years 
practicing that profession does not ordinarily have to spend any more time 
deciding whether he should be a physician or not. 
"{ ... Time} narrows appreciably the alternatives that must be considered by 
the individual at each moment, and is certainly a necessary, though not 
sufficient, condition of rationality" (Simon 1957, p68) 
The confidence in our knowledge of the intrinsic causal models at work within a 
situation can be characterised by degrees between certainty and ignorance. 
Ambiguity can be situated somewhere on the continuum between certainty (where 
causal models are known and future states can be finitely attributed) and ignorance 
(whete no causal models are known and no future states can be ruled out). Daniel 
Ellsberg's (1963) seminal work on ambiguity characterises the ambiguity of any 
situation as dependent on the "amount, type, quality and 'unanimity' of information, 
and giving rise to one's degree of 'confidence' in an estimate of relative likelihoods" 
of future possible states (p657). 
Risk and uncertainty literature is almost totally devoted to the ways in which humans 
identity and react to varying degrees of knowledge in future states. The comparative 
effects of certainty, risk and ambiguity on decision-making has been explored widely 
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within organisational contexts (Langholtz et al 1993; Ho et al. 2002; Einhorn and 
Hogarth 1985, 1986; Kunreuther et al. 1995). Both implicitly and explicitly, 
researchers manipulate the amount, type, quality and unanimity of information to 
elicit the efficiency with which actors delineate 'possible' future states as evidenced 
by the information at hand. In the traditional risk and uncertainty literature, gambles 
have been the most commonly employed vehicle by which researchers elicit actor 
behaviours; behaviours which are considered evident through preferences and 
strategies used within the gamble. The reason for the use of gambles (such as the urn 
problem of Ellsberg (1963), rolling a die, or tossing a coin for example) finds its 
roots in history and pragmatism. Historically, most of the risk and uncertainty 
research has employed these gambles, characterised by defined distributions where 
one employs a significant number of trials. 
Given the inherent complexity of most human action, causal attribution to most 
preferred consequences of actions can never be determined with absolute epistemic 
certainty. Ambiguity in real-world decision-making here is characterised by 
epist~mic ambiguity about the appropriate causal attributions of preferred future 
outcomes. When individuals select their preferred set of outcomes, they must discern 
which of a range of possible actions would result in those desired outcomes. This is 
what Simon (1976) defines as strategy. A decision involves the selection of a 
strategy that most closely follows the preferred set of consequences (Simon, 1976, 
p67). He adds that decisions become more than just simply factual propositions 
about current states. Rather, decisions are "descriptive of a future state of affairs" 
(p46). 
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Entropy is built into the structure of escalation decision dilemmas, by the use of 
aspirations, plans, resource limits, deadlines, and penalties and rewards for 
achievement of goals. Furthermore losses faced on exit from a an escalating course 
of action are not all sunk and not all known - often there are future penalties and 
costs arising precisely out of the reductions in alternatives that were necessitated at 
previous decision-points. It is erroneous to assume that prior decisions and 
investments are sunk and that decisions made at any point in time exist 
independently of others. 
Expectations as Reference Points and Setbacks as Variations 
Expectations Defined 
In the absence of known probabilities and outcomes, decision-makers form 
expectations about future states based on their own plans and intended actions. 
Expectations m_anifest from the causal models created by our knowledge of the 
relationships between current actions and future states. Effective decisions require 
knowledge of the problem space in order to "determine which consequences follow 
upon' which of the alternative strategies" (Simon, 1976, p68). The more we know 
about the causal mechanisms at work in the problem space, the better we will 
become at predicting the future states that evolve out of our decisions to undertake 
actions in the present. Simon (1976) acknowledges that we can never know precisely 
all of the consequences that arise out of our present behaviours. Rather, we form 
"expectations of future consequences, these expectations being based upon known 
empirical relationships, and upon information about the existing situation" (p68, 
emphasis in text). 
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Within ambiguous decision contexts (such as escalation situations), expectations 
about project outcomes and expected resource allocations serve as reference points 
by which project team members benchmark project performance. Reference points 
have a number of characteristics: 
I. They represent intended outcomes; 
2. They are sourced from either the individual, group or the organisation; 
3. They are often determined through history or force of precedent; and 
4. They are often socially constructed and negotiable. 
One set of reference points examined in previous literature and relevant to the 
current inquiry were those of hurdle rates. Cheng, Schultz et al. (2003, p65) 
investigated how the strength of the "psychological contract" created by a personally 
set hurdle rate affected the strength and salience of that hurdle rate in the face of an 
under-performing project. The strength of a hurdle rate set by the individual 
themselves, they argue, should create enough of a cognitive attentional load to 
"increase the salience of the dissonant feedback" (Cheng, Schultz et al., 2003, p69). 
Emplqying a laboratory study, they used both organisation-set hurdle rates and self-
set hurdle rates and predicted that these hurdle rates acted as a control to deescalate 
or terminate failing projects (that is, the IRR not meeting the required IRR set by the 
hurdle rate). While Cheng, Schultz et al. (2003) could not find support for their 
hypothesis that organization-set hurdle rates significantly reduced the tendency to 
escalate commitment; they did find that self-set hurdle rates were a significant factor 
in reducing the tendency to escalate. 
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Cost, Time and Effort Budgets - More Art Than Science 
The social construction of project expectations create two issues that have 
historically proved significant and often debilitating to the project development 
process. Firstly, those responsible for planning projects often (either wilfully or 
accidentally) tend to significantly underestimate time, cost and effort investments 
required for the smooth development of a project. The underestimation of these 
investment requirements stem from two sources. If accidental, they are often due to 
the widely prevalent problem known as the 'planning fallacy'. The planning fallacy 
was postulated by Beuhler et a!. ( 1994) and relates to the empirically verified 
phenomenon that people systematically underestimate the time it takes them to 
complete tasks due to the use of 'plan-based' scenarios, rather than the use of their 
own past experiences to inform future expectations of required effort. Schmidt et a!. 
(2001) confirm the planning fallacies effect on information systems project 
developments in a Delphi study of IS project managers in which poor estimation, 
insufficient staffing and inadequate planning were all identified as being among the 
top risks that projects face. Another interesting explanation of under-budgeting is 
discussed by Lovallo and Kahneman (2003) who suggest that people display 
systematic 'optimism bias' for future consequences of planned action that induces 
them to underestimate the likelihood of negative consequences and overestimate the 
likelihood of positive consequences of their actions. 
Budgets may also be wilfully or deliberately understated. These budgets often suffer 
the limitation that they are agreed upon and committed to at the outset of a venture. 
This may become problematic if these budgets are deliberately understated in order 
to 'sell' the project to an organisation or client, either by overstatement of the 
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expected outcomes of the development or by understatement of the realistic resource 
requirements (Smithson and Hirschheim 1998). This understatement is often used as 
a selling tool for project managers especially when they are in competition with 
others for contracts from clients, or for funding within the organisation. Selling 
project in this way is often believed to be a necessary pretext for project inception 
and funding. 
Expectations within Projects 
Expectations arise in two basic forms within project management in information 
systems contexts: 
I. Expectations about the project outcomes; 
2. Expectations about the resource investments required to attain these 
outcomes. 
Expectations about Project Outcomes and Deliverables 
Project outcome expectations relate to the goals for undertaking a project and can be 
trace(,i to the goals, scope and strategic value of the project. Project deliverable 
expectations relate to the sub-goals representing progress towards the intended 
outcome, such as project milestones and stage gates. These are typically codified 
within a project plan, most commonly in a project specification document and the 
project plan. Within information systems project developments, Fitzgerald (1998) 
identifies two broad categories of project outcomes from systems development 
projects. He identifies a broad class of 'efficiency' projects, those that aim to reduce 
the costs of a process by introducing information technology. Secondly he identifies 
'effectiveness' projects which "better achieve the required results, leading to 
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increased revenues, better service or whatever" (Fitzgerald 1998, pl8). Butler Cox 
(1990) identifies three additional types of project outcomes: mandatory investments 
(due to legal requirements, enforced monitoring et cetera), infrastructure investments 
(such as technology platforms, communications systems or other enablers of systems 
and services), and research investments (increase future potentials of technology), 
the latter of which is a special case where the ultimate objectives or expected values 
of such investments may often be unclear. 
Each of these five general classes of projects will exhibit differing metrics with 
regards to their expected outcomes. The point made here is that these projects are 
initiated with certain expectations of intended outcomes from project sponsors, 
development teams, user groups and other external stakeholders. The expectations 
are often codified within project plans and benchmarks, and most of the prominent 
information systems development textbooks and literatures advocate the 
establishment and agreement of these expectations among the various interest groups 
as the first activity to be undertaken during the planning process (Project 
Mana2ement Institute 2000). 
Expectations about Resource Investments 
Expectations about resource investments relate to the anticipated requirements, most 
commonly in terms of investments of money, time and effort. These expectations are 
usually codified within cost budgets, time plans and activity schedules. Y etton et al. 
(2000) use budgets and budget variances as the key measure that captures the 
effectiveness with which a project is undertaken. Variances from resource 
expectations are operationalised through budget variances. Johnson (1995), Hallows 
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(1998) and Yelton et al. (2000) identify time and cost variances as a key measure of 
a project manager's effectiveness. 
The importance of variations from expectations is critical to the investigations 
undertaken within this research programme as these will be shown to be absorbed 
and tolerated within ZOTs and corrected outside ZOTs. These corrections are 
manifest by actions ranging in severity from cost corrections (budget tightening) 
through to de-escalation and project abandonment. 
Two Expectation Reference Points: Aspiration Level and Survival 
"What he [the decision-maker] does is to form expectations of future 
consequences, these expectations being based upon known empirical 
relationships, and upon information about the existing situation. " (Simon 
1957, p68) 
Reference points, particularly aspiration-level reference points, are "central to 
theories of individual and organisational choice" (March and Shapira 1992, pl72). 
Aspirational reference points refer a specific and significant value metric relevant to 
the measurement of an expected outcome. Examples of aspiration-level reference 
points are budget figures, schedule deadlines, usage and deliverables metrics. March 
and Shapira (1992, pl73) extended the notion of reference points given a few more 
real-world constraints on the decision-maker. They assert that decisions change with 
respect to not only status quo, but also with "the amount of current resources and the 
history of reaching that amount". Aspiration-level reference points were employed 
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by Kahneman and Tversky's {1979) as a status quo expectation that adapts with 
experience and expected returns. 
Unlike Kahneman and Tversky' s ( 1979) prospect theory model, March and Shapira 
(1992) postulate a second 'survival reference point' which represents the point at 
which resources are exhausted. Risky decisions, then, are predicated on which of the 
two reference points the decision-maker is attending to. They explain that: 
"aggregate risk-taking behaviour in a population is attributable partly to the 
way the process affects the accumulation of resources, partly to the way it 
distributes risk takers to success and failure (in terms of their own aspiration 
levels), and partly to the way it allocates attention between the two reference 
points" (p174). 
Bright Lines and Mutable Reference Points 
Budget amounts, deadlines, usage metrics, quality requirements et cetera can either 
be mutable or immutable depending on the context and qualities of the expectation in 
question. Immutable reference points have been referred to by Schelling (1960) (and 
commonly within law) as 'bright lines', especially salient outcomes where deviations 
are markedly noticeable and significant. An example of a bright line survival 
reference point could be a budget spending limit, the points at which there are no 
longer any resources to spend, regardless of whether or not a decision-maker still 
wished to continue spending. 
Reference points are usually a little less transparent within a project management 
context. This is especially so if reference points are situated in a cardinal space (e.g. 
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in terms of money or time). These mutable reference points adapt to the changing 
circumstances of the organisation and the project and have the potential to be 
influenced by the actors involved in the decision-making process. 
Tolerance for Variations 
Budget overruns compounded to an unreasonable degree lead to entrapment episodes 
that may compel decision-makers to operate against the economic, social and moral 
incentives and disincentives available to them. Case study research by Keil (1995b) 
suggests that, in some circumstances, escalation is due to the project manager's 
allowance of budget variances in a tenacious attempt to salvage a project from 
failure. Prior escalation studies (such as Arkes and Blumer 1985) have examined 
escalation by giving decision-makers the binary decision to either allocate the entire 
remaining budget to complete the project or to abandon the project immediately. 
However, negat~ve information does not often lead to considerations of project 
abandonment. Project teams may attempt to resolve problems that arise during 
development so that the project may stay viable. Therefore, in order to ascertain the 
veracity of ambiguous cues, project managers may decide to continue investment in 
projects with a view to addressing some of the sources of potential project failure. 
Similarly, project managers may adopt a 'wait and see' approach by delaying the 
decision in order to better understand the likelihood of success or failure of the 
project. This approach to addressing ambiguity in information systems development 
environments effectively involves 'paying a premium' for ambiguity reduction by 
delaying the abandonment decision until such time as the ambiguities surrounding 
the likelihood of success are better understood. Ironically, tentatively continuing an 
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investment to reduce ambiguity may be seen to be compounding the likelihood of 
failure by causing the very escalating commitment it seeks to avoid. 
Ambiguity is the major reason for the encoding of tolerance within project plans. 
Within the context of project management, expectations about project outcomes and 
expectations of resource investments required to generate those outcomes represent 
the majority of all measurable reference points available to a decision-maker. 
Resource investments, the main object of inquiry within this research programme, 
relate to cost, time and quality budgets for projects. Of all project management tools 
available to decision-makers in projects there are few if any commonly accepted 
project management techniques that advocate the imposition of bright line budget 
limits, of which a breach would represent serious correction or stoppage of the 
project. Rather, budget overruns are usually dealt with on an ad hoc basis - and 
decisions to approve resource expenditures in excess of budget expectations depend 
greatly on the level of tolerance for these overruns expressed either by decision-
makers or through the environments in which they operate. The standard project 
management technique of incorporating resource slack into project plans is evidence 
of this phenomenon. 
Why do project managers acquiesce to budget variances to the extent that they do? 
To what extent does ambiguity drive the decision-making process? It could well be 
argued, in many cases, that the costs to the decision-maker of tolerating project 
slippages are lower than the costs of revising and correcting those slippages. This 
would suggest an asymmetric value function that implies that tolerance is more 
advantageous than correction. In cases such as these the self-interested or 
57 
Chapter 2- Literature Review 
opportunistic decision-maker would be best served by allowing variances to up to the 
point at which the cost of project slippages exceeds the benefits of not correcting 
them. A decision-maker faced with these circumstances would tolerate slippages to 
the point where support for these variations from expectations would be violated by 
constraints on the project, such as management I stakeholder support, or project 
constraints such as resource limits and deadlines. Furthermore, if a decision-maker 
knew a priori where these points of tolerance exhaustion lay and the magnitude of 
budget variance experienced by a project could be considered to be 'absorbed' by 
this tolerance, then there would appear to be few disincentives to overspending. 
Ultimately, the problem of allowing such budget overruns within a Zone of 
Tolerance is that overruns tend to have the effect of cascading and compounding 
over time. Making continuous small investments in the hope of a large eventual pay-
offhas been termed by Brockner (1992) as 'entrapment'. Brockner and Rubin (1985) 
exemplifies entrapment in a situation where one has waited 30 minutes for a bus and 
is considering catching a taxi. By waiting a little longer, one can hope to 'salvage' 
wast~d time by continuing to wait for the bus to arrive, or one can catch the taxi at 
the expense of time lost and a costly taxi fare. 
Tentative Conjectures: Variances, Tolerance, Ambiguity and 
Uncertainty 
Tolerance for Ambiguity is Contextual, Not Innate 
The very structure of the escalation of commitment problem seems to imply an 
interaction between variances from expectations and acknowledgement of ambiguity 
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in the decision context. The interplay between the two may lead decision-makers to 
reasonably concede that project setbacks are an inevitable consequence of ambiguity 
or uncertainty. Tolerance therefore, becomes a crucial part of the decision-making 
process. Tolerance may be extended by the decision-maker, but as wiJI be seen later 
in this section, this tolerance is dictated by the organisational and structural context 
within which an escalating project is being developed. 
Ambiguity can be situated somewhere on the continuum between certainty (where 
causal models are known and future states can be finitely attributed) and ignorance 
(where no causal models are known and no future states can be ruled out). Daniel 
EJlsberg' s ( 1963) seminal work on ambiguity characterises the ambiguity of any 
situation as dependent on the "amount, type, quality and 'unanimity' of information, 
and giving rise to one's degree of'confidence' in an estimate of relative likelihoods" 
of future possible states (p657). 
Tolerance for ambiguity has been a widely investigated construct in decision-making 
processes (Norton et al. 1975, Staw and Ross 1978, Teger 1980, Bowen 1987, Ghosh 
1994, among others). Within escalation literature neither Teger (1980) nor Staw and 
Ross (1978) found an effect of tolerance for ambiguity on the propensity to escalate. 
It is contended here that the reason for no discovery of an effect of tolerance for 
ambiguity in these decisions is that ambiguity has historically been investigated as 
internal to the decision-maker and exogenous to the decision context. By contrast, 
this research sees tolerance as inhered within the decision context and a product of 
the organisational and structural characteristics within which a decision-maker is 
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compelled to operate. This ambiguity is either promoted or constrained by the types 
and qualities of expectations and survival limits that are present within this context. 
Proposition 1: Treatment of Variances Within Zones of Tolerance 
As conceptualised by Lawrence and O'Connor (2005) Zones of Tolerance are 
created when a gap exists between reference points. Specifically, when a variance 
between expectations and outcomes is evident, decision-makers are compelled to 
examine the costs and benefits of maintaining the status quo and correcting problems 
(either by budget correction, project redirection or abandonment). If the outcome 
exists at a point where the costs of correction exceed that of maintaining the status 
quo, decision-makers may find it apt and appropriate to tolerance the variance, rather 
than incur these costs. This leads to the following proposition: 
Proposition 1: Decision-makers' reactions to variations from expectations 
associated with a project (overruns, errors, setbacks and other problems) 
depend upon Zones of Tolerance inherent within the project context .. 
Represented graphically, we may infer a relationship between a expected outcome 
metric's (such as a budget) and tolerance overlayed in the following way (Figure 
2.1): 
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Figure 2.1: Hypothesised Effect of Zones of Tolerance 
Zones of tolerance therefore, are a product of the distance between reference points. 
Rather than tolerance being viewed as inherent to the decision-maker, it makes 
ecological sense to surmise that this tolerance is a product of the context of the 
decision and the proximity of outcomes to these reference points. 
Situating Zones of Tolerance within Extant Literature 
The examination of Zones of Tolerance within escalation of commitment decisions 
has hitherto never been applied. Indeed, the nature of this research programme 
represents a broad departure from the extant literature base and necessitated a 
comprehensive examination of the tolerance phenomenon. It is, however, necessary 
to give due investigation to the extant literature base that inspired the current 
research programme. 
The determinants of escalation discovered from 30 years of literature arc diverse and 
complex. What follows is an in-depth investigation into the pre-existing literature 
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and the identification of the key determinants and factors that have been seen to 
contribute to escalation. These factors were discovered by numerous investigators 
through numerous research methods, most commonly case study, survey and 
experiment. Investigators from the fields of information systems, organisational 
behaviour, decision sciences and management have all applied insights from their 
fields to the problem. This is a testament to both the prevalence of the problem, its 
complexity and the multiperspectival character of its determinants. 
Three determinants of escalation have received much attention: management 
support, sunk costs, the completion effect. Within organisational behaviour 
literature, significant attention is allocated to the notion of sunk costs (Arkes and 
Blumer 1985, Garland 1990, Garland, Sandfeur and Rogers 1990, Arkes and Ayton 
1999, Arkes and Hutzel 2000, Keil, Mann et al. 2000) and completion (Garland and 
Newport 1991, Conlon and Garland 1993, Keil 1995a, Boehne and Paese 2000, 
Humphrey et al. 2004) as fundamental determinants of escalation. Management 
support, driven by self justification and cognitive dissonance, has received attention 
predolflinantly within information systems and psychology literature. What follows 
is a discussion of the sunk cost fallacy and completion effect. Subsequent to this 
discussion, we then employ a commonly accepted taxonomy of escalation factors: 
project, psychological, social and organisational/structural (Ross and Staw 1986 and 
1993, Drummond 1994, Keil 1995b, Newman and Sabherwal1996). This taxonomy 
has been used repeatedly throughout the escalation research and this literature review 
remains faithful to that classification. 
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The primary purpose of the remainder of this section is to put forward the argument 
that most escalation determinants are in fact manifestations of, or antecedent to, the 
factors identified within the organisational and structural determinants of escalation 
-technical side bets (Becker 1960), strong advocacy by key decision-makers and the 
nature of management controls, among others. These structural factors, impregnated 
into the organisational context writ large, act as scaffolding upon which decision-
makers determine their own tolerance for projects, and find constraints situated 
within the organisational context. These organisationaVstructural factors can be seen 
to be the most significant (albeit not the only) determinants of Zones of Tolerance. 
These organisationaVstructural factors encode tolerance into the decision context and 
it is postulated within this research programme that decision-makers react to these 
encoded conditions. Previous literature (particularly Drummond 1994) strongly 
suggests that the reference points that demarcate and delimit these ZOTs are most 
often found within these organisationaVstructural factors. 
When projects exist in isolation of the organisational context they can be seen to be 
influenced by very different determinants of escalation. In cases such as these, 
characterised by a lack of technical side bets (Becker 1960) and decision-making 
responsibility found within one individual (as opposed to a group), one could argue 
that the psychological determinants of irrational support may be more relevant. 
It is important to acknowledge Drummond's (1994) insight that most organisation-
driven projects (in particular information systems projects) are not ad hoc. Projects 
situated within organisations, however, face many more constraints and influences. 
Projects are embedded within organisations, and project constituencies can be 
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diverse and conflicting (such as the project Steering Committee, the project manager, 
users, customers, suppliers and other stakeholders). In these situations, the 
overarching organisational and structural constraints are more important and more 
salient to the decision processes that occur when a project faces escalation. 
Thus it will be argued that, in the main, Zones of Tolerance are constituted by these 
organisational and structural factors. This is not to say that other determinants will 
impinge upon this process. For the purposes of this research programme (largely a 
preliminary and limited investigation into the phenomenon of Zones of Tolerance), 
these organisational and structural factors will constitute the predominant metrics 
used by decision-makers to determine their course of action when faced with 
escalating projects. 
A Detailed Look at Extant Literature 
From Ambiguity to Its Manifestations 
A ri~h body of literature has developed around information systems project 
escalation. Within the context of information systems, escalation literature has 
typically focussed on causes due to project management failures during 
development. Time and cost overruns of IS development projects are attributed to 
mismanagement during the development cycle, obstruction by stakeholders and the 
inability to accept uncompensated losses by abandoning failing projects (Abdel-
Hamid, 1988; Keil 1995b; Keil et al. 1995, Newman & Sabherwal, 1996). An IS 
project manager facing the decision to escalate commitment to a failing system's 
development must evaluate whether it is more reasonable to abandon the project or 
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to complete it in an attempt to recoup as much of the investment as possible. In 
making this decision, these project managers are faced with high degrees of 
ambiguity. Ambiguity may be induced by conflicting information arriving from 
several sources whose authenticity and impact on the project needs to be assessed. 
There may be outcome-based ambiguity about a project's future costs, the value of 
the completed project and process-based ambiguity concerning whether the 
technologies to be implemented will work as planned. 
Abdel-Hamid (1988) suggests that IS projects are hampered by poor estimation of 
progress due to the inherent intangibility of the product under development and 
unreliability in information used to forecast time and cost budgets. In software 
development there are "no visible milestones to measure progress and quality like a 
physical product" (Abdel-Hamid et al., 1993, p604). It is very difficult to manage 
software development, he argues, since it is difficult to measure development costs, 
schedules and project development rates (Abdel-Hamid et al., 1993; Sengupta & 
Abdel-Hamid, 1996, Moores and Edwards 1992). He found that a common problem 
withi{l IS development is the phenomenon of the '90% syndrome', where project 
completion status increases uniformly to around 90% and tends to plateau until the 
project is completed (Abdel-Hamid, 1998). 
Loss Aversion as an Escalation Determinant 
The fundamental decision problem inherent to escalation of commitment is whether 
to abandon or continue a project when information becomes known that reduces its 
likelihood of success. The compulsion to finish a project may be extremely strong 
despite knowledge of its possible failure. The project abandonment decision will 
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require that some amount of previously invested costs, termed sunk costs, will be 
irrecoverable. This may be manifest as investments of time, cost, effort or even the 
reputation of the managers that have supported the system's development. 
This phenomenon can often be explained through Prospect Theoretic evidence that 
suggests that losses are significantly more salient and keenly felt than equivalent 
gains (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). The findings from this literature confirm 
March and Shapira's (1992) conjectures that decision-makers focus their attention on 
salient indicators of loss functions, such as the proximity of an outcome to the 
aspiration reference points (i.e. goals) as well as to the survival points (i.e. resource 
exhaustion). In sum, decision-makers are influenced by the presence or threat of 
punitive losses of variations of outcomes from their expectations. Decision tasks in 
which survival is not threatened or losses will not occur create antecedent conditions 
for generally more 'lazy', self-interested or opportunistic resource allocation 
decisions. 
The $unk Cost Effect 
The biggest effect of loss aversion within an escalation context is seen as manifest 
through the 'sunk cost effect'. The 'sunk cost effect' biases decision-makers to 
become impelled to continue a course of action due to their inability to reconcile 
with their losses. Classical economic theory considers sunk cost concerns as 
irrational. Extant theory asserts that sunk costs should not be factored into future 
investment decisions, since they cannot be altered by the decision variables (Arkes 
and Blumer 1985; Arkes and Ayton 1999; Arkes and Hutzel 2000). However, 
Kahneman and Tversky ( 1979) empirically prove that while the sunk cost effect may 
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be irrational, "a person who has not made peace with his losses is likely to accept 
gambles that would be unacceptable to him otherwise" (p287). Contrary to the 
dictates of expected utility theory, their descriptive account of risk preference, 
known as prospect theory, maintains that loss aversion, rather than risk aversion, is 
the stronger motivator behind choices involving risky prospects. The theory states 
that a decision to accept risk is not invariant across all domains; rather, it is reference 
dependent and contingent upon the possibility of making a gain or a loss relative to 
the status quo. The prospect of abandoning a project and incurring a loss with 
certainty "increases the aversiveness to losses as well as the desirability of gains" 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979, p269). They find that when faced with the option of a 
certain loss (abandonment of development) or the risky possibility of recouping 
losses with an attendant increase in investment (escalation of commitment), 
decision-makers tend to prefer to take their chances. 
Arkes and Blumer's (1985) examination into escalation of commitment regards the 
sunk cost effect as a "robust judgement error" (p 139) which is "irrational, no matter 
ho\Y compelling [the argument) may seem" (p 126) and "promotes lingering until the 
bitter end" (pl26). In a series of experiments, they investigate how the presence of 
sunk costs affects peoples' decisions to escalate commitment to chosen courses of 
action. These experiments included organisational decisions on troubled projects 
such as the highly replicated airplane experiment (see Figure 2.2) as well as personal 
decisions (such as where to go on holiday after paying for two trips for the same 
weekend). They found that individuals tended to want to complete projects when 
presented with sunk cost information (expressed as a percentage of the total budget). 
Thus, Arkes and Blumer (1985) show that the 'sunk cost fallacy' impacts upon 
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decisions and becomes salient in the decision to abandon projects. The Arkes and 
Blumer (1985) experiments, particularly the airplane investment problem (Figure 
2.2) have been replicated a number of times in several studies into the sunk cost 
phenomenon (for example, Garland 1990, Conlon and Garland 1993 and Keil et al. 
1995). 
As the president of an airline company, you have invested I 0 
million dollars of the company's money into a research project. The 
purpose was to build a plane that would not be detected by 
conventional radar, in other words, a radar-blank plane. When the 
project is 90% completed, another firm begins marketing a plane 
that cannot be detected by radar. Also, it is apparent that their plane 
is much faster and far more economical than the plane your 
company is building. The question is: should you invest the last I 0% 
of the research funds to finish your radar-blank plane? 
Yes41 !No 7 
Arkes and Blumer (1985) 
Figure 2.2: Arkes and Blumer's (1985 p129) Airplane Experiment 
The Completion Effect 
"Better is the end of a thing than the beginning. " 
Book of Ecclesiastes 7:8 
Conlon and Garland (1993) postulate a 'completion effect', based on prospect theory 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), which describes the increasing tendency to escalate 
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commitment to a failing project as it draws nearer to completion. The completion 
effect conforms more closely to prospect theory than the sunk cost effect (Whyte, 
1986). As Kahneman and Tversky ( 1979) explain, prospect theory concludes that 
sensitivity to gains or losses are not evaluated in terms of total wealth, but by relative 
gains and losses from a reference point, such as a total budget or an expected return. 
Prospect theory's value function is hypothesised as concave for gains and convex for 
losses (see Figure I). In this case, gains and losses are determined in relation to a 
reference point that represents an initial asset position. From this reference point, the 
relative magnitude of gain or loss from this reference point is the main carrier of 
value, rather than the absolute amount of that change. 
Kahneman and Tversky ( 1979) exemplify this relativity by showing how individuals 
tended to value the difference between $100 and $200 much more than the 
difference between $1100 and $1200, even though there is no difference between the 
two in absolute terms. Furthermore, the value function is steeper for losses than for 
gains, since "losses loom larger than gains. The aggravation that one experiences in 
losin,g a sum of money appears to be greater than the pleasure associated with 
gaining the same amount" (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
\IALUE 
lOSSES GA.1NS 
Figure 2.3: The Prospect Theory Value Function (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) 
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Garland and Newport (1991) question the construct validity of Arkes and Blumer's 
(1985) treatment of sunk costs suggesting instead that "relative sunk cost" (later 
termed the 'completion effect'), rather than the absolute amount of the prior 
investment, significantly affected decisions to escalate. Garland and Newport (1991) 
aver "individuals should be more likely to persist in a chosen course of action when 
these dollars represent a higher proportion of their anticipated budget" (p58). This 
hypothesis finds empirical support within prospect theory and IS escalation research 
(Keil, Mann et al., 2000). They see sunk costs as being confounded with the 
completion effect in Arkes and Blumer ( 1985) by the expression of sunk costs as a 
proportion of the overall budget. Garland and Newport (1991) find that 67% of their 
respondents tended to escalate commitment in conditions of high proportional sunk 
cost, as opposed to 28% within the context of a proportionally low sunk cost, 
regardless of its absolute dollar value. On the other hand, the tendency to escalate 
appeared invariant when subjects were presented with absolute sunk costs without 
reference to a total budget. Conlon and Garland (1993) empirically validate that sunk 
cost l'fld project completion represent two theoretically different constructs3• Varying 
the levels of sunk cost and percentage completion independently, Conlon and 
Garland (1993) find that the completion effect positively correlated with the 
tendency to escalate and found no significant effect from the absolute level of sunk 
cost incurred. Garland and Conlon's (1998) replication of the previous completion 
effect studies using various demographic samples also found strong support for this 
3 Practically, however, they would most likely be highly related. As one gets closer to completion, one 
is likely to have spent more of the budget. However, the point of Conlon and Garland's (1993) 
argument is that the relative, rather than absolute, amount of spending is more important to decision-
makers. 
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finding. Within the IS context, Keil and Mann. (1997) finds strong support for the 
completion effect in a survey of IS auditors. 
Garland and Conlon ( 1998) hypothesise that "[a ]s a project completion increases, 
subjects' willingness to continue investment in the project will increase." This 
implies that the completion effect is correlated with the proportion of the project 
completion. However, in their operationalisation of the completion effect 
phenomenon, the study employs a limited set of completion rates; 20% and 80% in 
the first experiment, I 0% and 90% in the second and third. Similarly, Conlon and 
Garland (1993) examine the completion effect using project completion rates of 
I 0%, 50% and 90%. Studies of the completion effect have consistently used high 
rates of completion (80% and over) in the operationalisation of the completion effect 
(see Table 2.1). Although Garland (1990) reports a linear correlation using 
completion rates of I 0%, 30%, 50%, 70% and 90%, the study suffers from common 
method variance. Bias is induced into the research instrument as the response mode 
has the same scale as the level of completion reported in the scenario proposed. In 
GarJand's results, there is quite a clear similarity between the completion effect 
(expressed as a percentage) and the respondents' likelihood of contributing more 
funds (also expressed as a percentage). This criticism is given further cogency by the 
study's non-significant results when correlating completion effect with the 
respondents' belief that the project will be profitable. That is to say, the belief in the 
profitability of the project is empirically proven not to correlate with the level of 
completion. Despite claims by these studies that the completion effect has a 
monotonic association with the tendency to escalate, this linearity has never been 
conclusively established. 
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Table 2.1: Completion Levels Employed When Examining Completion Effect 
Completion Rates Low Intermediate High 
Garland (1990) 10%,30% 50% 70%,90% 
Garland & Newport (1991) 10%, 15%, 20% 90%, 85%, 80% 
Conlon & Garland (1993) 10% 50% 90% 
Garland & Conlon (1998) 10% 90% 
The effects of completion may be better understood by examining its causal source. 
While providing a robust descriptive account of changing risk preference, prospect 
theory does not attempt to address the cause of the phenomena. The causal source of 
the completion effect is not adequately addressed even within escalation literature 
itself, although Garland and Conlon (1998) provide a tentative explanation of the 
completion effect in terms of Lewin's (1935) theories of goal satisficing. Lewin 
postulates that proximity to a goal, even if it is unattainable, creates an independent 
incentive to complete that goal. In situations where the primary goal is unattainable, 
the "attainment of a substitute goal, a consolation, or an encouragement is, for a 
child, to a rather considerable degree the equivalent of a genuine success." However 
Garland and Conlon (1998) fail to report that Lewin's (1935) examination of this 
hypothesis comprised of experiments conducted by testing infants with tasks of 
varying difficulty. Whether these findings can be extrapolated to information 
systems projects is a matter for conjecture. 
Ambiguity and the Completion Effect 
As a project draws nearer to completion, ambiguity usually diminishes that relates to 
whether the technology works and what the final costs will be. At completion, the 
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only significant ambiguity remaining is the value of the project itself. This ambiguity 
reduction in the final stages of the project may be the real reason for the completion 
effect. Garland and Newport (1991) and Conlon and Garland (1993) replicated the 
Arkes and Blumer (1985) instrument in their studies with the additional construct of 
project completion. 
Self-Justification and Management Support 
"!could not love thee, dear, so much, lov 'd I not honour more. " 
Richard Lovelace 
Strong, public and continued support for troubled projects by key decision-makers 
such as a project's management team deserves significant attention as it has been 
robustly identified as one of the most significant predictors of commitment to 
troubled projects (Schmidt et al. 200 I). The hypothesised effects arising from 
management support and personal responsibility within escalation theory has 
borrowed heavily from Festinger's (1957, 1964) 'theory of cognitive dissonance'. 
The• founding idea within the theory of cognitive dissonance is that individuals strive 
toward consistency within themselves (Festinger, 1957). Once decisions are made, 
individuals tend to innately conduct cognitive processes of self-justification in order 
to 'freeze' and rationalise the decision in their own minds. Challenging this 
rationalising process by providing negative or disconfirming information will induce 
the decision-maker to actively and deliberately avoid situations and information 
which would likely increase dissonance between their perceptions and actions 
(Festinger, 1957). These challenges may arise from logical inconsistencies in 
information, adherence to cultural mores and decisions based on past experience. 
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Cognitive dissonance is said to occur when decision-makers actively suppress or 
reframe negative information pertaining to the project, rather than adjusting their 
previously-held beliefs about the likelihood of project failure. 
Keil (1995) found that strong management support is coupled with high degrees of 
personal responsibility felt by senior members of project teams are one of the most 
consistent and significant predictors of escalating commitment to troubled projects. 
This is especially so if managers tie the success of the project to their own standing 
within organisations or if it is likely to affect their future job prospects. Negative 
information about a project's status is seen to be actively ignored since it goes 
against a manager's own conceptions of the viability of projects and creates 
cognitive dissonance in the mind of a decision maker. This may be often 
compounded by their emotional, financial or otherwise personal investment in the 
project's outcomes. 
Support from management is not the only source of support necessary to prop up 
trou,bled projects. While senior management, in the form of a Steering Committee or 
a project management team, are most often the key decision-makers in funding and 
continuation decisions, support from users, suppliers, customers and other external 
stakeholders is also critical to the eventual success or failure of a project. A lack of 
support from any of these constituencies may lead to an erosion of overall support 
that would necessitate a project's eventual termination. 
In the case of Vancouver's world fair the Expo 86 (Ross and Staw 1986), a strong 
determinant of the escalation of the project was the exigencies associated with the re-
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election of the public officials that provided their support. The need to justify prior 
investments is especially strong when "prior expenditures are irrevocable, public, 
freely chosen and repeated" (Keil 1995b ). The effect of personal responsibility and 
justification, according to Keil et al. (2000) may be both a phenomenon in the social 
sense (justifying actions to peers) as well as the personal (decision-makers 
convincing themselves of the efficacy of their decision). Ross and Staw (1986; 1993) 
also found that management support was often extended in order to justify the 
project to peers within the organisation or the public. 
Staw (1976) applies the theory of cognitive dissonance to escalation by proposing 
'self-justification theory'. Cognitively, individuals strive for consonance in decisions 
post hoc. This behaviour may become aberrant when they "go beyond the passive 
distortion of adverse consequences in an effort to rationalise a behavioural error" 
(Staw and Fox, 1977, p432). This theory states that individuals are most likely to 
invest additional resources to failing projects in order to justify their previous 
investment decisions. In such situations, suppressing negative information may 
becqme a causal source for escalating commitment to a failing project. Staw and Fox 
(1977) find that investment decisions under conditions of high personal 
responsibility are more unstable than under conditions of low personal responsibility, 
however did not find self-justification persisting over time. 
Not only can these impressions occur within an individual, such as the project 
manager or project sponsor, self-efficacy arising out of prior success may also occur 
within an entire project team. Festinger's (1957) theory is enrolled to explaining the 
effects on escalation by management's history of past success. Keil (1995b) finds 
75 
Chapter 1- Literature Review 
that "a prior success may inhibit a decision-makers's willingness to re-examine the 
current course of action, thus promoting escalation". He reports one interviewee 
within the case organisation suggesting that the project managers' success with a 
recently completed project led to the belief that he could "hit that home run again" 
(Keil, 1995b). Festinger (1957) specifically mentions 'past experience' as a conduit 
for impressions of self-efficacy. 
Based on the theory of cognitive dissonance, Staw's (1976) self-justification theory 
asserts that negative information is suppressed by decision-makers post hoc, leading 
to bias in future decisions. However, Festinger (1957) is more moderate in his 
description of the individual's receptivity to negative information, stating that 
decisions may be made with due acknowledgment of negative information that may 
impact the decision. This is especially prevalent when two negative options are 
placed in direct opposition (such as the decision to escalate or abandon a project). He 
states, 
"The mere presence of two negative alternatives does not put the person in a 
decision situation unless there are some other factors that force him to 
choose between them. If this occurs, the same consequences concerning 
dissonance will exist after the choice has been made. There will be some 
cognitive elements favouring the choice of the other alternative. No matter 
which is chosen, there will then be a number of cognitive elements 
dissonant with the cognition about the action" (Festinger 1975, p36, 
emphasis added). 
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Festinger (1957), in apologia of decision-makers, acknowledges that "very few 
situations are clear-cut enough that opinions and behaviours are not to some extent a 
mixture of contradictions" (p5). In other words, decision-makers need not 
necessarily actively ignore negative information when deciding to escalate 
commitment to a project. In fact, Festinger (1957) asserts that most decisions one 
must make will be in direct opposition to certain information that refutes the appeal 
of the option chosen. 
Questioning Management Support 
While strong management support for projects appears both intuitively and 
empirically supported as a key determinant of escalation, it is important not to 
neglect certain qualifiers to this argument. Research by Sharma and Yelton (2003) 
finds that management support is also significantly correlated with project success. 
That is to say, strong management support is necessary for any IS project to be 
successful, both to maintain interest in the project at an organisational level and to 
encourage usage of the systems implemented. Employing surveys, Yelton et a!. 
(1999) find empirically that "[s]enior management support, as measured by resource 
commitment, clarity of objectives and communication of objectives, increases the 
likelihood that the project is completed and not redefined or abandoned" (p277). 
While this study does not exclusively examine escalated projects, it does give insight 
into the relative importance of strong management commitment in any project 
venture. Indeed, Sauer (1993, p27) conjectures that the absence of management 
support itself is a sign of project failure, stating that failure "fmally and irreversibly 
occurs when the level of dissatisfaction with a system is such that there is no longer 
enough support to sustain it" (although this is questioned by Boehm (2000) who sees 
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project termination as an inevitable aspect of software development). While Keil 
( 1995b) finds empirical validation of management support as a determinant of 
escalation, Keil et a!. ( 1998) empirically validate the opposite conclusion. In a 
survey of project managers in three countries found that the most significant risk 
during project development was the potential for "lack of top management 
commitment to the project" (rated by Likert scale for relative importance against 
twelve potential project risks). 
Management support appears to be necessary, therefore, for all projects regardless of 
whether they are escalated or not. Contrary to some escalation theories, strong 
management support is not just a determinant of projects that are likely to go over 
time and over budget. Rather, it is a determinant of all projects that do not 
experience early termination. Aristotleans would label the empirical validation of 
management support construct in escalation literature a fallacy of secundum quid, the 
failure to acknowledge qualifiers to an argument proposed. Strong management 
support, therefore, is lauded when projects are successful and blamed when they are 
not- Regardless of the motive behind the support, poor decisions leading to 
escalation of commitment cannot logically be solely ascribed to continued support 
for a project. 
Management Support Really Represents Tolerance 
It is reasonable to assert that, in reality, information systems projects, indeed projects 
and ventures in toto, rarely if ever progress precisely as planned during the course of 
its development. Unanticipated events (negative or positive) may affect either the 
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eventual outcomes that a project can reasonably achieve, or the resources required to 
achieve them. When unanticipated setbacks occur they force a project's stakeholders 
to evaluate whether or not they will continue their support for the course of action, 
whether it should be re-directed or whether it should be abandoned. For a project to 
withstand setbacks without redirection or termination, project stakeholders must be 
willing to tolerate these setbacks as a 'necessary evil'. 
Management support, therefore, is too imprecise a term for a decision-maker's 
attitudinal stance when assessing their reactions to unanticipated setbacks. Decision-
makers deciding to absorb setbacks on the path towards an implementation goal 
tolerate setbacks (rather than support them). Thus management tolerance is perhaps 
a term more specific and germane to the failure question. 
Project, Psychological, Social and Organisational/Structural Factors 
A little over thirty years of escalation research has provided a litany of causal 
contributors to escalation in addition to the sunk cost, completion and management 
support constructs discussed previously. These determinants have been ascertained 
and investigated through a range of research methods, most commonly through case 
study, survey and experiment. The list of causes is extensive and indeed 
contradictory in some cases (such as for management support). Nevertheless, many 
within the catalogue of determinants have been found consistently across a range of 
case studies and found significant within experimental research. 
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Much of the research into escalation of commitment in project management has been 
conducted using a case study or survey research design. Such examples are Ross and 
Staw's (1993) investigation into the Shoreham nuclear power plant, Ross and Staw's 
(1986) investigation of the 1986 Expo, Keil's (1995b) study into the CONFIG 
development and Drummond's (1999) case study of TAURUS. These projects 
represent large-scale, highly escalated failures receiving wide public attention during 
development. Case study research into the escalation phenomenon has the ostensible 
aim of theory building and is deemed significant in absence of research into the 
escalation phenomenon within organisational settings. The authors of these case 
studies argue that the laboratory experiments of Garland and Newport (1991) 
Garland and Conlon (1998), Arkes and Blumer (1985) and Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979), among others, do not capture the organisational dynamics of the 
phenomenon of escalating commitment, perhaps explaining some of their 
contradictory results and implications. 
Ross and Staw (1986) investigated the world fair "Expo 86" hosted and managed by 
the ,government of British Columbia. This project was originally estimated to cost 
$78 million, although the final cost of the escalated venture exceeded $1.5 billion4 • 
Ross and Staw (1993) presents a study of the Shoreham nuclear power plant 
development, initially estimated to cost between US$65-$75 million and abandoned 
after outlays of more than US$5.5 billion. Keil (1995b) examined a software 
development project named CONFIG as an example of escalation. The organisation 
internally funded this development project for over a decade although its failure to 
be adopted by end users ultimately lead to its termination. 
4 Note that Expo 86 was an escalated project (in terms extremely high time and cost ovenuns) rather 
than a 'failed' project since the project maintained enough support to be seen through to execution. 
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What is clear, particularly through case study research, is that no single determinant 
is common to all cases of escalation. Much of the escalation literature has divided 
the contributory determinants of escalation into four classes: project, psychological, 
social and organisational/structural determinants as originally classified by Ross and 
Staw {1986, 1989), borrowed from Brockner and Rubin (1985) 5 Project 
determinants are those factors that are "variables relating to the objective utility of 
one's course of action" and include investment returns, opportunity costs, salvage 
value and the general economic structuring of the project (Ross and Staw, 1986). 
Psychological determinants include self-justification mechanisms, personal values 
and preferences, as well as heuristics and biases in information processing (Ross and 
Staw, 1986). Social determinants include the need to 'save face' or credibility with 
others and social norms, and structural determinants relate to how the organisation 
has structured the project, in terms of political support, and economic and technical 
side-bets (Ross and Staw, 1986). Technical side-bets refer to measures that have 
been undertaken to support and supplement the project "such that withdrawal from a 
cqurse of action involves many changes in an organisation beyond the ending of the 
project itself' (Ross and Staw, 1986). For example, such side-bets could include 
opening new plants, hiring new staff and development of distribution channels (Ross 
and Staw, 1986). Ross and Staw (1986) employed the same framework for case 
study research into escalation that was used by Ross and Staw {1993) and Keil et a!. 
(1995b). 
' It should that the term "structural factors" is used in Staw and Ross ( 1986) which they later renamed 
to "organisational factors" in Ross and Staw (1993). Other papers, such as Drummond (1994) retain 
the use of the term "structural factors" and these are used interchangeably here. 
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Table 2.2a: Project Factor Determinants of Escalation of Commitment 
Escalation Determinant Promotes EOC Controls EOC No Effect 
Project Factors 
Large Payoff I Terminal Value Keil, Mixon et al. (1994), Case & Shane (1988) 
Long-term Payoff Structure Ross and Staw (1986, 1993), Tang (1988) 
Large Closing Costs Ross and Staw (1993) 
Low Salvage Value Ross and Staw (1986, 1993) 
Infeasibility of Alternatives Keil, Mixon et al. (1994) 
Ambiguous Performance Data I Ross and Staw (1986, 1993), Abdei-Hamid 
Inaccurate measurement of progress (1998), Abdei-Hamid, Sengupta et al. (1993), 
Alter and Ginzberg (1978) 
Uncertainty/Ambiguity/Equivocality Bowen (1987), Bragger et al. (1998, 2003), 
Drummond (1997) 
Setbacks Seen as Temporary Keil, Mixon et al. (1994) 
Probability of Success Estimates Arkes and Hutzel (2000), Tan and Yates (1995) Tan and Yates (2002) 
Feedback Ghosh (1997), Hollar et al. (2000) 
Negative Feedback Smith et al. (2001 ), Sabherwal et al (2003) Barton et al. ( 1989) (limited), 
Brockner, et al. (1986), Conlon & 
Parks (1987), Simonson and Slaw 
(1992),Tan & Yates (2002) 
Potential Loss Benartzi & Thaler (1995), Keil, Wallace et al. 
(2000) 
Risk Cule et al. (2001) (Assessment) Kirby and Davis (1998) 
Time Slaw and Fox (1977), Slaw and Barside (1997) 
Budgets Tan and Yates 2002 
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Psychological Factors 
Personal Responsibility I Self 
Justification 
Entrapment 
Information Processing Errors 
Framing 
Sunk Costs 
Reverse Sunk Cost 
Completion Effects 
Reinforcement Traps 
Ambiguity A version 
Table 2.2b: Psychological Factor Determinants of Escalation of Commitment 
Promotes EOC 
Sabherwal et al. (2003) Schoorman & Holahan 
(1996), Staw & Ross 1986, Staw (1976, 1980, 
1981 ), Bazerman et al. (1982), Davis & Bobko 
(1986), Haunschild et al. (1994}, Keil (1995a), 
Keil & Mann (1997), Moon (2001 ), Schaubroek & 
Williams (1993), Schultz & Cheng (2002) 
Brockner & Rubin (1985), Brockner & Houser et 
al. (1986), Brockner, Nathanson et al. (1984) 
Ross & Staw (1986, 1993), Keil (1995b} 
Davis & Bobko (1986), Kahneman et al. (1990) 
Garland (1990), Keil & Mixon (1994 ), Arkes & 
Ayton (1999), Arkes & Blumer (1985), Arkes & 
Hutzel (2000}, Keil, Truex et al. (1995), 
Northcraft & Wolf (1984), Parayre (1995), 
Roodhoft & Warlop (1999), Soman and Cheema 
(2001), Staw & Hoang (1995) 
Bohne & Pease (2000), Conlon & Garland 
(1993) Garland (1990), Garland & Newport 
(1991 ), Humphrey et al. (2004), Keil, Truex et al. 
(1995) 
Ross & Staw (1993), Goltz (1993) 
Fox and Weber (2002), Frank and Brandstatter 
(2002), Ghosh and Ray (1997) 
Controls EOC 
Johnstone (2002) 
No Effect 
Schoorman and Holahan (1996) 
Armstrong (1996), Bohne & Pease 
(2000), Camerer and Weber 
(1999), Garland & Newport (1991 ), 
Soman (2001) (Sunk Time) 
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Table 2.2b: Psychological Factor Determinants of Escalation of Commitment (Continued) 
Promotes EOC Controls EOC No Effect 
Psychological Factors (cont'd) 
Continuity of Champion Ross and Staw (1993), Keil (1995b), Ruchala 
et al. (1996), Schmidt and Calantone (2002) 
Emotional Attachment Ross and Staw (1993), Keil (1995b), Randall 
(1987) 
Prior History of Success Keil (1995b) 
Strong and Repeated Support in Past Keil (1995b) 
Value attached to turnaround Keil (1995b) 
Inaction, Status Quo Bias Arkes, Kung and Hutzel (2002) 
Anticipated Regret Arkes, Kung and Hutzel (2002), Bernheim and 
Thomadsen (2005) 
Loss Aversion I Prospect Theory Thaler, Tversky et al. (1997), Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979), Whyte (1986) 
Self-Efficacy Whyte et al. (1997), Heath and Tversky (1991) 
Job Insecurity Fox and Staw (1979) 
Goal Setting I Hurdle Rates Karlsson et al. (2002) Abdei-Hamid and Sengupta et 
al. (1999), Cheng et al. (2003), 
Simonson and Staw (1992) 
Information Asymmetry Schultz and Cheng (2002), Schwenk (1986) 
Framing Sharp and Salter (1997), Tversky and 
Kahneman (1986), Rutledge (1995), Bazerman 
(1984), Northcraft and Neale (1986), Shafir and 
Tversky (1992) 
Attribute Conflict Fischer et al. (2000), Tversky and Shafir 
(1992a, 1992b), Tversky et al. (1990), 
Redelmeier and Tversky (1992) 
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Table 2.2c: Social Factor Determinants of Escalation of Commitment 
Promotes EOC Controls EOC No Effect 
Social Factors 
Public identification with project Ross and Staw (1993), Drummond (1994, 
1995), Staw and Ross (1988) 
Responsibility for Failure Caldwell and O'Reilly (2003), Kirby and Davis 
(1998), Leatherwood and Conlon (1987) 
Competitive I Political Rivalry Rubin et al. {1980), Haunschild et a1.{1994) , 
Keil (1995b) 
Successful Models of Persistence Staw and Ross {1980), Brockner et al. (1984), 
Ross and Staw (1993) 
Norms of Consistency Ross and Staw (1993), Keil (1995b) 
Public Decision Context Haunschild et al. (1994) 
Emotional Attachment Keil (1995b) 
Prior Resistance Encountered Ross and Staw {1993) 
Group Decision Making Rutledge (1995), Whyte (1989, 1993) Whyte (1991) 
Cultural Impacts Keil, Tan et al. {2000), Sharp and Salter (1997) 
Diffusibility of Blame Leatherwood and Conlon (1987) 
Separating Champion from Sponsor Barton et al. {1989) 
Policy Resistance Fox and Staw (1979) 
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Table 2.2d: Structural I Organisational Factor Determinants of Escalation of Commitment 
Escalation Determinant Promotes EOC Controls EOC No Effect 
Structural Factors 
Economic and Technical Side Bets Becker (1960), Ross and Staw (1993) 
Top Management Support Ross and Staw (1986, 1993), Keil (1995b), 
Hambrick et al. (1993), Sauer (1993) 
Institutionalisation I Strategic Nature Drummond (1994), Ross and Staw (1986, 
of Project 1993) 
Slack Resources Keil (1995), Aloysius (2003) 
Portfolio Effects Marchewka and Keil (1995) 
Alternatives I Opportunity Costs Keil , Truex et al (1995), 
Northcraft and Neale (1986) 
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Escalation as a Multi-Dimensional Construct 
Multidimensionality- A Detailed Look at Factors Promoting Escalation 
The following section details the more influential factors promoting escalation (i.e. 
the most commonly discussed within literature) that have been found to contribute 
to escalation within projects, both within information systems and projects in 
general. These factors are divided into four broad categories of project factors, 
psychological factors, social factors and structural/organisational factors. This 
taxonomy has been used extensively throughout case study research into the 
phenomenon (most notably, Brockner and Rubin 1985, Heemstra and Kusters 1989, 
Ross and Staw 1986, Staw and Ross 1987b, Drummond 1994, Keil 1995b and 
Sabherwal et a!. 2003). Drummond (1994) and Sabherwal et a!. (2003) further 
suggest that their case studies saw evidence of a changing prominence of the four 
classes of deterrflinants over time. As a general taxonomy, this list is useful as a 
categorisation mechanism when dealing with escalation of commitment causes and 
prescribing remedies for their avoidance (refer to Table 2.2). 
A certain conflict is evident upon review of the factors promoting escalation. Many 
of the factors (such as management support discussed previously) would appear to be 
determinants of both success and failure, i.e. that many of these attributes cannot be 
solely factors evident in escalating and failing projects only. Many of these factors 
are evident in information systems project development writ large and stem mostly 
from the high levels of ambiguity present when assessing a project's required 
investments (Abdel-Hamid 1998), future payoffs and anticipated support from the 
project community. 
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Nevertheless, while all of these factors appear to be present within the escalating 
project cases, surveys and experiments investigated here, it will be argued that many 
of these factors are manifestations of underlying organisational/structural constraints 
(or the lack thereof). These organisational/structural factors are the key contributors 
to Zones of Tolerance. Furthermore, it will also be argued that many of these factors 
require as an antecedent condition, organisational and structural constraints that 
allow them to become problems during a project's development. 
Project Factors 
Project factors relate to the objective features of the project itself and typically centre 
around the payoff structures and expected returns specifically associated to the 
project in question. Projects most conducive to escalation have been found display 
some combination of characteristics that indicate that they are long-term 
investments, have long-term payoffs, large eventual payoffs, high closing costs and 
low salvage values or beliefs that setbacks are temporary in nature (Newman and 
S~bherwal 1996, Keil 1995b ). 
Salvage Value, Terminal Value and Closing Costs 
An often discussed element relevant to this is the salvage versus terminal value of 
the project (Keil and Mixon 1994, Case and Shane 1988, Ross and Staw 1986, 
1993). Put simply, when forced to evaluate the relative costs and of project 
abandonment, decision-makers are forced to consider closing costs (Ross and Staw 
1986), salvage values (Keil 1995b) and terminal values (Case and Shane 1998). The 
nature of IT projects is often such that payoffs have the potential to be much larger 
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than the commensurate investments. Keil's (1995b) 'CONFIG' case study reports 
that economic analyses conducted on the (eventually) failed project on three separate 
occasions all reported that the high payoff anticipated from the project strongly 
encouraged continuation despite its rapidly rising costs. 
Ambiguities in Payoff Value, Payoff Structure and Net Present Value 
One of the most conventional and widespread assessment tools available to project 
managers is the calculation of the net present value of a project in order to determine 
whether future cash flows arising from the project's development are sufficient to 
cover the current and future cost outlays. A project's terminal value, therefore, is a 
key estimate necessary to determine whether or not a project is worthwhile. 
Determining future costs and benefits may be difficult, and Case and Shane (1998) 
report that measuring terminal values are often difficult (or even impossible) to 
quantify "because it depended on the value of the qualitative factors such as 
organisational learning, inter-departmental relationships of communication channels, 
competency building, and hypothesis testing" (p773). Furthermore, the ambiguity 
surrownding these future benefits may confound efforts to assess them, as found by 
Ross and Staw (1986) who report that during "much of [Expo 86's] early planning 
stages, the deteriorating financial situation was neither universally accepted or 
verifiable" (p288). The study found a pattern over time, whereby the project "stated 
out as a beneficial project, then entered a period of contested projections, and finally 
became a clear-cut financial loser. Yet the decision to stage Expo [the project] 
remained unchanged" (p289). 
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Ross and Staw (1986) suggest that the assessment of project structure and value are 
insufficient in themselves to promote or inhibit escalation: "[w]e might therefore 
conclude that project variables alone are insufficient to explain commitment to Expo; 
other variables are necessary to explain why the decision to hold Expo was 
repeatedly affirmed despite the growth in project losses" (p289). 
Psychological Factors 
Self-Justification and Management Support 
As discussed previously, management support has consistently been identified as one 
of the most significant determinants of escalation. Yet the contention with this 
conclusion remains that management support is a key in both continuation of 
escalating projects resulting in failure, and continuation of projects resulting in 
success. 
Social Factors 
Social factors are determinants of escalation that arise from group decision-making 
' 
or involvement by stakeholder groups that restrain a decision-maker into continuing 
projects despite an individual's personal beliefs about the project (Brocker and 
Rubin 1985, Newman and Sabherwal 1996). Some of the more common 
determinants of escalation that have been identified within this group of factors 
pertain to competitive rivalry between competing stakeholders, the need for external 
justification and norms of consistency (Rubin et al 1980, Ross and Staw 1993, Keil 
1995, Haunschild eta! 1994, Brockner et al 1994). 
-90-
Chapter 2- Literature Review 
Competitive Rivalry Among Stakeholders 
In a study investigating over-commitment to acqusitions, Haunschild et al. (I 994) 
empirically validate that competition between rival stakeholders creates an 
inordinate commitment to a venture that extends beyond the venture itself and cites 
two reasons for this phenomenon: 
"First, competition indicates that others are interested in the target, and 
participants may be reluctant to "lose" the target to others. Second, 
competition may provide a signal to participants that the target is valuable." 
(p538) 
The contention is that project managers that are competing for resources with other 
stakeholders within and outside the organisation are often compelled into 
commitments for reasons beyond the economic viability of a particular project and 
perhaps may view commitment to particular underperforming projects from a 
strategic perspective. 
Persistence is Synonymous With Strength 
One of the more folkloric aspects of management in general is that commitment to 
projects despite setbacks is often considered a sign of strength and resolve. Staw and 
Ross (I 987b) point out that managers "who can turn things around or convert a 
losing project into a winner" are often rewarded, through promotion or recognition 
(Staw and Ross 1987b, p58). Keil (1995b) speculates that 
"there may be a kind of "hero effect" in which society reserves special praise 
and admiration for leaders who "stick to their guns" and are able to turn 
things around even when there is a low likelihood of success" (p434). 
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The paradox inherent within this popular logic is clear: persistence with eventual 
payoff is rewarded, whereas persistence without eventual reward is reviled, 
regardless of the likelihood of success. Indeed, one may go so far as to conjecture 
social rewards for success may even increase upon payoff as the probability of 
success decreases. 
External Justification 
The two factors discussed above, competitive rivalry and norms of consistency, are 
interlinked with the need for external justification as an escalation determinant. IT 
projects are particularly prone to this when customers, industry and other external 
stakeholders look to public and high profile systems implementations as models for 
implementations success. The contemporary phenomenon of the commoditisation of 
software may create strong incentives for project managers to successfully 
implement benchmark industry applications simply to keep up with competition, 
independent of the value of these implementations to the business itself(Carr 2004). 
Group Decision-Making 
Paradoxically, the effect of group decision-making has been found to be both a 
contributor and an inhibitor to escalation. Rutledge (1995) and Whyte (1993) both 
found group decision-making as a contributory factor in escalation situations, 
whereas Whyte (1995) found that group decision-making contexts can actually act as 
check and balance that mitigate the effect of an individual's personal attachment on 
the decision-making process. The social or group decision-making elements of 
escalation situations are highly germane to any investigation into the escalation 
phenomenon as most projects are initiated, continued and implemented by groups. It 
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is rare for any IT project to be championed, sponsored and developed by any one 
individual except under circumstances where the project is small or of low value. 
The very definition of escalation as arising from a decision that is public (Ross and 
Staw 1986) presupposes that many, if not most organisational escalation situations 
arise through the decision-making of large constituencies of diverse stakeholders. 
Sponsors and Champions 
One of the remedial actions against escalation touted by Barton eta!. (1989) is to use 
the group decision-making process in order to benefit oversight on a project. In an 
experimental scenario involving technology managers as subjects, Barton et a!. 
( 1989) tested whether decoupling responsibility for initial decision to commence a 
project from the subsequent decisions to continue investment and found conditional 
support. They found an interrelationship within the data to suggest that decision-
makers with initial responsibility for commencing a project were more inclined to 
escalate projects than decision-makers who were not responsible for the decision 
upon receiving positive feedback. Counter-intuitively and contrary to their 
expectations, they found the opposite result when decision-makers were given with 
negative (rather than positive) feedback about a project. 
Structural I Organisational Factors 
Structural factors pertain to the extant contextual conditions surrounding the project. 
Staw and Ross (1987b) initially used the term 'structural' to which they later rename 
'organisational' in Ross and Staw (1993). Ross and Staw (1987b, 1993) refer to three 
particular phenomena: technical side bets (Becker 1960), political support and 
institutionalisation. 
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Technical and Economic Side-Bets 
Technical and economic side-bets were postulated by Becker (1960), but 
interestingly have received little attention in commitment and escalation literature. 
Side bets refer to the linking of extraneous interests with a consistent line of activity 
(Becker 1960). Becker puts forward a number of ways in which side bets may be 
manifest within the decision context. Generalised cultural expectations may provide 
penalties for those who violate them, for instance within a culture or a context in 
which consistent behaviour is expected and deviations from this are considered 
erratic or unstable. Impersonal bureaucratic arrangements may provide 
disincentives to change courses of actions, if extraneous financial side-bets (such as 
other development projects) may be threatened by change. An example of this could 
be found if some development projects that are troubled may be continued for the 
purpose of building or retaining the same development teams on future projects. 
Individual adjustment to social positions may be dictated by the social and cultural 
mores within the institution or society. And finally, face to face interactions suggest 
undar-girding social mechanisms that are relevant and significant outside the venture 
in question and these interactions within one domain (such as a troubled project) 
may negatively impact these interactions in other projects. 
Keil (1995b) added three more determinants from his case study investigation, 
namely: 
Strong advocates who provided continued funding and protection; 
Slack resources and loose management controls; 
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Empire building (where divisional managers seek to bolster their departments 
through conspicuous and highly supported projects) 
It will be argued that these structural and organisational factors represent the most 
significant factors that either promote or inhibit escalation. The factors are examined 
in more detail in the following section. 
Significance, Temporal Precedence and Interrelationships - Where Do They 
Exist? 
A significant limitation with case study research is that results often gtve no 
indication of the strength of the relationships between the determinants identified 
and the resultant escalation behaviour. Furthermore, many of the case studies and 
surveys used to analyse escalated projects rely on self-report on behalf of the 
decision-makers involved in the project itself. This opens up significant scope for 
self-report bias, where a decision-maker may consciously or subconsciously skew 
their assessment of past actions towards justification of why they chose to take that 
• 
action, or to assign blame to external parties. Significant doubt persists within this 
research as to which of the four sets of determinants actually contributes most to 
escalation behaviour, where interactions exist and what remedial policies would best 
prevent this behaviour in the future. 
Interaction effects seem to be quite evident, yet remain unreported in much of the 
case study-based escalation literature. For instance, there would appear to be prima 
facie evidence to suggest that Keil's (1995b) identification of project factors relating 
to high personal responsibility and emotional attachment to a project would seem to 
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be associated with the organisational/structural factors relating to the presence of 
strong advocates providing funding and protection. However, in the model suggested 
in his results, these three factors appear independent (see Figure 2.3). It could even 
be argued that many of the project factors impacting upon decisions to persist despite 
the repeated and significant setbacks to the project could have all been prevented had 
there not been an environment of slack resources and loose management controls (an 
organisational/structural factor in Keil's (1995b) model). 
Project Factors 
• Evidence that ccntinuod inveslmenl c:oulcfproduc:e large payoff 
• ProjeCI regan:tod as an 1nvesrmen1 in researdl and developmenl 
• ProjeCI salbacks appeared to be temporary problems 
P-vchologlcal Factors 
• Prior history oi8UCC88S 
• High degree of pen1011al responsilility for lha outcome of the project 
• EIJOft!l in information procosaing ~ • Emotionalallachment lolhe projeel" 
Project I 
Social Factors v Escalation • Competitive rivalry between Sales and Manufacturing • Need for axtemal ]\lstiflclltion 
• Norms for oonsislency 
Organizational Factors 
• Strong advocsllts who provl:led continued funding and protection 
• Empire building • 
• Slack Resources and loose management c:on1ro1s • 
"Indicates factor that has nol been widely discussed in the escalation literature 
Figure 2.4: Summary Model of Factors that Promoted Escalation 
(Keil1995b, p436) 
Not only are the individual factors insufficient as independent explanations of 
escalation behaviour, but the temporal precedence of these factors (and by 
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association, their interdependencies) are not clear. Sabherwal et al. (2003) suggest 
that these four factors appear to have differing effects at different stages of a 
development process. They find, for instance, that project factors such as the size and 
timing of payoffs (project factors) have greater importance at the beginning of a 
project and decline in importance near the end of a project. 
While case studies cannot be seen as prototypical examples of escalation due to 
selection bias, several findings are common. These projects are all reported to have 
experienced strong management support, often due to prior management successes 
and the need for external justification. It was also found that decisions relating to the 
project were prone to errors in information processing and negative effects arising 
from the project's sheer size and complexity (Ross and Staw, 1986; Ross and Staw, 
1993; Keil, 1995, Newman and Sabherwal, 1996, Wallace et al. 2004). These 
findings must be moderated by the lack of predictive ability and external validity. 
Hoyle et al. (2002) explain that case study research examines situational 
characteristics of phenomena, such as the environmental characteristics and the 
situational constraints, however the researcher's control over these environments is 
limited. As a result, researchers must often limit their claims to external validity. 
Ross and Staw (1986; 1993) and Keil (1995b) are only able to identify each 
escalation determinant inter alia, and are not able isolate these determinants to 
ascertain their relative effect on the overall scenario. Despite this, it is worth 
examining these findings within the context of escalation research and within the 
context of project management. 
-97-
Chapter 2- Literature Review 
It's Basically All Structural 
"The sea itself is one thing, the foam another; 
Neglect the foam and regard the sea with your eyes. " 
Rumi, from The Elephant in a Dark Room 
Drummond (1994) offers some insights into the problems of significance, temporal 
precedence and interdependencies in her case study of a failing city council project: 
"It was suggested that escalation would be successively structural, project, 
psychological and then once again structural. Escalation is basically cyclical 
but the pattern of micro-variables is different from that predicted, that is, the 
pressures are mainly structural and social" (Drummond 1994, pp602-3.). 
"The pressures to escalate in established decisions are indeed different from 
those experienced in ad hoc ventures. It is a speculative point, but the data 
here suggest that escalation in established situations !§. basically structural, 
overlain by project, psychological and social pressures" (Drummond 1994, 
p064, emphasis in text). 
This distinction between 'ad hoc situations' and 'established situations' is one that 
has received only scant attention in previous studies. She suggests that the Ross and 
Staw ( 1986) case of Expo 86 was in fact a project that had very few 
interdependencies with the surround organisational context, suggesting that as an ad 
hoc venture if it "were not cancelled, the fair would have been held and that would 
have been the end of the matter" (p591) suggesting further that "[m]any 
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organisational predicaments are not nearly as dramatic or self-resolving" (p591 ). 
Rather, she suggests that projects are often essentially 'muddled through', constantly 
playing to the mores of the extant decision context as dictated by the environment. 
OrganisationaVStructural Factors as the Foundation of Escalation Behaviour 
In this program of research it is argued that the escalation of commitment dilemmas 
finds their foundations and naissance within the extant organisational environment 
within which a project is undertaken. Ewusi-Mensah and Przasnyski (1991) provides 
survey data to confirm this conjecture. They found that organisational factors are 
dominant, albeit not to the exclusion of economic and technical considerations. They 
cite some of the main sources of project failure as arising through management and 
organisational politics, with only 13% of respondents reported that organisational 
politics did not influence a project failure. 
The organisational and structural factors, therefore, are the undergirding structure 
above which the economic, social and moral incentives and disincentives within the 
organisation are based. These factors can either promote or inhibit escalation and are 
posited to be of fundamental importance to projects that are (as in reality) situated 
among a portfolio of differing activities with interdependencies and common 
constituencies. 
Proposition 2: ZOTs as Organisational and Structural Constraints 
The purpose of this research programme is not to investigate the individual effects of 
these factors. Rather, it is hypothesised that these factors combine to structure the 
decision environment and inhere ZOTs into the decision context. Similar to 
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Langholtz et al.'s (1993) conceptualisation of 'harsh' and 'benign' resource 
constraints, and Lawrence and O'Connor's treatment of 'kind' and 'unkind' loss 
functions, these constraints combine to either extend or contract the Zones of 
Tolerance within which decision-makers find it ecologically rational to skew their 
decisions towards erring on the side of continuing projects despite setbacks. 
Proposition 2: It is therefore proposed Zones of Tolerance are constructed 
through the interplay of organisational and structural factors within the 
decision context that define the economic, social and moral incentives and 
disincentives for continuing with projects experiencing setbacks. 
These Zones of Tolerance may be so broad as to never threaten a project's survival 
despite repeated setbacks or as strict as to threaten a project's survival with even 
minor deviations from expectations. Revisiting the organisational/structural factors 
detailed previously, three major factors stand out as germane to the ecology of 
organisations within which projects are developed: 
Economic and technical side bets situate the project within the overarching culture 
and context of the organisation. The nature of the organisation's work, the industry 
within which it operates and the management culture present combine and manifest 
within the organisation in many ways. Activities that are undertaken in parallel to the 
project may compete for funding and attention from key decision-makers The 
parameters on a project's scope, impact and return on investment are also situated in 
reference to other activities. They are either complementary to the work on the 
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project, or may represent its opportunity cost, and the nature of these side bets can be 
hypothesised to be important to garnering tolerance for a project's setbacks. 
Advocacy by top management, particularly those who control the funding decisions 
of the organisation and can mandate a project's implementation, are critical to the 
continuation of projects. Tolerance for setbacks from these key stakeholders are 
crucial for maintaining funding and interest in the project, as well as garnering 
additional resources in excess of initial expectations in order to combat its problems 
and setbacks. 
Resource slack and management controls can either encourage or deter decision-
makers (particularly those who are strongly invested in the project) to continue 
projects despite setbacks to a project's development. Given sufficiently loose 
resource constraints and management controls, the irrational decision-maker may 
escalate projects even despite its lack of any prospect of success. When management 
controls and oversight are strict, however, they can mitigate or completely nullity the 
effocts of self-justification, irrational persistence and uncontrolled spending. 
This programme of research, therefore, will use these organisational and structural 
constraints as points of reference to decision-makers. It will empirically validate how 
these constraints, when operating in ambiguous decision contexts, serve to create 
Zones of Tolerance that decision-makers reference in order to determine their chosen 
course of action when faced with a troubled project. 
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Experiment 1: Proof of Concept 
The first experiment detailed in this dissertation will serve as a 'proof of concept' for the 
basic propositions for this research programme. The manipulation of these constructs (Zone 
of Tolerance and Budget Variance) is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. These two 
constructs are present in all three experimental investigations detailed within this dissertation 
and represent the core contribution of the research programme. We therefore make the 
following propositions to inform the first experiment: 
Proposition I: Decision-makers' reactions to variations from expectations 
associated with a project (overruns, errors, setbacks and other problems) 
depend upon Zones of Tolerance inherent within the project context. 
Proposition 2: Zones of Tolerance are constructed through the interplay of 
organisational and structural factors within the decision context that define the 
economic, social and moral incentives and disincentives for continuing with 
projects experiencing setbacks. 
As a secondary hypothesis, this study examines the effect of the availability of 
alternatives on both the decision to escalate a current project and as a factor in the 
diminution of ZOT's. Alternatives become important particularly when a challenged 
course of action requires decision-makers to conduct search of other possible 
avenues of progress (Janis and Mann 1977). Keil, Truex & Mixon (1995) and 
Schaubroeck & Davis (1994) found that the availability of alternatives had a 
moderating effect on escalation tendencies. 
Proposition 3: The availability of alternatives has a negative effect on the 
tolerance for variances outside a ZOT. 
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Concluding Remarks 
This chapter outlined the basic premise of the research programme and put forward 
some basic propositions relating to the escalation of commitment phenomenon 
(especially within information systems projects). Escalation is defined as occurring 
when projects experience setbacks that require an increase in commitments by 
stakeholders beyond that which was originally anticipated. When setbacks occur that 
raise the level of commitments in previously unanticipated ways, they create 
decision dilemmas in which decision-makers must decide whether continuing their 
support of a project is worthwhile. Our guiding research question can be stated as a 
question to the decision-maker: when managing a project facing setbacks. to what 
extent are you willing to tolerate variations from your prior expectations, and how 
do you react once this tolerance has been breached? 
The objective of this research programme is to investigate how tolerance for 
variations from expectations affects a decision-maker's choice in escalation 
situations. Our fundamental proposition is that Zones of Tolerance have a 
foundational impact upon the way decisions are made within escalation· situations. 
These Zones of Tolerance are encoded within projects primarily through the 
organisational and structural factors which situate economic, social and moral 
incentives and disincentives within the decision context. These factors can either 
promote or inhibit escalation and are posited to be of fundamental importance to 
projects that are (as in reality) situated among a portfolio of differing activities with 
interdependencies and common constituencies. 
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We therefore posit two propositions that inform the three experiments detailed 
within this research programme: 
Proposition 1: Decision-makers' reactions to variations from expectations 
associated with a project (overruns, errors, setbacks and other problems) 
depend upon Zones of Tolerance inherent within the project context. 
Proposition 2: Zones of Tolerance are constructed through the interplay of 
organisational and structural factors within the decision context that define the 
economic, social and moral incentives and disincentives for continuing with 
projects experiencing setbacks. 
We also made mention of a third proposition that will be tested within the first 
experiment, namely that the availability of alternatives are important to escalation 
decisions. Tnis proposition will be discussed in the first experiment chapter. 
Proposition 3: The availability of alternatives has a negative effect on the 
tolerance for variances outside a ZOT. 
This research programme contains three experiments in which the main and 
interaction effects of Zones of Tolerance and Budget Variances will be tested, as 
well as testing other constructs germane to escalation situations (namely alternatives, 
time, risk, variance stability and resource slack). The following chapter details the 
methodological and procedural approaches used within these experiments as well as 
a discussion of some of important considerations that were taken into account when 
executing and analysing them. 
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--- CHAPTER 3 ---
RESEARCH METHODS AND ANALYSIS 
Introduction 
The purpose of this section is to outline the research methods and analysis 
techniques used in three studies comprising this programme of research. This chapter 
discusses how this research has been characterised as both universalistic and basic 
and how this characterisation strongly influences the design of the research and the 
way in which the inevitable challenges of data collection and analysis were 
managed. By characterising the research in this way, the underlying considerations 
of research scope and interpretation of findings allow us to reconcile some of the 
conflicting demands on experimentation and establishes a relative importance of the 
demands of internal validity over external validity when designing and conducting 
the experimental tasks. 
Furthermore, this chapter outlines the design of the experiments, the way in which 
they were conducted and the statistical techniques used to analyse the findings. It 
describes the common laboratory settings through these experiments, the 
experimental particulars, construct manipulations and dependent variables used 
across all three experiments in this research programme. In summary, the chapter 
discusses the following key elements of the research design, implementation and 
analysis: 
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The sample selection strategy and procedures are discussed 
with particular examination of the caveats associated with 
recruitment of student subjects on response homogeneity and 
generalisability. 
Sample Description: The number and qualities of the samples used in the 
experiments are detailed with reference to previOus 
experiments as benchmarks of appropriateness. 
External Validity It is argued within this section that due to the scope and 
purpose of the experimental design, internal validity 
considerations were deemed to be of greater significance to 
the findings than external validity considerations when 
making tradeoffs between the two. 
Experimental Design: The key elements of the experimental designs for the three 
experiments in this dissertation are outlined and the rationale 
for the selection of these designs is addressed. 
Experimental Procedures: The recruitment procedures, laboratory settings and 
Measures: 
participant interactions are discussed in detail. 
The key dependent measures used across the three studies are 
discussed with particular attention to the use of multiple 
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measures and the subtle differences between them as the 
experiments refined and improved over time. 
The potential for validity threats associated due to individual 
differences, non-probabilistic samples due to self-selection as 
well as the difficulties associated with generalising the 
findings are all discussed in detail. 
Universalistic and Basic Research 
As it is characterised in this research programme, a Zone of Tolerance is an abstract 
construct that has the potential to be universally applied to any number of decision 
contexts and situations. When testing such hypotheses, particularly in proof of 
concept-stage experiments, the basic question we must ask is 'can the existence of 
such a construct be demonstrated at all?' To this end, particulars regarding the 
setting, population and other idiosyncrasies of the experiment are less important than 
the ability to prove the existence of ZOTs. In other words, the demands of internal 
• 
validity exceed those of external validity. 
This research can be described as both universalistic and basic. "Universalistic 
research is intended to investigate theoretically predicted associations between 
abstractly specified constructs" (Hoyle et al. 2002). In light of this, a laboratory 
setting is an appropriate method to manipulate certain variables that may or may not 
be able to be controlled in a real-world setting. Specifically, laboratory research 
allows us to control and manipulate variables associated with failing projects that 
may not be controllable or manipulable in any practical or ethical way in a real-
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world context. Some examples of variables that are more amenable to manipulation 
in experimental tasks, rather than real-world settings, include varying the level of 
management support, sunk costs, budget variance and availability of alternatives (as 
in Experiment I). 
Basic research is conducted to "develop and refine new knowledge" (Hoyle et al. 
2002). The examination of Zones of Tolerance as an independent construct in 
escalation of commitment research constitutes basic research that has hitherto never 
been posited or tested. The uses of escalation of commitment dilemmas as the 
decision context are simply pragmatic foundations within which these construct may 
be saliently exemplified. These experiments constitute what amounts mostly to a 
'proof of concept', whereby the ZOT is examined against some of the more basic 
constraints in IS project management contexts. 
This being said, the characterisation of Zones of Tolerance as both universalistic and 
basic create a unique set of circumstances surrounding the objectives and scope of 
the experimental tasks performed to test hypotheses. Simply put, the greater 
demands on the experiment relate more to the appropriate definition of the ZOT 
construct and the convergent and discriminant validity of the variables used to 
measure it. Therefore, in a practical sense, some amount of compromise must be 
exerted against the demands for generalisability (thus external validity). The 
following research designs and analysis methods reflect the greater need for internal 
validity and also acknowledge some of the challenges to external validity necessary 
when only three relatively small experiments are performed. 
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Sample Selection 
Sampling Procedures Specifications 
In all three studies conducted for this research programme, the unit of analysis was 
the decision-maker's resource allocation decision. Both business trained students and 
professionals participated in experimental tasks (see Table 3.1). Participation in the 
experimental tasks was voluntary in all three studies conducted. Voluntary 
participation in experiments essentially connotes that participants are self-selected, 
and this was due to the ethical constraints imposed upon the research process as well 
as practical considerations when recruiting from the population of interest. It can be 
argued that self-selection essentially makes a sample non-probabilistic, thus controls 
and manipulation checks need to be implemented in order to ascertain the potential 
for systematic Type I or Type II errors from this potential bias. 
Sample Description 
Ex)leriment I 
Table 3.1: Sample Profiles of Experiments 
Masters students enrolled in a postgraduate Business Information 
Systems course at the University of Sydney. Components of this 
course include Systems Development methodologies and project 
management, included in the criteria for PMI accreditation. In 
addition, the course provides an exploration of the Information 
Systems industry as a whole, its core characteristics and strategic 
position in the value chain. 
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Experiment 2 Final Year auditing undergraduate students as well as PhD students 
enrolled at the University of Sydney. Topics taught in the 
Accounting course include risk management, assurance and 
controls. 
Experiment 3 Final year undergraduate students enrolled in an Information 
Systems Project Management course at the University of New 
South Wales. Topics taught include all areas of the Project 
Management Institute (PMI) accreditation criteria and assessments 
include the creation of project requirements, plans and risk 
management procedures. 
Determining Sample Size 
In all three experiments, sample sizes were based on sufficient samples for statistical 
significance for each level of the between-subjects factors in a randomised 
experiment. This was decided in order to minimise the likelihood that variations 
between groups were simply a product of chance. This does not include those 
• 
responses that were removed by virtue of being either incomplete or significantly 
anomalous to suggest the task was misunderstood. Anticipating this requirement for 
redundancy in the sample, typically more than 25 participants were recruited per 
factor group6. 
It is practically impossible to determine or estimate the global population of IS 
project managers against which we could calculate the requisite sample size for 
6 Experiments 1 and 2 contained a minimum of25 subjects per treatment group. In experiment 3, 
fifteen subjects were used for each between-subjects group and this was based on studies upon which 
that experiment was based (e.g. Langholtz et al. 1994) which used comparable sample sizes. 
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adequate statistical power and confidence intervals. In the absence of such metrics, it 
may be useful to benchmark the sample sizes used in these experiments with the 
sample sizes used in previous experiments into the field of escalation of 
commitment. 
External Validity Considerations- University Students as Experiment Subjects 
The key consideration for external validity implied here is how representative the 
responses of this sample are of the aforementioned total population of interest (i.e., 
IS project managers). Students were recruited from within both Information Systems 
and Accounting postgraduate and undergraduate courses, since it is believed that 
they are familiar with the Information Systems industry and have had at least some 
experience in an industry setting. 
A long-standiog issue within the fields of experimental and behavioural economics is 
the use of students as subjects for experiments. Many argue that students represent a 
viable sample base replacement when selected from among a student population that 
is studying economics, business or in other fields related to the research in question. 
There is a long history of student participation in experiments, not limited to smaller 
experiments, but even in some of the most widely cited papers in the field, such as 
the seminal Prospect Theory paper by Kahneman and Tversky ( 1979), Conlon and 
Garland's (1993) proposal of the completion effect, Kahneman, Knetsch and 
Thaler's (1990) experimental investigation into the Endowment Effect, Arkes and 
Blumer's (1985) exploration into the Sunk Cost Fallacy. Tversky and Kahneman's 
(1974) widely cited paper into heuristics and biases even used high school students 
to explore anchoring and adjustment heuristics. 
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Remus' ( 1986) empirical study testing for differences between line managers and 
postgraduate students with no managerial experience found no significant difference 
between the responses of both groups in production scheduling decisions. He 
concluded that "research on decision-making should not be discounted simply 
because graduate business students were used as subjects" (Remus 1986, p24). 
Chang and Ho (2004), on the other hand, found that students tended to display less 
escalation tendencies than equivalent managers. Research into the use of students as 
subjects generally urges caution, without ever going so far as to categorically rule 
out their use. Truth be told, students represent a pragmatic surrogate to industry 
professionals since they are readily accessible to academics and are, in effect, a 
convenient subject market. One of the more compelling criticisms of using students 
is that age and education have been proved to be powerful demographic variables in 
the capacity and comprehension of decision-making tasks in organisational settings. 
Sears ( 1986) criticises such a narrow methodological base of life experience, 
suggesting that student subjects may have internal biases relating to "demand 
ch~~racteristics, experimenter bias, and, evaluation apprehension" (p516) referring to 
the ability of experimenters to exert comparatively stronger pressure on younger, less 
experienced subjects through unequal power relationships that are inherited from the 
classroom. Indeed, some of the more controversial incentives for participation 
include tying participation to course credit, non-anonymity of respondents and using 
results of experiments as an assessable component of a course. 
Conducting experimental research often involves compromises. In the same way that 
one must give sufficient consideration to the trade-off between experimental realism 
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and parsimony, so too must there be compromises in the execution the experiment. 
Indeed it would be time- and cost-prohibitive to seek out a high number of industry 
professionals and to adequately reimburse them for at least an hour of their time to 
undertake an experiment. In addition, it is much harder to find said professionals in 
sufficient numbers to be conducive to a sufficient sample for appropriate statistical 
power. Professionals generally have greater demands on their time than do students 
and are not as willing to be accept a token reimbursement of $20 or $30 for their 
foregone time as would a student. 
Caveats to Consider- Response Homogeneity and Generalisations 
Thus while the use of students are appealing from time, cost and scale perspectives, 
an experimenter must consider certain caveats to any findings they may make. In 
particular, experimenters must look with a critical eye upon the homogeneity of 
responses and the ability to generalise their findings to the overall population. 
Importantly, an experimenter needs to be aware of systematic differences between 
the responses of students and the potential responses of the population as a whole. 
Perhaps one of the most comprehensive investigations into the issue within a Social 
Science context was conducted by Peterson (200 I) in The Journal of Consumer 
Research. In that study, he conducted four meta-analyses into response homogeneity 
(with an approximate n=650,000) as well as thirty meta-analyses into effect sizes of 
sixty-five behavioural and psychological relationships (approximate n=350,000). In 
these studies he compared the responses of college students to non-student (adult) 
samples and found the responses of students to be slightly more homogenous than 
those of the non-student samples. In Peterson's (200 I) words, students "displayed 
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less variation within a scale (smaller standard deviations) and more consistency 
across scales (higher correlations) than did non-students" (p454). But while this may 
be the case, the study showed that this does not necessarily relate to higher more 
powerful hypothesis tests or larger effect sizes. He states, 
"Although greater homogeneity implies less noise or extraneous variability 
in data, it may also reduce the magnitude of differences or minimise 
relationships that do exist among variables" (ibid, p458). 
Peterson (2001) concluded that while these results suggested some difference, there 
are no systematic patterns of differences between students and non-students. From a 
research point of view, the corresponding conclusion to be drawn from this is that, 
while students can still be used, prudence must be exerted when making claims to 
the generalisability of findings. The remedy, of course, is to replicate experiments 
outside of the student population. 
The Use of Subject for IS-Related Experimental Tasks 
Host, Regnell and Wohlin (2000) report a study of subjective indicators of the lead 
time of projects to compare the performance of Masters students and professional 
software developers. The study employed 26 final year Masters students from the 
Computer Science and Engineering, and the Electrical Engineering programmes at 
Lund University; as well as 18 professional software developers with a mean 
industry experience of II years. The study found "only minor differences between 
the conception [of the experimental task] of students and professionals" (p212) and 
"no significant difference between the correctness [of the conceptions of the task 
between] students and professionals" (p212). The consistency ratios found by the 
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study are presented in Figure 3.1, which shows a close simi larity between 
professionals ('prof) and students ('stud') and seems to confirm Peterson's (2001) 
suggestion that students sample sets display greater homogeneity of variance. 
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Figure 3.1: Box plots of the consistency ratios for each group of subjects 
reported by Host, Regnell and Wohlin (2000). 
At this point- it is important to declare that all pilot studies that for the following 
experiments were conducted with Information Systems industry professionals, and 
post-test interviews for these pilots were conducted with a view to strengthening face 
validity (that the presentation of the case accurately abstracted real projects), 
concurrent validity (that budget measures resembled real project metrics) and 
external validity (that project managers and IS professionals would make similar 
decisions to that of the student subject sample). 
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Experimental Design 
Mixed Factorial Designs 
These experiments were conducted using a research design unique and hitherto 
untested within escalation research. They employed combinations of both within-
and between-subjects factors, each with slightly different matrices of constructs and 
construct levels. These mixed designs presented both new opportunities and 
challenges. 
In all the within-subjects factors tested throughout these experiments, the integrity of 
the randomised experimental design is maintained by randomising the order in which 
each combination of within-subjects factors is presented to the subject. The use of a 
within-subjects design also allows us to control the number of subjects required for 
each experiment while still investigating an appropriate number of levels for each 
factor. For instance, Experiment I contains nine within-subjects factor combinations 
(3 X ZOT and 3 X Variance). A within-subjects design allows us to examine all of 
' 
these factors efficiently by reducing the need for participants to a number that 
satisfies the requirements for statistical power for the between-subjects factors. 
Experiment 1 
Experiment I, the Proof of Concept experiment, employs a randomised mixed 
design; a 2 X (3 X 3) factorial design in which the Availability of Alternatives was 
the between-subjects factor. Zone of Tolerance and Variance were the two within-
subjects factors, each with three levels: none (control), low and high. Subjects were 
randomly assigned to each of the two between-subjects groups in an effort to 
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max1m1se internal validity by minimising any effects from individual differences 
between participants creating a systematic imbalance between treatment groups. 
In this experiment, the interaction effect between ZOTs and Variance is a primary 
hypothesis. In order to empirically test this hypothesis, it is useful to be able to 
examine the interaction of these two constructs within the same subject. An 
advantage of employing a between-subjects design in this case is that is allows us to 
use each participant as a comparison against themselves. Specifically, we can see the 
threshold of tolerance within an individual when faced with multiple levels of the 
Variance. Furthermore, we can also see how the same individual responds to 
differing levels of tolerance within the environment. ZOT posited as a product of the 
external environment (as opposed to casting it as a source of individual difference) is 
important here, as individual differences cannot be used as a within-subjects factor 
(Hoyle et al. 2002). 
Availability of Alternatives consisted of two levels: 'Alternatives Available' and 'No 
Akernatives Available'. It was operationalised as the option (or lack thereof) to 
reallocate unspent resources from an abandoned project to other projects under the 
decision-maker's control. In the 'No Alternatives' condition, participants were told 
that cancelling a project would connote that the remaining unspent funds would be 
lost to the decision-maker and subsumed into the company budget, outside the 
control of the project manager. 
The Availability of Alternatives construct was selected as a between-subjects factor 
in order to preserve face validity. It would not be ecologically valid, nor intuitively 
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tractable that project managers would have options of how to use unspent funds that 
changed between decisions. It would appear more credible that the conditions of use 
of unspent funds be set at as a budgeting rule at a higher organisational level, and not 
subject to change between two projects under control by the same project manager in 
the same organisation. 
Comparisons to the Research Designs of Prior Escalation Research 
This research design was selected because it allows us to examine the tolerance 
towards different levels of variance within the same participant. Previous escalation 
research has often suffered from the problem that participants were presented with a 
simple one-shot decision task (see Table 3.2). Typically, these decisions were framed 
around a project that was unambiguously failing, or unambiguously not failing. In 
Arkes and Blumer's (1985) seminal investigation of sunk costs, every experiment 
consisted of _one shot decision tasks involving two, or in some cases three, 
alternatives. The organisational decision-making tasks consisted to yes/no responses 
to the option of whether or not one would continue investment in a troubled project. 
The standard between-subjects factorial designs in previous research have not 
adequately explored the transition in decision-making between points where a 
project is not in trouble, is beginning to get in trouble and is finally unambiguously 
failing. This new and hitherto unapplied research design will be continued through 
the research programme discussed in this dissertation and represents one of the key 
contributions of this research programme. 
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Table 3.2: Escalation's Experimental Studies and Their Designs 
Study Research Design 
Arkes & Blumer (1985) I Factor (2 levels) Between-Subjects 
Cheng & Schultz (2003) I Factor (3 levels) Between-Subjects 
Conlon & Leatherwood (1989) I Factor (8 levels) Between-Subjects 
Garland (1990) I Factor (5 levels) Between-Subjects 
Garland and Newport (1991) 4 X 4 X 4 Latin Squares 
Garland et al. ( (1990) I Factor (4 levels) Between-Subjects 
Keil et al. (1995) 2 X 4 Between-Subjects 
Conlon & Garland (1993) 2 X 4 X 4 Between-Subjects 
Schaubroek & Davis (1994) 2 X 2 Between-Subjects 
Schaubroek & Williams (1993) I Factor (2 levels) Between-Subjects 
Schoorman & Halohan (1996) 3 X 2 Between-Subjects 
Schmidt & C&lantone (2002) 2 X 2 X 2 Between-Subjects 
X 3 Within-Subjects (Time) 
Schultz & Cheng (2002) 2 X 2 Between-Subjects 
Experimental Procedures 
Setting 
The laboratory setting in which a subject participant participates may influence his or 
her behaviours. Perhaps tbe most important aspect of tbis is the contribution of the 
setting to any unwanted experimenter expectancy effects. Expectancy effects arise 
when participants wish to 'please' the experimenter by second-guessing tbe answers 
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that they believe the experimenter wishes to see. Care was taken not to overstep 
ethical lines and introduce internal bias into the subject responses due to any overt or 
perceived coercion on the part of the experimenter. In particular, recruitment was 
conducted with the following constraints: 
The recruitment procedure was approved under the conditions set out by the 
Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) at the University of Sydney, 
For each of the three experiments, the researcher attended the lectures or tutorials of 
the potential participants. The potential participants were told only that they were 
invited to participate in an experiment relating to resource allocation in project 
management to test their judgement and decision-making skills. Further, subjects 
were told that there was no preparation necessary, it was non-assessable, 
voluntary, anonymous and paid. If one had instead told students that the 
experiments specifically examined decision-making within the context of project 
failure, a subject may have reasonably induced that they would be expected to treat 
projects with suspicion or be encouraged to abandon projects. Since such a statement 
would induce a high possibility of experimenter expectancy, such information was 
not given to students until the debriefing. 
Participation was voluntary and anonymous 
In accordance with the ethical guidelines set out by the University of Sydney, 
subjects were reminded that all participation was voluntary and that no personally 
identifYing information would be collected. Consequently, there were some 
limitations induced since no demographic information with regard to age, gender, 
race or educational background was collected, even though these demographic 
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variables have been investigated within the context of escalation of commitment 
dilemmas in previous research. 
While recruitment was conducted within the lectures and tutorials within which the 
potential subject pool were studying, a number of measures were undertaken to 
ensure that recruitment could not be seen as a product of coercion in order to 'please' 
the lecturer approving the advertisement of these experiments. Specifically, 
participants did not sign up within the lecture itself. Rather, they were able to sign up 
with the experimenter outside the classroom after the lecture or tutorial had taken 
place. The potential subjects were made assured by the experimenter that the lecturer 
or tutor of their class would not be aware of who chose and did not choose to 
participate in the experiment. 
Participants Were Reimbursed For Their Time 
Subjects were paid either $20 or $30 for their time depending on the experiment in 
which they participated. Reimbursement was not tied to performance in the 
experiment for the first two experiments. In the third experiment a $200 prize was 
given to the participant who performed closest to optimal behaviour. Reimbursement 
serves two important functions in experiments. Primarily, it acts as an inducement 
for the potential subject pool to participate. Secondly, it also allows both participant 
and experimenter to complete a 'contract' that facilitates the efficient and effective 
running of the experiment. It induces the participant to apply themselves to the 
experiment and create an environment in which they are more likely to spend time 
and consideration on the task at hand. 
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Measures 
The Particular Need for Multiple Measures in Escalation Research 
This research programme employs a number of dependent variable measures of 
tolerance to assess escalation behaviour as test of both convergent and discriminant 
validity. Escalation of commitment decision dilemmas are vastly different from the 
gambling tasks from which 'revealed preference' experiment designs have arisen. 
Critically, one often cannot make the same assumptions about the rationality or 
irrationality of behaviour because probability estimates and payoffs are either 
incomplete or non-existent. Most of the experimental escalation literature has 
utilised some degree of ambiguity in future outcomes in order to preserve the face 
validity of the task. 
Furthermore escalation decisions are often made with high degrees of conflict within 
the decision-maker when making a choice between what they feel is the 
economically rational decision to make and avoiding the 'blow-back' from other 
stak.eholders who still perceive the project to be worthwhile in continuing. Much of 
the case study research indicates that projects often reach a point where both 
continuation and abandonment of a course of action contain equally dire results. 
Dependent Measures: Experiment 1 
The notion of tolerance in resource allocation decisions requires at least two 
measures: (I) the decision-maker's resource allocation decision, and (2) their 
evaluation of how 'happy' they are with said allocation. In order to operationalise 
this within an escalation of commitment context, the fundamental goal of these 
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dependent measures is to determine how much of a departure from their budgets or 
expectations that the decision-maker is willing to tolerate. In the first two 
experiments, the independent variable for budget variance is operationalised through 
a 'team request' for additional funding for the coming period in excess of the 
original budget. Approving part or the entire additional request for additional 
resources would constitute some degree of escalation, whereas allocating only the 
budget amount could be seen as an effort to control spending. Resource allocations 
below the budget could be construed as manifest de-escalation behaviour and 
allocating no resources to the project can be considered abandonment behaviour. 
In addition to the actual resource allocation decision, a second measure is required to 
determine how the decision-maker evaluates their own decision to make said 
allocations. In other words, in the presence of a resource allocation in excess of 
original expectations, we also need to determine how 'worried' they are about the 
decision that they make. Little or no conflict about allocating resources in excess of 
original expectations would seem to constitute tolerance, and it is interesting to 
observe the interaction between how much a decision-maker invests and the level of 
tolerance to that investment. 
Resource Allocation Decision: Recommendation I Request Ratio (RIR Ratio) 
The first dependent variable was computed by dividing subjects' recommendations 
for spending for the next period by the allocation requested by the Project Team for 
that period. The rationale for using the ratio was to 'wash out' the effects of project 
size to aid comparability between recommendations within and across subjects and 
projects. Thus, if a subject allocated the amount requested by the project team the 
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R/R Ratio would be 1.0. If the subject allocated the original budget amount, the 
mean RIR Ratio would be 0.930 for the Low Variance condition (a mean requested 
budget variance of 7.5%) and 0.816 for the High Variance condition (a mean 
requested budget variance of 22.5%). In the Low and High Variance conditions, an 
R/R Ratio of 1.0 would indicate the subject's willingness to escalate the project to 
the budget overrun requested by the Project Team. Similarly, an RIR Ratio at or 
below the budget indicates that the subject elected to control or de-escalate the 
project by recommending a reduction to next period's allocation below the original 
budget. Project abandonment decisions (R/R Ratios of 0) were excluded from the 
univariate ANOV A to maintain the normal distribution of the results and were 
considered in separate analysis. 
Project Status 
The dependent measure of the 'worry' or concern about the variances experienced in 
the project is operationalised through a simple nominal scale rating of the project 
manager's assessment of the significance of the variances that the project is 
experiencing. Specifically, participants were required to suggest a 'project status' to 
the Steering Committee to whom they report. 
In experiment I, this project status changed depending on the treatment of whether 
alternative investments were available or not. In this way, one can tease apart 
decisions to continue that were made because the decision-maker was happy to 
tolerate the variances experienced and those that were reluctantly made. The project 
status options are illustrated in Figure 3.2. 
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Figure 3.2: Experiment 1 Project Status 
Participants were asked to select one of the following options for each of the projects 
under their control. 
'Alternatives Available • Condition: 
o On Track: Continue Without Change 
o Some Concerns: Continue With Closer Monitoring 
o In Trouble: Continue But Seek Ways To Minimise Loss 
-OR-
Suspend Project: Project Should Be Suspended Immediately 
o And Use Remaining Funds to Commence a Project Awaiting Funding 
o And Use Remaining Funds to Deposit in Corporate Bank 
'No Alternatives Available' Condition 
o On Track: Continue Without Change 
o Some Concerns: Continue With Closer Monitoring 
o In Trouble: Continue But Seek Ways To Minimise Loss 
o Suspend Project: Project Should Be Suspended Immediately 
Dependent Measures: Experiment 1 
In Experiment 2, the 'Alternatives' condition was not manipulated, thus the Project 
Status measure needed to slightly change. These are illustrated in Figure 3.3. 
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Figure 3.3: Experiment 1 Project Status 
o The project is progressing on or close to track 
o Variations are occurring but no action needs to be taken at this stage 
o Variations are occurring and we need to be careful about future spending 
o Serious budget and scope cuts are needed for this project 
o The project should be suspended immediately 
Experiment 2 was designed in a slightly more complex fashion than Experiment I 
given the introduction of time as a 10 factor-level within-subjects measure. To that 
end, the measure of a subject's 'worry' was combined with their resource allocation 
decision. If subjects chose a project status stating that they were either satisfied with 
the project or that they needed to remain vigilant of budget overruns, then the 
project's funding continued uncorrected. Subjects chose one of the following options 
In order for the project to continue uncorrected: 
I. The project is progressing on or close to track; 
2. Variations are occurring but no action needs to be taken at this stage; 
3. Variations are occurring and we need to be careful about future 
spending. 
If, however, the subject chose the option that 'serious budget and scope cuts are 
needed for this project', the project's funding reduced by 10%. A graphical 
simulation depicted the effect of this project status prior to a subject confirming this 
option. Finally, subjects choosing the option 'the project should be suspended 
immediately' withdrew all funding from the project. 
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A caveat must be noted at this point: while there is a certain amount of valid 
criticism that the selection of these measures and associated actions do not conform 
well to face validity considerations, the choice of manipulating the project in this 
way was to make way for measurement of an additional construct Project Risk, in 
which subjects were required to decide upon their treatment of how certain setbacks 
experienced by the project were to be handled. In truth, the decision to tie decision-
makers' selected project status with funding continuation was borne of pragmatism-
a need to simplify the number of choices a subject made within each of the ten time 
periods in order to ensure the experiment was completed in under an hour, given 
additional complexities in the task. As it stood, the experiment required 30 decisions 
by the subject. Retaining the bi-partite feedback structure of the first experiment 
would have required subjects to have made 50 decisions in under an hour7• 
Dependent Measures: Experiment 3 
Experiment 3 included a measure asking subjects to determine the percentage project 
completion (a formula determined by both time and cost inputs) they decided to 
undertake on two projects per period (one escalating and one non-escalating). This 
measure, expressed as a percentage of total project completion, was compared 
against a linear programming optimal. 
7 Ideally, common dependent measures across all three experiments would improve the comparability 
between experiments and al1owed for cross-analysis to enhance the richness of the findings. It would 
be worthwhile to retest these experiments with two common dependent variables (the resource 
allocation decision and the project status) measured in exactly the same way, however time and cost 
constraints did not allow for this to occur prior to the completion of this dissertation. Rather, 
appropriate care was taken when analysing these results and when making generalisations from the 
findings. Both the changes to the dependent measures and the reasoning behind them are discussed 
throughout this chapter and within the chapters detailing each experiment. 
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Experiment 3 returned to a Project Status measure independent of the investment 
decision (Figure 3.4). The wording of the Project Status options were very similar to 
Experiment 2. The reason for retention of Experiment 2's wording was due to the 
absence of Alternatives as a construct. 
Figure 3.4: Experiment 3 Project Status 
o The project is progressing on or close to track 
o Acceptable variations are occurring 
o Unacceptable variations are occurring 
o Serious budget and scope cuts are needed 
o The project should be suspended immediately 
Interpreting the Dependent Variables 
It cannot be assumed that continuing a project simply implies complete support for it 
despite variations from expectations. The notion of tolerance to such variances 
recognises that there are in fact two major elements to any decision of this kind: the 
attitude or 'utility' experienced by the decision-maker over the variations from his or 
her expectations, and the manifest behaviour that it engenders. Continuing a project 
despite budget variances may in fact have a number of possible interpretations. The 
decision-maker could be untroubled by the idea of tolerating the variations and thus 
happily invest more than they originally expected, or they may decide to continue the 
project, yet carry some degree of worry or reluctance about the variances that are 
occurring. Thus, the same investment in the project could be due to a number of 
possible attitudes and vice versa. Similarly, there may be a number of possible 
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interpretations to a project manager's decision to reduce spending on a project in 
which budget variances are occurring. Conlon and Leatherwood (1989) suggest that 
some of these reasons may be "as a punishment, as an attempt to constrain or control 
future spending, as a desire to extend a project's completion horizon, or as a mistrust 
of the cost projections" (p840). 
Multiple Dependent Variable Measures -Avoiding Errors of Assumption from 
Revealed Preference Techniques 
With any number of interpretations of manifest behaviour possible, Conlon and 
Leatherwood (1989, p840) conclude, "[r]esults that converged on more than one 
measure would be more likely to represent commitment effects than would an effect 
on a single dependent variable." Multiple measures were employed specifically to 
see the interaction between the 'disutility' of variations from expectations, the risk 
preferences t,hey engendered as well as manifest behaviour in order to see if and 
where anomalies and aberrant behaviours lie. Employing multiple dependent 
measures in any experimental research design also has many benefits, such as the 
aliility to draw stronger conclusions from our research findings by providing 
multiple metrics to establish the motivations and manifestations of extant decisions 
and behaviours. Furthermore, it allows us some degree of insurance against the 
possibility that the responses from one dependent measure are not simply a product 
of chance, variable error or invalidity. 
Many behavioural studies rely on manifest behaviour to interpret the mindset of 
decision-makers when performing decision tasks in an experimental process known 
as 'revealed preference'. Revealed preference is based on the assumption that 
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manifest behaviour reflects the internalised attitude or motivation of the decision-
maker. Such an approach has been recognised in the past as problematic, as it relies 
almost exclusively on the assumptions that the researcher makes regarding how a 
manifest behaviour is to be interpreted. Sen (1971) critiques these assumptions, 
particularly through the lens of theoretically posited axioms of rational behaviour. To 
that end, he raises the question "[a]re the rationality axioms to be used only after 
establishing them to be true?" (p312) and observes that "a primitive concept like the 
coincidence of different interpretations of revealed preference can be taken to be a 
complete criterion of rationality of choice is of some interest in understanding this 
problematic concept" (p311). Sen (1971) hits upon a fundamental problem with 
revealed preference ~ that a lack of criteria for complete rationality complicates the 
assumptions we can make about the rationality or irrationality of manifest behaviour, 
particularly when decision-makers are provided with as little information as they 
have in previous escalation of commitment tasks. For instance, in Arkes and 
Blumer's (1985) investigation into sunk costs, the questions leading to the binary 
dependent variable (yes I no response) is stated thus: 
Experiment 8 AlB: "[S]hould you invest the last million dollars of your 
research funds to build the radar blank plane?'' (Arkes & Blumer 1985, p133) 
In the case of these experiment tasks, there could be many explanations for why 
decision-makers would decide to invest in the project, despite the researchers' 
insistence that such a choice would be irrational. Perhaps they have a belief that the 
competitor threat could be tolerated (since competitor threats seldom if ever disrupt 
production so significantly that a product offering is abandoned). Alternatively, in 
the absence of disconfirming information, the decision-maker may surmise that there 
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is sufficient salvage value if the project is seen to completion, or that the project 
could be re-focussed to another segment of the market. Essentially, given a decision 
task that contains neither future projections of income, nor quantitative assessment of 
the competitor threat, the decision-maker is forced to make a binary 
escalate/abandon decision with incomplete information and no recourse to justify 
their decision. 
Validity Threats 
Individual Differences 
It could be argued that Zones of Tolerance are, in part, a product of individual 
differences between decision-makers. For instance, Zones of Tolerance can be a 
product of individual's tolerance for ambiguity, risk tolerance, gender or some other 
demographic variable. However, in this research programme takes as its foundational 
premise that tolerance is (at least in the main) determined through the organisational 
and structural components of the decision-context. Due to constraints within the 
. 
laboratory settings it was not possible to record demographic variables due to the 
constraints of time, costs and requirements for anonymity of the participants. The 
main focus of the study is to examine the effects of experimental variables (i.e. 
properties that an experimenter can manipulate) as opposed to the effects of 
individual variables. Examining the effects of all possible individual variables is not 
possible within the confines of this laboratory setting. 
The most common method of mitigating the effects of individual differences is 
through randomisation. Randomised research designs and random assignment of 
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participants to treatment groups assures that every participant has an equal likelihood 
of being exposed to each of the experimental conditions. By doing so we can 
maximise our assurance that, given a sufficiently large sample size, that all treatment 
groups are essentially similar and contain no systematic differences. Hoyle et al. 
(2002) state that "random assignment and randomised experimental research designs 
control for all possible individual differences". 
The second approach to addressing the possible effects of individual differences are 
by recruiting a sample set in which participants are relatively homogenous. Perhaps 
more through the practical limitations on the recruitment process than by design, the 
participants for these experiments were relatively homogenous. The use of 
postgraduate and final year undergraduate students resulted in a certain degree of 
homogeneity with respect to age, business experience and knowledge of project 
management tools and techniques. Homogeneity of the sample set allows us to 
assume (to a degree) that significant differences discovered through experimentation 
are most likely a product of the tested constructs themselves, rather than through 
extraneous experimental artefacts. 
There are two major limitations to consider when using relatively homogenous 
sample sets: homogeneity of responses and lack of generalisability. As discussed 
earlier, the use of students as experiment participants has been empirically proven to 
result in commensurately more homogenous responses. That is, it is shown in earlier 
studies that the responses of students compared to business professionals tend to 
contain less variance (Figure 3.1). However, the differences between professionals 
and students are not deemed to be significant enough to preclude the use of students 
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as surrogates for professionals, and there are no other empirically verified significant 
systematic differences between these two experiment groups. The second threat, a 
lack of generalisability, is discussed below under 'External Validity'. 
Non-Probabalistic Samples Due to Self-Selection 
What would be a systematic difference between the self-selected recruits and the 
non-participating elements from the population? Possibly, the ability to be induced 
through the (small) reimbursement could be one differentiating factor. Time-poor or 
wealthier students may not be able to be induced to participate though a token 
remuneration. Arguably, a postgraduate subject that is not induced through a $20 or 
$30 reimbursement may not have the time available or does not feel the reward 
sufficient for the time spent. Such subjects are perhaps more likely to be otherwise 
employed and a part-time university student (as is the case with many postgraduate 
students). Per]).aps therefore, the subjects choosing not to participate may have more 
industry experience. This is obviously an unprovable conjecture under our 
constraints of voluntary participation. Once again, the potential effects of using a 
non-probabilistic sample were mitigated through the use of a relatively homogenous 
sample and random assignment to treatment groups. 
External Validity 
Real-world escalation dilemmas are very difficult to analyse, since they are a product 
of numerous context-specific and history-laden influences. Previous research 
identifies a litany of psychological and organisational factors that contribute to each 
decision point. Every escalation of commitment dilemma is a product of the history 
of the decisions that led to the dilemma, as well as the ambiguities inherent when 
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making any forecasts of potential future outcomes from current decisions. One may 
argue that all escalation of commitment dilemmas can only be viewed through the 
lens of history, and that experiments by design, do not provide sufficient historical 
context nor psychological affect to truly replicate what are often very difficult 
decisions with significant and negative consequences. 
While significant pre-testing was conducted to maximise the face validity of the 
experiments, the artificiality of the decision setting does not fully represent the 
natural processes associated with decision-making of this type. For instance, 
participants knowing that their decisions have no real impact on themselves, others 
or on a 'real' project are less likely to completely experience the levels of anxiety, 
frustration and fear arising from a real-world responsibility for a project that is 
facing significant setbacks. Nor would they experience the levels of conflict between 
stakeholders that attend such decision dilemmas. 
Experimental designs are more efficient, albeit somewhat more passive, than 
attempting to manipulate factor levels in the midst of a real-world setting (Levitt and 
List 2006). In truth, experimental settings may actually as beneficial (or indeed more 
beneficial) to understanding the unique problems associated with escalation of 
commitment dilemmas since it can allay these extraneous factors in order to single 
out particular influences on the decision process. It would be impossible for all 
practical purposes to 'experiment' on real-world situations by adjusting the dynamics 
of the natural decision processes mid-stream. For instance, it would be 
unconscionable to experiment various management strategies when faced with a 
failing war, since lives and national assets may be lost in the process. Similarly, in an 
- 134-
Chapter 3- Research Methods and Analysis 
organisational setting, it would be difficult to manipulate organisational conditions 
when scarce organisational resources, not to mention the reputations and jobs of the 
stakeholders involved, are at stake. 
These experiments have been designed with a primary goal of maximising internal 
validity. The experiment design is intended to rule out alternative explanations of the 
findings through individual differences through randomisation and the use of 
homogenous sample sets, particularly during the proof of concept stages of 
experimentation. However, as is the case with most experimental research, the 
obvious trade-offs of maximising internal validity is a commensurate loss of external 
validity. It is not possible to draw too many conclusions about the generalisability of 
the findings until such time as these ZOT experiments are applied to different 
samples of the population and in different contexts of decision-making. Future 
studies could include manipulation checks on constructs under investigation to add 
empirical veracity to the variables used to test them. In addition, external validity of 
these findings could be supported by the use of IT Professionals as experimental 
subjects, instead of students as surrogates for IT managers. 
In conclusion, while the artificiality of the experimental settings used for this body of 
research do not fully capture the historical and psychological influences on real-
world escalation of commitment dilemmas, they are necessary in order to single out 
and examine the effects of tolerance. Addressing external validity in such 
experiments is only truly possible by replicating them (or experiments of this ilk) in 
a number of different settings with a number of different samples from the 
population. Time and cost constraints to attempt such efforts are outside the purview 
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of this dissertation. The abstract and innocuous nature of Zones of Tolerance would 
be very difficult to isolate and examine within, say, a case studies of escalated 
projects, since decision-makers often forget or fail to address the incremental effects 
of small variations in expectations. 
Analysis 
The Research Design Informs the Analysis 
As has been mentioned earlier, this research programme employs a unique research 
design that has hitherto rarely been used within escalation of commitment research. 
The use of mixed factorial models that incorporate both within- and between-
subjects designs create exigencies associated with the method of analysis. The main 
purpose of analysis in this case is to examine whether decision-makers change their 
resource allocation decisions depending on the Zones of Tolerance associated with 
the project context. To that end, using Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA) provides the best and most robust methods with which to compare means 
across multiple factor treatments. 
ANOV As are used to compare means from a number of populations of interest. It 
takes as its null hypothesis that the means of all independent treatment groups are 
equal. The alternative hypothesis, that there are differences in the means of the 
treatment groups (such as low vs high ZOTs), suggests a rejection of the null 
hypothesis that are not attributable to the natural variability among sample means 
(Norusis 2002). 
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ANOV As are useful in analysing fixed effect models - where multiple treatments of 
the same construct are applied to subjects within a number of treatment groups. The 
use of I-tests are insufficient given (in some of the experiments) a larger number of 
groups (such as in the time conditions of Experiments 2 and 3 - where I 0 levels of 
time are measured). Rather, the F ratio obtainable within ANOV As is a simpler and 
more effective measure of determining the strength of a construct's effect on the 
overall model. ANOV As require a number of assumptions (Norusis 2002).: 
I. Populations are normally distributed; 
2. Equality of variances (i.e. population variances are equal); and 
3. Independent random samples are taken from each population. 
Normal Distributions 
The normality assumption states that each group be normally distributed. This can be 
verified by normality distribution plots or histograms. While ANOV As are not 
heavily dependent upon this assumption, one must be cautious when applying the 
technique to small sample sizes in which outliers may skew the distribution of 
responses. In the case of this research programme, responses that were significantly 
aberrant were removed from the analysis, since they are believed to represent naive 
responses or an indication that the task was not sufficiently understood. 
Equality of Variance 
The equality of variances assumption is not of critical concern to ANOV As if the 
number of cases in each group is similar (as in the case of the experiments within 
this programme of research). In order to ensure that variances are equal between 
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groups, one may employ Levene's test for equality of variance and, if necessary, 
apply a Boneferroni correction to the model. 
Independence 
The independence assumption requires that observations between groups, and 
observations in the same group, are not related to one another. In Experiment I, a 
singular challenge to the analysis was that a project abandonment decision was 
represented a $0 budget allocation. A $0 allocation to a project provides a significant 
skew of the distribution of responses and, as such, it was deemed necessary to 
remove them from the data set and analyse these cases separately. If one were to 
treat all project decisions by the same subject as related, a $0 response from a subject 
within a group of 'related' other project decisions would be treated by an AN OVA as 
a 'missing value' and the entire subject's response would be removed from the 
analysis. Missing values introduce imbalance into the sum of squares model 
resulting in non-orthogonal design matrix (Golub and Nash 1982). Thus, ANOVAs 
remove all observations containing missing values. Since one cannot remove 
in<iividual observations from an ANOV A without removing the entirety of the 
subject's response, it was deemed necessary to treat projects as independent 
observations, removing only those observations that related to an abandoned project. 
Within the scope of this research programme, a critical question therefore arises: can 
observations from the same individual independent? If (as in Experiment I) one were 
to treat each project as independent (even though each subject made decisions on 
nine projects), then randomisation of tasks becomes crucial to the analysis. Through 
randomisation one washes out order effects and expectancy effects. While not 
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perfect, the analysis of these projects as independent was important to our analysis, 
as will be discussed further in the Experiment I chapter. 
Statistical Software 
Both SPSS 11.5 and SPSS 15.0 were used to analyse the results. SPSS is a 
commonly used and robust statistical software application. Most of the statistical and 
graphical outputs of the analysis were generated through this application. The 
software was licenced through the Faculty of Economics and Business at the 
University of Sydney. 
Concluding Remarks 
We have established that this research is both universalistic and basic. The 
characterisation of Zones of Tolerance as such create a unique set of circumstances 
surrounding the objectives and scope of the experimental tasks, placing the greater 
priority on the construct, convergent and discriminant validity of the variables used 
. 
to measure it. The experiments that follow were conducted using a research design 
unique and hitherto untested within escalation research, employing combinations of 
both within- and between-subjects factors, each with slightly different matrices of 
constructs and construct levels. These mixed designs presented both new 
opportunities and challenges and these were discussed above. 
Thus, the research design and analysis methods reflect the greater need for internal 
validity and also acknowledge some of the trade-offs against external validity that 
were necessary in this new experimental programme. 
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--- CHAPTER 4 ---
EXPERIMENT 1: PROOF OF CONCEPT 
Abstract 
This study is a preliminary investigation whose objective is to determine how the 
presence and function of ZOT's affects resource allocation decisions. This proof of 
concept experiment seeks to establish the relationships between the key constructs 
and variables used in this research programme. In particular, we aim to test the 
effects of Zones of Tolerance and Budget Variances on the tendency to escalate 
commitment to information systems projects. We postulate that the structural and 
organisational conditions that surround a project create boundaries within which 
budget variances (and, more generally, variations from expectations) are tolerated. 
As a secondary hypothesis, we examined the effects of Availability of Alternatives 
oq the decision to escalate. Furthermore, we seek to establish the veracity of the 
research design (hitherto not used within escalation research), subject selection and 
data collection methods for use in subsequent studies. 
We found that Zones of Tolerance and Variance are statistically significant 
contributors to the continuation of courses of action. Contrary to prior studies (and 
our expectations) we could find no significant effect of Alternatives on either the 
continue/abandon decision or as an interaction effect with either Zones of Tolerance 
or Variance. Decision-makers' sensitivity to ZOT's are intuitively and empirically 
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valid phenomena and have been shown to be a key contributor to resource allocation 
decisions in general and escalation of commitment decisions in particular. 
Proof of Concept and Parsimony 
"Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem. " 
("Entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity. '') 
-William of Occam 
Overarching Objectives of Proof of Concept Experiments 
Proof of concept experiments serve a number of purposes, and their main objective is 
to clarify and defined the nature of the problem under investigation. They establish 
the existence of constructs and make some tentative conclusions about their effects 
on the population of interest. Furthermore, proof of concept experiments are used 
predominantly to test the veracity of the key constructs, particularly if those 
constructs a new and hitherto untested. These experiments also establish the 
relationships between key constructs and variables and this is particularly important 
if these have not as yet been operationalised in previous research. Furthermore, the 
use of proof of concept-style research using experimentation establishes the veracity 
and validity of the research method. In particular, it seeks to establish the veracity of 
the research design, subject selection and data collection methods. 
The two major constructs to be examined in this proof of concept experiment are 
Budget Variance (VARIANCE) and Zone of Tolerance (ZOT). An important 
consideration during the conduct of proof of concept experiments is that the number 
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of constructs under investigation and their operationalisations remam as 
parsimonious as possible. In the Popperian tradition, simplicity in applying inductive 
reasoning, particularly for new interpretations of manifest phenomena, is requisite to 
the falsifiability criterion (Popper 1992). This is critical to avoid possible confounds 
in findings and to establish the effect of core constructs on observed behaviours. 
Furthermore, it allows for stronger tests of reliability during empirical testing. For 
these reasons, the first experiment conducted here establishes conceptual and 
empirical proof of the core constructs manipulated within this research program, 
namely Zones of Tolerance and budget variance. Zones of Tolerance situate an 
escalation dilemma within the structural and organisational context within which 
decisions to escalate are made, as well as within the constraints imposed therein. 
Budget variance is manipulated as an overt manifestation of project escalation, 
objective evidence that the project is not going according to plan. 
Important Considerations and Challenges in Research Design 
Possible Confounds From Individual Differences 
Both of these constructs present some unique challenges that stem largely from the 
fact that they are relativistic depending upon the impression made upon the decision-
maker. This impression may be made through risk preference, past experience and 
subjective framing. The main threat to validity, therefore, derives from individual 
differences between participating subjects. Individual differences would introduce 
complications to the model due to random error in empirical results, possibly 
confounding its findings. Argawal and Prasad (1999) posit a reference model for 
individual differences in information technology acceptance by suggesting individual 
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differences arising from an individual's role within IT, tenure in the workforce, 
education, prior experience and training. They state: 
"A radical suggestion then, if these results are further confirmed in 
subsequent work, might be that researchers construct simpler models that 
exclude individual differences altogether. "(Argawal and Prasad 1999, p383). 
Their justification for this is that beliefs and cognitions about information technology 
acceptance and innovation are not invariant across technologies, and the effect of 
individual beliefs need to be negated or controlled in order to develop parsimonious 
models of technology use. In the case of this research, Zones of Tolerance, while 
represented by manifest conditions within the organisational environment, may be 
perceived differently depending on a subject's prior knowledge or experience of 
these constraints. 
Eliminating Individual Differences Through Within-Subjects Design 
One method of controlling for individual differences, particularly while investigating 
relativistic independent constructs, is through the research design itself. One of the 
mo<e potent means of addressing the validity threats present in such research is 
through the use of within-subjects research designs. Used in conjunction with 
random assignment of subjects to treatments, within-subjects designs serve to reduce 
the error variance between treatment groups since subjects experience all treatments, 
thus aiding the comparability of observations. 
Within-subjects designs also aid the objectives of the research itself. To whit, it 
allows one to investigate the relative (not absolute) changes in behaviour between 
'low' (or harsher) ZOTs as compared to 'high' (or more lenient) ZOTs without 
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presupposing all the possible permutations of conditions by which these Zones arise. 
Since the responses to a ZOT are essentially evaluator-relative, observing differences 
over a number of conditions (enabled by a within-subjects design) allows us to 
evaluate these observations in relation to each treatment group. In other words, this 
research programme is less concerned about the specific components of Zones of 
Tolerance and instead focuses on the behaviour manifest by the general condition. 
One of the common issues associated with within-subjects design are 'carry over 
effects' - that providing subjects with multiple treatments available to their memory 
may create false positives through subject reactions to the perceived differences 
between treatment groups. Any experimentation that runs the risk of experiencing 
this validity threat requires careful testing, with the inclusion of random assignment 
and random ordering of treatments. Given sufficient sample size and due care to 
random assignment, these effects can be negated or controlled. 
O.bjectives of Experiment 1 
Establishing the Core Causal Model 
The purpose of this proof of concept experiment is to set some broad and 
unequivocal manipulations of both the Variance and Zone of Tolerance constructs in 
order to observe both the main and interaction effects between the two. As a 
secondary hypothesis we will examine the effect of alternatives on the decision to 
tolerate variances from expectations, as the effect of this as a foundational aspect of 
decision theory is germane to the question of tolerance. 
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It is possible to construct a simple causal model using a Baysian net, constructed 
using a directed acyclic graph whose arcs represent the both the main and interaction 
effects between the three independent constructs investigated within this experiment 
(Figure 4.1 ). 
Budget 
Variance 
Zone of 
Tolerance 
Availability of 
Alternatives 
Tolerance of 
Escalation 
Figure 4.1: Hypothesised Causal Model 
To reiterate from the previous chapter, there are three core assumptions to this 
research that each relate to a foundational aspect of the theoretical model and its 
attendant constructs. These elements are postulated to be common to most escalation 
episodes. These core assumptions are important to keep in mind as we explore the 
constructs examined within this experiment, and their manipulations, more deeply. 
Namely: 
1. Temporal ambiguity: manifest through the structural and organisational 
context; 
2. Expectations as reference points and setbacks as variations: manifest in a 
project context through budget variances; 
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3. Project setbacks are absorbed within Zones of Tolerance and corrected 
outside them: a behavioural outcome manifest through a decision-maker's 
willingness to tolerate budget variances 
The Core Causal Model- Zones of Tolerance and Budget Variance 
Zones of Tolerance 
As stated in the previous chapter, Zones of Tolerance are defined as the extant set of 
boundary conditions within which variations from expectations are recognised but 
carry no significant utility or disutility to the decision-maker. In other words, the 
costs to the decision-maker of tolerating variations from expectations within ZOTs 
are zero, negligible or relatively less than the costs of correction. 
Specifically, we postulate that the structural and organisational conditions that 
surround a project create boundaries within which budget variances (and, more 
generally, variations from expectations) are tolerated. The extent to which the 
. 
environment dictates tolerance for variations from expectations is determined 
predominantly through the loss functions inhered within that context by said 
constraints on decisions and actions. For instance, an organisational context within 
which rivalry between competitors is fierce may have the effect of making decision-
makers more cost-conscious than, say, a research and development division where it 
is understood that many of the experimental projects under development may never 
be implemented. 
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An important distinction between this research and the previous literature examining 
the escalation of commitment phenomenon is that this research is less interested with 
the specific components of the project context that contribute to escalation and more 
interested in the incentives or disincentives to escalate that are manifest through the 
boundary conditions of tolerance that they create. The aforementioned project 
management constructs are considered antecedent to the creation of a Zone of 
Tolerance and are excluded from manipulation in this programme of research. As 
has been discussed previously, escalation is a multi-dimensional construct within 
which many factors combine to contribute to the phenomenon in various ways and 
with varying magnitudes. In this investigation, Zones of Tolerance are, in effect, a 
gestalt look at the project environment that incorporates such factors as the nature of 
the project, its interdependencies with other activities within the organisation, the 
ambiguities inherent within the environment and the significant actors that 
participate in the decision-making process. It represents a departure from the 
traditional approach of investigating the more literal aspects of conventional project 
management constructs and organisational contexts. 
Formally, we hypothesise a main effect of Zones of Tolerance: 
Hl: There is a main effect of Zones of Tolerance on the willingness of a decision-
maker to tolerate escalating commitment to troubled projects. 
Within this experiment, Zones of Tolerance will be manipulated by using three 
variables that are common to all IS project management contexts: the nature of the 
project itself, the nature of the organisation/industry and management support 
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(Figure 4.2). These variables are germane to the research question, empirically 
supported as relevant by previous research and parsimonious in nature. 
ZOT Contributors 
(outside scope of 
analysis) 
Nature of the 
Proiect 
Nature of 
Organisation 
Management 
Support 
~-
Figure 4.2: Contributors to Zones of Tolerance 
The Nature of the Project 
The purpose of the project and its overarching objectives affect the assessment of its 
stra:egic importance to the organisation, its contribution in terms of economic and 
strategic value to the organisation's activities, and the interdependencies between it 
and other activities. This variable relates loosely to the 'project factors' postulated by 
Ross and Staw ( 1986) and employed as a category of escalation constructs within the 
literature review. Some of the facets of the nature of the project could include its: 
Strategic focus; 
Payoff structure (Keil and Mixon 1994, Case and Shane 1988); 
Terminal value (Sabherwal et al. 2003) 
Closing costs and salvage values (Ross and Staw 1993) 
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Ambiguity or equivocality of objectives (Bowen 1987, Bragger et al. 1998. 
Bragger et al. 2003, Drummond 1997, Lindblom 1959); 
Probability of success (Arkes and Hutzel 2000); and 
Riskiness (Kirby and Davis 1998). 
For the purposes of this investigation, manipulations using the nature of the project 
as a component of a Zone of Tolerance will focus mainly on (I) the strategic focus of 
the project, (2) its payoff structure and (3) its likelihood of success, and these three 
factors will be used concurrently with each other to create organisational conditions 
that generally indicate high or low tolerance conditions (Table 4.1 ). 
Table 4.1: Boundary Conditions Contributing to Zones of Tolerance 
Employed Within Experiment 1 
HIGHZOTs LOWZOTs 
Nature of Project 
Strategic Value to Organisation High Low 
Economic Value to Organisation High Low 
.Ambiguity High Low 
Probability of Success High Low 
Nature of Organisation I Industry 
Competitive Rivalry Low High 
Stability I Maturity of Technology Unstable Stable 
Implementation Rates of Project Within Low High 
Portfolio 
Nature of Consumer Demand Strong Weak 
Management Support 
Steering Committee Tolerance of Budget High Low 
Overruns 
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The Nature of the Organisation I Industry 
The nature of the organisation within which a project is being developed has not as 
yet been formally investigated in escalation literature. Within this research, while not 
directly addressing the components of the organisational context, applies some basic 
elements of an industry context that would seem to have an effect on Zones of 
Tolerance writ large within organisation: 
The nature of competitive rivalry within the industry; including both the 
number and intensity of competition between rival organisations as well as 
the nature of the product offering as competing on price or quality; 
The stability and maturity of technologies used within the organisation that 
would have a direct effect upon the risk associated with the implementation; 
The success and failure rates of implementation, and, 
The nature of consumer demand for the products under offer. 
Management Support 
Management support has been found to be one of the strongest determinants of 
escalation (Schmidt et al. 200 I, Keil 1995b among others). Support for a project 
from a project's key decision-makers creates conditions in which projects may be 
doggedly supported despite deteriorating project performance in order to self-justify 
prior decisions, in line with cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger 1957). However, 
as discussed within the literature review, research by Sharma and Yetton (2003) 
among others finds that management support is also significantly correlated with 
project success. That is to say, strong management support is necessary for any IS 
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project to be successful, both to maintain interest in the project at an organisational 
level and to encourage usage of the systems implemented. 
Rather than focussing on management support for overall project success, this 
research situates management support for budget variances as a key determinant of 
Zones of Tolerance. If a decision-maker is cognizant that they are likely to be 
reproached or punished for budget overruns by senior management, they are likely to 
adjust their own tolerance for budget variances accordingly. The point at which 
senior management (or indeed other project stakeholders) are likely to rebuke a 
decision to tolerate budget overruns creates a boundary condition beyond which 
there will be costs associated with the overrun, either through disapproval by 
management or by more punitive action, such as withdrawal of support. Implicit to 
this is that tolerance is predicated not only on a decision-maker's tolerance to 
overruns, but also by those other key decision-makers who can affect the eventual 
success of a project through a threat of withdrawal of their support. 
Buliget Variances 
Budget overruns (particularly time and cost overruns) are a critical measure of a 
project manager's performance with regards to delivering a project in a timely and 
efficient manner (Johnson 1995, Hallows 1998). Budget variances refer to the 
differences between a project's actual spending versus its originally planned 
spending as expressed in a cost budget. In this study, budget variations are used as an 
objective indicator that a project is experiencing setbacks or troubles that were not 
originally expected, hence representing a salient and objectively verifiable variation 
from expectations. 
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Yelton et al. (2000) employ budget variances as a dependent variable to encapsulate 
the efficiency with which a project is meeting its expecations. They cite Lyytinen and 
Hirschheim (1987), Sauer (1993) and Ewusi-Mensah and Przanyski (1991) in their 
caveat that management support is the primary determinant of project influence on 
whether a project is completed, they make the conceptual distinction between said 
project support and the efficiency with which business benefits are delivered, stating 
"[b]udget performance is generally the primary concern of the project 
manager, rather than the business investment appraisal team [or Steering 
Committee}. The project manager 'sfocus is on project efficiency" 
(Yelton et al. 2000, p265). 
While ZOTs are postulated as being critical to tolerance of budget variances, we 
hypothesise that the relative magnitude of budget variances (as a proportion of the 
overall spend) have a main effect on the willingness to continue with a project. 
Specifically, we hypothesise that small budget variances are likely to be tolerated 
while larger budget variances are likely to be corrected. Formally, 
H2: The magnitude of budget variance has a negative effect on the willingness of 
a decision-maker to tolerate said variances. 
Furthermore, we hypothesise that the magnitude of budget variance that is indeed 
tolerated by a project manager is determined in part by the Zones of Tolerance. 
Budget variances occurring where Zones of Tolerance are high (i.e. benign 
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constraints) are much more likely to be tolerated, and to a greater extent, than the 
same budget variances occurring in the presence oflow ZOTs (i.e. strict constraints). 
Formally, 
H3: There is an interaction effect between the magnitude of budget variance and 
Zones of Tolerance on a decision-maker's willingness to accept said 
vanances. 
Availability of Alternatives 
As a secondary hypothesis, this study examines the effect of the availability of 
alternatives on both the decision to escalate a current project and as a factor in the 
diminution of ZOT's. Referring back to the blind date scenario, it would appear that 
a salient alternative to the chosen course of action could complicate the decision 
process. Alte_rnatives have been thoroughly examined within decision literature, 
notably by Simon (1976) who placed central importance on the presence of 
alternatives as central to strategy selection, and the key ingredient in choice 
behaviour. Alternatives become important particularly when a challenged course of 
action requires decision-makers to conduct search of other possible avenues of 
progress (Janis and Mann 1977). Keil, Truex & Mixon (1995) and Schaubroeck & 
Davis (1994) found that the availability of alternatives had a moderating effect on 
escalation tendencies. 
The availability of alternatives was selected as an important and interesting additional 
construct within this investigation as it provides an ecologically valid extenuating 
circumstance to most organisations: namely, that when projects are situated within 
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established (rather than ad hoc) organisational contexts, they are constantly competing for 
attention, support and funding from key stakeholders. Rarely if ever are information systems 
projects developed outside of such a portfolio of projects'. 
In this study, we examine the effect of alternatives on Zones of Tolerance as well its main 
effects on the continue/abandon decision in escalation situations (see Figure 4.3 for 
manipulation). We hypothesise that decision-makers are more likely to take alternatives 
under conditions where 'unkind' ZOT's exist in the environment or decision task, and are 
less likely to accept alternative courses of action to the trouble project when ZOT's are 
accommodated in the environment. Formally, 
H4: Decision-makers are more likely to escalate commitment to a course of 
action when there are no alternatives to the investment. 
H5: There is an interaction effect between alternatives and Zones of Tolerance on 
a decisi_on to escalate commitment to a course of action. 
Section C: Summary of Requirements 
You must make a recommendation for the funding amount you wish to allocate to this 
project in the next period. This recommendation can be the same or different from the 
Project T earn's request and/or budget. 
Senior management can choose to accept or reject your recommendation based on 
whether they believe you have allocated too much or too little. Your reputation with 
them depends on your ability to make good recommendations. 
Should you choose to suspend a project, the remaining funds CAN be 
used to EITHER fund the commencement of other projects awaiting 
funding, OR deposit it in the corporate bank with an low-interest yield 
equivalent to government bonds. 
N.B. You cannot reallocate funds from suspended projects to projects 
that are already under development. 
Figure 4.3: Alternatives Manipulation 
8 The decision-making behaviour of project managers when faced with a portfolio of multiple projects 
is empirically investigated in Experiment 3. 
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Additional Considerations and Experimental Controls 
The following experiment is a relatively simple decision-making task. However, it is 
predicated on the application of a unique research design that needs to be tested 
before being applied to more complex decision tasks in later studies. Therefore, there 
are a number of constraints imposed upon research method that need to be taken into 
account. We can control some unintended effects from the idiosyncrasies of a 
decision-makers personality or background by use of a homogenous sample. Using 
homogenous sample can mitigate random effects from demographic, socio-graphic 
and psychographic influences. 
Secondly, it is important to appreciate the contribution of both pilots and post testing 
when conducting the experiment. Both pilot testing and post testing allow for us to 
get a greater insight into the face for Lydia the case, the internal validity as well as 
the discriminating and convergent validity of goal constructed manipulations. 
Methodological Foci of Proof of Concept Experiments 
When conducting proof of concept experiments it is important to acknowledge that 
the outcomes of these experiments do not offer conclusive evidence of the 
hypotheses being investigated. Neither, therefore, does it immediately suggest 
remedial options for escalation of commitment dilemmas under these constraints. 
For this reason this experiment is one of a number of experiments investigating this 
phenomena, and as a result will be focused on the main independent variables that 
will be examined repeatedly throughout this multi-study dissertation. Later studies 
will further retest and expand upon the hypotheses within the present study and 
- !55-
Chapter 4- Proof of Concept Experiment 
further explore related and possibly interdependent factors, such as tolerance's 
effects over time, its effects on risk-taking, how it is affected by the stability of 
variances and how tolerance exhibited in one project can affect a project portfolio. 
Research Method 
Sample Selection 
Overview of Subject Selection 
A total of fifty-four subjects participated in the experiment. This experiment was 
conducted with 27 subjects for each of the two Alternatives levels ('No Alternative 
Available' and 'Alternative Available'). The decision on the sample size was made 
due to the presence of two between-subjects levels of the Alternatives factor and a 
minimum of 25 subjects per treatment group. Subjects were recruited from 
postgraduate ·students enrolled in a Business Information Systems course at the 
University of Sydney in 2006. 
Subjects voluntarily participated in the task and were reimbursed for their time at a 
flat rate of $30 in cash, paid upon completion. Reimbursement was not tied with 
their performance of the decision task. 
Selection Procedure 
The researcher attended two lectures for a Business Information Systems course 
attended by students of the Masters of Business degree at the University of Sydney. 
The prospective subjects were presented with a brief announcement at the beginning 
of the class that the experiment was to be conducted (see Figure 4.4 for slides). In 
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this announcement they were told that the experiment related to a resource allocation 
task within a project management context that would test their judgement and 
decision-making skills. They were instructed that the experiment was to be 
conducted in the following week and would take up to one hour of their time. 
Further, they were told that there was no pre-requisite of prior knowledge of the task 
domain, no preparation necessary and completely voluntary. To stress the anonymity 
of their participation, they were assured that the lecturer-in-charge of the course in 
which they were enrolled would not know who participated or their proficiency at 
the task and that the task was non-assessable. 
Following the announcement, an Expression of Interest form was passed throughout 
the class and subjects were asked to arrange a time to attend following the 
completion of the lecture (See Figure 4.5). The Expression oflnterest form requested 
subjects' contact details (email and phone) and their preferred time to attend. The 
form also contained key information relating to human research ethics requirements 
mandated by the University of Sydney. 
Once prospective subjects completed the form they were booked into one of the 
available time slots for attendance. The following day, they were emailed 
confirmation of their attendance as well as the time and location of the session for 
which they requested to attend. 
A couple of important points must be mentioned relating to subject recruitment. All 
procedures relating to subject recruitment were approved by, and conformed to, the 
requirements of the Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) at the University of 
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Sydney. These are stringent controls imposed upon University researchers by the 
University in which all recruitment procedures, participation incentives (i.e. 
payments to participants), data collection instruments and analysis techniques must 
be approved by the HREC prior to the commencement of the research. A second 
important point to be declared is that potential participants were told that they would 
be audio-recorded for the purposes of the experimental task. The initial reasoning 
behind this was to collect some verbal protocol information for subsequent analysis. 
This requirement was later removed, since the initial recordings contained little value 
to the final analysis. Less than ten subjects were audio recorded for the experiment. 
Figure 4.4: Recruitment Slides 
Participants Wanted 
Resource Allocation in Project Management 
Experiment to test your judgement and 
decision-making skills 
~ Chief Investigator is a Professor of Business 
Information Systems at University of Sydney 
~ 
The Experiment 
One hour next week - at a time that suits you 
You will be paid 
No Preparation Necessary 
No pre-requisite knowledge 
Non-anessable 
No personal information collected 
You will be audio-recorded 
---
Plea:.e hii out the E~re:.:.ion of Interest form If vou 
would 1ke to part1c1pate. 
The 
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Figure 4.5: Expression of Interest Form 
-- Obverse Page --
Yes, I would like to register my interest to participate in this Resource Allocation in 
Project Management experiment. 
Name: 
Email: ~---------------------------------------1 
Daytime Phone: 
YOUR EXPERIMENT SESSION IS:-------------
Please see reverse side for important information about this experiment. 
You will receive information about the location of the experiment via email. 
Please contact Jonathan Paul G.paul@econ.usyd.edu.au) if you are unable to attend 
at this time. 
--Reverse Page --
Some important points to note: 
I. You will be required for one hour and you will be paid $30 upon completion of the 
experiment. 
2. The experiment will be conducted on the University of Sydney (Camperdown campus) 
at a location to be confirmed. 
3. Your participation is completely voluntary and you will be audio recorded for the 
'Purposes of the experiment. 
4. No personally identifying information about you will be collected, used or revealed 
during the experiment. 
5. You can withdraw from the study at any time, without affecting your relationship with 
the researchers now or in the future. 
Project Title: 
HREC Approval Ref: 
Chief Researchers: 
Tolerance, Alternatives, Escalation and Exit Decisions. 
02-2006/118793 
Jonathan Paul U.paul@econ.usyd.edu.au) 
Prof. Marcus O'Connor (m.oconnor@econ.usyd.edu.au). 
Any person with concerns or complaints about the conduct of a research study can contact 
the Manager, Ethics Administration, University of Sydney on (02) 9351 4811. 
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Sampling Method and External Validity Considerations 
Postgraduate students were chosen as an acceptable surrogate for Information 
Systems project managers. The advantages and disadvantages of selecting students 
for experimental tasks are examined in detail in the Research Methods section. 
Briefly, several studies on the effects of student samples on observed results have 
found little or no evidence of systematic differences between observed responses 
when compared to industry professionals (Peterson 200 I, and Host et al. 2000 
among others). It must be reiterated, however, that it would not be possible to make 
broad generalisations based on any empirical findings based on this research. 
However, external validity through generalisability are not the objective of this proof 
of concept experiment. 
By retaining students from the same class as the entirety of the sample, while posing 
significant challenges to external validity, actually serves to assist the research 
design. By selecting subjects from a relatively homogenous sector of the population 
of interest, the possibility of random error due to individual differences reduces as a 
validity threat. Random allocation of subjects to tasks can largely reduce and control 
for this validity threat. 
Special Sampling Procedures for Student Samples 
We employed a number of the suggestions from Carver, Jaccheri et al. (2003) on the 
use of students in IS-related experimental tasks. 
I. The goals, measures and analysis method were not revealed prior to 
executing the experiment. Other than stating that they were to complete a 
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project management task, subjects were not given details of the task, viz. that 
the purpose of the experiment was to examine their tolerance variances 
during troubled projects. 
2. Subjects were given an opportunity for feedback to justifY their decisions. By 
means of a open-ended question, students were able to explain the rationale 
for their decisions if they so chose. It also served as a tacit reminder as to the 
requirement for recommendations that would be approved by senior 
management. The question asked the subjects to "[s)tate the reasons for your 
recommendation and why you think senior management should approve it". 
3. Subjects (if they so requested) were given the chance to receive feedback on 
their performance in the task. Upon completion of the experiment, subjects 
that requested feedback on the task were told that the experiment tested their 
willingness to tolerate budget variances under differing project conditions. 
A. Subjects were given a realistic time estimate of one hour to complete the task. 
While told the experiment would take up to an hour to complete. On average, 
subjects took between 45 minutes to one hour to complete the paper-based 
task, including reviewing the cover material, making their project 
recommendations and completing the post-test questionnaire. 
5. Finally, students were allowed to choose from a range of possible times to 
attend so as to avoid conflicts with their lesson schedules. Multiple session 
times were held over a two week period in which students could choose their 
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preferred time for attendance. These times were chosen so as not to clash 
with their classes. 
Design and Procedures 
Experimental Design 
A 3 (Zone of Tolerance) X 3 (Variance) within-subjects and an additional X 2 
(Availability of Alternatives) factorial design was employed to test both the 
independent and interaction effects between the Zone of Tolerance and Variance. In 
all, each subject made decisions on nine projects in all three 'Zone of Tolerance' and 
'Variance' conditions, in either the 'Alternatives Available' or 'No Alternatives 
Available' treatment group. 
Altern• 
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Figure 4.6: 3 X 3 (ZOT XV AR) Within-Subjects Research Design with 
X 2 (Availability of Alternatives) Between-Subjects Treatment Groups 
Three levels of the variance factor were used to manipulate a control condition of No 
variance (0% difference between budget and actual), a low variance condition of 
between 5% and I 0% (which was expected to be tolerated) and the high variance 
condition of between 20% and 25% (which was expected to be corrected). The first 
hypothesis pertaining to the main effects of the variance factor predicted that there 
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will be no significant difference between the control and low variance conditions. In 
other words, there will be little or no impetus on behalf of the decision maker to 
correct minor variances from expectations. On the other hand, we should see some 
significant difference in the reaction to high variances from expectations. 
It would be disingenuous to assert that there are clear boundary conditions between 
what the decision maker would deem to be a variance worth correcting and one that 
can be tolerated in the absence of additional information. As a result, the choice of 
low and high variance conditions were used as extreme, yet realistic, quantities of 
budget variance. 
This research design is a considerable departure from prior escalation studies in that 
it tests within-subject behaviour over a variety of escalation situations and over a 
variety of magnitudes of variance from budget (including one control group where 
no budget variance is displayed). While the investment recommendation is still a 
single-shot decision (one decision required per project), the purpose of making 
decisions on three projects each with a different budget variance within the same 
Zone of Tolerance condition is an attempt to make each decision independent while 
testing a variety of magnitudes of budget variance. Most prior studies have not been 
able to test investment behaviour under numerous conditions within similar decision 
contexts due to their between-subjects, single-decision designs. 
Neither does this study make a priori judgements of the conditions of a 'failed' 
project. Rather, it allows the decision-maker to assess the amount of tolerance they 
can display for budget variations depending on the decision context. For example, 
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while a 20% budget variance may be rationally judged to be acceptable under a 
'High Tolerance' condition (such as for an R&D project), it is anticipated that a 
similar variance may not be tolerated under a 'Low ZOT' or 'No ZOT' condition. 
Dependent Variables: RIR Ratio and Project Status 
Recommendation I Request Ratio (R/R Ratio) 
The dependent variable was computed by dividing the subjects' recommendation for 
spending in the next period by the allocation requested by the Project Team for that 
period. This project team request was the manipulation of the VARIANCE 
condition, as the team would request funding at No (0%), Low (5-10%) or High (20-
25%) variance from the original budget for that period. 
Recommendation 1 Request Ratio= Subject's Allocation Decision 
Project Team Request 
The rationale for using the ratio was to 'wash-out' the effects of project size (which 
varied from $500,000 to $700,000) in order to aid comparability between 
recommendations within and across subjects and projects. Thus, the R/R Ratio 
would be 1.0 if the subject allocated the amount requested by the project team in any 
of the Variance conditions. 
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Figure 4.7: Example of RIR Ratio 
The following budget information represents one of the High Variance treatments a 
subject could have been presented with during the experiment. The High Variance 
condition presented subjects with budget variances randomly varying between 20-
25% above the original budget estimate. In this example, the original budget for the 
coming period is $60,500 and the project team is requesting $74,839 (23.7% above 
the original budget estimates). 
Section B: Project Cost Information 
Cost Budget($) Actual($) Difference 
Planned Final Costs 605,000 
Spent to Date 503,705 623,083 23.7% 
I Budget !~l II Team Reguest m I Difference 
Request From 
Project Team For 60,500 74,839 23.7% 
Next Period 
If !Re participating subject decided to allocate the budget amount only (i.e. $60,500) 
for the following period, the RIR Ratio would be calculated thus: 
Recommendation I Request Ratio = Subject's Allocation Decision 
Project Team Request 
R d . I R R . ..:.60::..?.':...:50:..:.0 ecommen atwn equest aho = 
74,839 
Recommendation I Request Ratio ~ 0.808 
- 165-
Chapter 4 - Proof of Concept Experiment 
In the Low and High Variance conditions, an R/R Ratio of 1.0 would indicate the 
subject's willingness to escalate the project equal to the amount requested by the 
Project Team. If the subject allocated the original budget amount (deciding to ignore 
the Project Team's request for additional resources), the mean R/R Ratio would be 
0.930 for the Low Variance condition (a mean budget variance of 7.5%) and 0.816 
for the High Variance condition (a mean budget variance of 22.5%). An R/R Ratio 
below these benchmarks indicates that the subject has elected to de-escalate the 
project by recommending a reduction to next period's allocation below the original 
budget. Project abandonment decisions (R/R Ratios of 0.0) were excluded from the 
univariate ANOV A to maintain the normal distribution of the results and are 
considered in separate analysis. 
Project Status 
In addition to the investment decision, subjects were asked to select an option which 
best described the status with which the project should be reported. This measure 
was introduced to allow some comparison between the stated investment decision 
and·the 'feelings' subjects had about the project. By including such a measure, one 
would be able to gain some insights into the potential for cognitive dissonance in 
investment strategies. By that, we intend to see if subjects were providing their 'true' 
opinion regarding the status of the project and to see how that tracks to the 
investment decision. 
In experiment 1, this project status changed depending on the treatment of whether 
alternative investments were available or not. In this way, one can tease apart 
decisions to continue that were made because the decision-maker was happy to 
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tolerate the variances experienced and those that were reluctantly made. The project 
status options are illustrated in Figure 4.8. 
Figure 4.8: Experiment 1 Project Status 
Participants were asked to select one of the following options for each of the projects 
under their control. 
'Alternatives Available' Condition: 
o On Track: Continue Without Change 
o Some Concerns: Continue With Closer Monitoring 
o In Trouble: Continue But Seek Ways To Minimise Loss 
-OR-
Suspend Project: Project Should Be Suspended Immediately 
o And Use Remaining Funds to Commence a Project Awaiting Funding 
o And Use Remaining Funds to Deposit in Corporate Bank 
'No Alternatives Available' Condition 
o On Track: Continue Without Change 
o Some Concerns: Continue With Closer Monitoring 
o In Trouble: Continue But Seek Ways To Minimise Loss 
o Suspend Pro.iect: Project Should Be Suspended Immediately 
Zone of Tolerance (Within-Subjects) 
Three Zone of Tolerance conditions were manipulated (None, Low and High) in two 
corresponding ways. Firstly, prior to making project recommendations, subjects 
were presented with a one page company brief that included the Senior 
Management's strategic objectives for all IT project developments within that 
company. Secondly, they were presented with an industry analysis detailing some 
opportunities and risks within that industry. 
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The three companies, each representing one ZOT manipulation were presented as 
follows (see Figures 4.18, 4.19, and 4.20 respectively): 
NoZOT: 
LowZOT: 
HighZOT: 
A home computing company operating in a highly competitive, cost-
driven consumer technologies market space with intense competition 
from major industry players (such as Google, Microsoft and Apple). 
The focus of developments is on cost competitiveness using low-risk, 
stable technologies. There is little room for changes to a project's size 
and scope without adversely affecting profitability; 
A company involved in custom business software developments were 
the focus of developments is client satisfaction and moderate 
flexibility in plans and budgets; and 
A research and development company with a focus on high value 
investments over the medium to long term and a high degree of 
tolerance for the uncertainties surrounding the development of new 
technologies (albeit acknowledging a commensurately high risk). 
The second means by which ZOTs were manipulated were through a condensed 
version of this one page summary on the pages relating to each individual project. 
Since each of the nine projects were presented to participating subjects on its own 
separate page, this summary acted as a salient 'reminder' to subjects of the Senior 
Management's Directives regarding the project. Table 4.2 shows these condensed 
ZOT manipulations as it appeared to subjects when making a decision on each 
project. 
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Table 4.2: ZOT Manipulations 
HighZOT Our expectation of the Research and Development Division is that 
Manipulation they produce high value investment opportunities for 
implementation and release in the medium to long term. As long as 
projects are strongly profitable, project managers can decide, to an 
extent, how much this quality should cost in terms of time and 
money. There is a degree of tolerance for the uncertainties of 
developing brand new technologies. 
LowZOT 
Manipulation 
Our expectation of the Business Solutions division is that they must 
focus on the quality of the products they develop. While managing 
costs within budgets are highly important, it is crucial that we are a 
quality leader in this area of the business. We are going to closely 
monitor all project developments and approve those projects that 
demonstrate strong market value and whose cost and time budgets 
are proceeding on or close to plan. 
No ZOT New competitive threats from Google, Microsoft, Apple and other 
Manipulation major industry players have severely tightened the market for our 
products. The essence of the new market conditions is cost 
competitiveness and timeliness of delivery. Spending approvals 
will only be granted to project managers demonstrating the ability 
to ensure that very tight cost budget controls are placed on projects 
to maintain their viability in the market. 
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Variance (Within-Subjects) 
Three budget Variance conditions (None, Low, High) were manipulated through the 
amount of budget slippage the project was experiencing to date as expressed through 
the absolute and percentage difference between budget vs. actual spend-to-date. This 
same variance was 'requested' by the project team for the coming period in which a 
recommendation was to be made. The three orders of magnitude of variance were 
expressed as randomly distributed between the following ranges (Table 4.3). 
Table 4.3: Minimum and Maximum Budget Variances 
(Randomly Assigned to Each Project) 
Minimum Maximum 
Variance Treatment 
Variance Variance 
No Variance 0% 0% 
Low Variance 5% 10% 
.High Variance 20% 25% 
An example of the presentation of the Variance Condition - budget vs. actual 
financial information (in this case, a High Variance) condition is provided below 
(Table 4.4): 
Table 4.4: Example- Project Cost Information 
Cost Budget($) Actual($) Difference 
Planned Final Costs 594,000 
Spent To Date 502,484 625,593 24.5% 
Budget($) Request($) Difference 
Request From Project 
Team for Next Period 
59,400 73,953 24.5% 
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Availability of Alternatives (Between-Subjects) 
The study employed a between-subjects design to test the significance of Availability 
of Alternatives in EOC decisions. Two treatment groups received information about 
a project portfolio in which they either had access to (Between-Subjects Group 1), or 
were denied access to (Group II) the remaining resources available in a budget if a 
project was to be abandoned (the wording of each of these treatments can be found 
in Figure 4.9a and 4.9b). Those in the With Alternatives treatment condition could 
choose whether to invest the remaining funds in other projects waiting for funding, 
or to invest the funds in a 'company bank' yielding a low rate of interest equivalent 
to government bonds. The reason for the inclusion of the 'company bank' option was 
to provide a 'safe' alternate use of funds and negate the influence of uncertainty in 
the 'new' project affecting the decision to withdraw from of the current project. This 
is contrary to Arkes and Blumer's (1985) experiments in which the only alternative 
when abando11ing a project was to start a second one. This may confound subjects' 
interpretations of the relative risk of continuing the current investment with the new 
project. 
Subjects in the No Alternatives treatment group were instructed that remaining funds 
would be subsumed back into the company treasury and that any decision to abandon 
an investment would mean that the remaining resources that were available for the 
project would become forfeit. In this case, the choice to abandon a project does not 
create an alternative use of the 'saved' resources for the decision-maker since even if 
the decision-maker decides to abandon the investment, they are unable to put the 
resources saved to an alternative use. 
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Figure 4.9a: No Alternatives Manipulation Panel in Introductory Statement 
IMPORTANT NOTE: 
Should you choose to suspend a project, the remaining funds CANNOT BE USED to fund 
the commencement of other projects under your control. 
Any remaining unspent funds will be forfeit from that company's budget. 
You cannot reallocate funds from suspended projects to projects that are already under 
development. 
Figure 4.9b: Alternatives Manipulation Panel in Introductory Statement 
IMPORT ANT NOTE: 
Should you choose to suspend a project, the remaining unspent funds for that project can be 
used to EITHER: 
I. Fund the commencement of a new project under your control that is still waiting 
for funding; OR 
2. Deposit the remaining funds into the corporate bank with a low-interest yield 
equivalent to government bonds. 
You cannot reallocate funds from suspended projects to projects that are already under 
development. 
Figure 4.9c: Subject's Response Options in the Alternatives Manipulation 
Section D: Your Recommendation For Next Period 
Investment 
It is recommended that the project receive: 
in the next period. 
Recommended Status of this Project (please select one of the fof/owing) : 
0 On Track: Continue Without Change 
0 Some Concerns: Continue With Closer Monitoring 
D In Trouble: Continue But Seek Ways To Minimise loss 
---------------············----·--OR .................................. . 
Suspend Project: Project Should Be Suspended Immediately 
D And Use Remaining Funds to Commence a Project Awaiting Funding 
D And Use Remaining Funds to Deposit in Corporate Bank 
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The scenario was controlled to ensure that projects were treated independently and 
that findings were not confounded by a decision-maker viewing the investments as a 
portfolio in which they may decide to terminate or de-escalate one investment to 
'cover up' the cost slippages of another. If the task was properly understood by 
subjects, it should be clear that approvals by the Steering Committee will only be 
granted to projects that remain economically viable in their own right. 
The Decision Task- Experimental Apparatus 
Each subject was presented with an introductory statement and cover story prior to 
making their nine project investment decisions across three companies. The study 
placed the decision-makers in a scenario in which they were a consultant Project 
Activity Manager for three companies all within the Information Technology 
industry. Their role was to conduct end of period reporting to each of the three 
companies' ~enior Management for three IT project developments under their 
purview within each company. The decision-maker had to make project investment 
recommendations for each project with a caveat that they had to justify their 
deCisions which were ultimately approved by the Steering Committee and that their 
professional reputation was staked on the quality of their decisions. 
For each of the three companies (ZOT manipulation), decision-makers were 
provided with a snapshot of the industries' risks and opportunities and a Steering 
Committee briefing that outlined the strategic objectives of project developments. 
For each of the three projects, decision-makers were provided with budget 
information and details of the constraints on their decisions. The budget information 
contained budget vs. actual details on costs to date and the budget information for 
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the coming period. In addition, they were provided with a 'team request' which was 
at variance with the budgeted costs for the coming period. Their decisions included 
(I) whether each project should be continued or not; and (2) If so, how much funding 
it should receive. The template used for each of the nine projects is presented in 
Figure 4.1 0. 
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Figure 4.10: Project Template 
I Industry: Research & Development Project Name: "Innovation House" 
Section A Section A: Senior Management Directive Section 0: Your Recommendation For Next Period 
0.. expec:qtion ~ the R-.:11 end Development OiYISIOII 11 1Mt they produce high Investment Section D 
ZOT Manipulation ...aue onvestmenl ~for omplementabon .,d releae ., the medium to long It is nteommended that the project receive: lerm As long as projeds •• strongly ~ilable. project~ c:.n deade, to., 
extent. how muc::h lh• qoaity ahould cost in tenns ~ bme and money There is a I I I Subject Response: degree ~tolerance for the ~llllles ~ dellelopong brand new lec:hnologoes. 
In the next period. 
investment 
Section 8 Section B: Project Cost Information ~ s-. otlhia Project (piN.se select one o1 the folowng} : 0 On Tnoc:k Contllue Wihout Ch8nge Recommendation Coet Budaet·S AcbM!ISl Dllfwtwnee 0 Soma Conc:ern. ConiJnue Wilh Cbler Manlloring 
Variance 0 In Trouble Conmue But See!< w..,_ To Morwnrse Loss 
Planned Finlll Coets 605.000 
and Project Status Manipulation OR 
Spent to Date 503,705 623083 237% 
Suepend Project: Project Should Be Suapended lmmedlnly 
Bud-lSI r ..... -..uiSI [)Iff.....,. 0 Artd Use Remaining Funds to Commence a Project Awaibng Fundong 
Request F10m 0 Artd Use Remaoneng Funds to DepoM., Colporate Bank 
Project Tum For 10,100 7 .. ,131 23.7% 
Next Period 
Section C 
Section C: Summary of Requirements State the reasons for your recommendation and why 
~ou must malce a recommendation for the fundol1g amount you Wdh to a1ocate to this you think senior management should approve il 
Alternatives prqect on the next penod This recommendation can be the - or dillerenl from the Justification for Pro,ect T earn's request andlor budget. 
Manipulation Senior management can choose to accept or reject your recommendation based on ~they beielle you have doc:Med too much or too Iitie. YOIX repuWtion with Decision ~ depends on your ab*ty to n\llke good recommendations 
Sr-Jid you choon to -pend a project, the ,._lnlng funda CAN be (N.B. Results not reported 
UHd to EITHER fund the commenc-nt at other pRijectll -•ltlng 
funding, OR depoelt It In the corporate benk with an low~-t yield 
- negligible added value 
equivalent to gov.,_nt bonda. 
t!,§, y 2!1 !i1D!!2l mlllilildl flllllll flllllllllllllllllll arolecta ill oroiec:ll 
S!!III[IIIE!ID 1111!11[ develcxlnwld, 
to the analysis) 
I ~OIIaoUoo .Oioly~7!~' 10 
--
- ---
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Procedure 
Subjects were given a number of alternative times to attend the experiment session. 
Each session was held in a classroom at the University of Sydney. Upon arrival, 
subjects were instructed to take time to read through the Ethics materials and sign 
Participation Consent Forms as per the requirements stipulated by the Human 
Research Ethics Committee at the University. Subjects were given a short 
introduction about what to expect during the experiment task. They were told that 
they were to receive nine projects for three companies in which they needed to make 
investment decisions. Time was allowed for questions. 
In order to preserve the ordering of decisions (randomised by subject) printouts were 
given to the students and they were instructed to not flip ahead (and supervised to 
ensure this). Table 4.5 describes the order in which projects were shown to subjects. 
Table 4.5: Presentation Order of Task 
Page(s) Purpose 
I Participant Information Sheet 
2 Participant Consent Form 
3 Introductory Cover Story 
4 ZOT Manipulation I 
5-7 Projects 1-3 
8 ZOT Manipulation 2 
9-11 Projects 4-6 
12 ZOT Manipulation 3 
13-15 Projects 7-9 
16 Summary and Post-Test 
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Introductory Statement, Cover Story and Enhancing Ecological Realism 
Each subject was provided with an introductory statement regarding the roles of 
project managers when making project investment decisions. After reading the 
introductory statement, subjects read the cover story detailing their role as a 
Consultant Project Activity Manager whose role is to "oversee the day-to-day 
progress on projects that [they] monitor and make sure that projects run according to 
the plans set out by the senior management of each company." They were then 
instructed that was time to review the progress of their projects and make 
recommendations to senior management about each project. 
In order to make the importance of 'good' project investment decisions, subjects 
were told the following, 
"Your reputation is significantly affected by the quality of your 
recoll!mendations to Senior Management. A poor recommendation may be to 
spend too much or too little on a project, or take actions that will lead to 
project failure. 
"You know that a lot of projects are supported by Senior Management -
some good and some bad - and you need too make recommendations that 
conform to both the Senior Management's strategic directives as well as 
contribute to the value of each company." 
The reason behind providing this information is to discourage participants from 
making opportunistic investment decisions that are skewed excessively towards 
escalating projects to preserve their reputations or to kowtow to Senior Management 
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despite their assessment of the project as failing. It was anticipated that decision-
makers should use their judgement to balance the competing influences of the Senior 
Management's strategic directives, the progress of the project and the nature of the 
industry in which they operate. In other words, the subjects were induced to balance 
the relative importance of the ZOT manipulations (management's strategic directives 
and the industry brief) with the Variance manipulation (the efficiency with which the 
project was progressing according to plan). The incentive was heightened by virtue 
of the fact that they were instructed that Senior Management "first considers [their] 
recommendations and then decides whether or not to approve [them]. They 
[Management] have the final say in how much gets allocated to each project and can 
decide on their own to increase or reduce funding to the project, or suspend it if it is 
not running to plan." 
To improve the experimental realism of the scenario, the level of completion and the 
size of each project were randomly varied over a normal distribution between 70% to 
90%, and $500,000 to $700,000 respectively. Manipulation checks against the co-
val'iation of the size of the recommendation against these two possibly exogenous 
influences on the tendency to escalate were considered. 
Random Allocation of Tasks 
Twelve randomised decision sequences were created to negate ordering effects and 
these decision sequences were randomly assigned to subjects. Zone of Tolerance 
manipulations were grouped together, so that the decision-maker could make project 
recommendations by company, and the order of the Variance conditions within each 
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company were also randomised. Thus the order of investment decisions was 
displayed in the following manner (as an example): 
Table 4.6: Within-Subject Design With Randomised Ordering of Projects 
To Test For ZOT X V AR Effects (Example) 
Zone of Tolerance Variance Condition 
Condition 
Project I (No VAR) 
' Company I i 
(No ZOT Condition) 
Project 2 (Low VAR) 
Project 3 (High VAR) 
Company 2 
Project 4 (Low VAR) 
Project 5 (High VAR) 
(Low ZOT Condition) 
Project 6 (No VAR) 
Company 3 
Project 7 (High VAR) 
(High ZOT Condition) 
Project 8 (No VAR) 
Project 9 (Low VAR) 
Methodology 
Analysis Methodology- Univariate Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
The 3 (ZOT) X 3 (Variance) X 2 (Alternatives) factorial design was tested using a 
univariate ANOV A employing a Type III Sum of Squares with a Bonferroni 
correction. This correction was required since the R/R Ratio used as the dependent 
variable did not satisfy the Levene's test for homogeneity of variance, although it did 
satisfy tests for normality. The ANOVA was conducting using the statistical 
software package SPSS 11.5. Prior to analysis, project abandonment decisions were 
removed for seaparate analysis as project investment decisions of effectively $0 are treated 
as missing values in an ANOV A. 
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Analysis and Results 
Estimatetl Margi11al Mea11s of Recommendation I Request Ratio 
The following chart (Figure 4.11) represents the mean investment decision per ZOT 
X VARIANCE group as a proportion of the original budget (project abandonment 
decisions excluded). 
... 
• 
Alternatives 
aa , 
~100 
ID 
ii 
c 
a. 
-;:; 
0 
... 
0 
• eo 
aa 
~ 
• u 
... 
• Q. 
- so 
None Low 
ALTERNATIVES 
No Alternatives 
tigh None Low tigh 
VARIANCE 
ZONE OF 
TOLERANCE 
-None 
- Low 
None 
, Figure 4.11: Mean Investment Decisions as a Percentage of the Original Budget 
From a cursory look at above figure it would appear evident that there were dramatic 
differences between Variance condition, and a marked difference in the treatment of 
Alternatives conditions in the Low ZOT condition only. Subjects exhibited a general 
tendency to allocate funds at amounts closer to the budget than the Project Team 
request under the No or Low Variance conditions. In the No Variance (control 
group) condition, mean RIR Ratios were extremely close to 1.0, indicating that the 
subjects treated the control group as expected. 
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Budget Variance 
A highly significant main effect was found for the Variance construct (F(2,409) = 
92.013, p = .000, partial eta squared= .31 0) (H2 Supported, See Figure 4.12). 
Alternatives 
1.1 
" 0 .9 
:G 
" c: 0.8 
"' •~ 
0 .7 
0.6 
0.5 
None Low 
ALTERNATIVES 
No Alternatives 
tigh None Low tigh 
VARIANCE 
ZONE OF 
TOLERANCE 
-None 
• Low 
None 
Figure 4.12: Recommendation I Project Team Request Ratio (R by R) 
Table 4.7: Recommendation I Project Team Request Ratio (R by R) Statistics 
Type III Partial 
Sum of Mean Eta 
Source Squares df Square F Si2. Squared 
Model 391.455(a) 18 21.747 5027.65 .000 .996 7 
Alternatives .012 1 .012 2.695 .101 .007 
ZOT .098 2 .049 11.375 .000 .053 
Variance .796 2 .398 92.013 .000 .310 
Alt * ZOT .001 2 .000 .091 .913 .000 
Alt * Vnc .021 2 .Oil 2.479 .085 .012 
ZOT * Vnc .060 4 .015 3.484 .008 .033 
Alt * ZOT * 
.001 4 .000 .065 .992 .001 Vnc 
Error 1.769 409 .004 
Total 393.224 427 
a R Squared = .996 (Adjusted R Squared = .995) 
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Recall that the Recommendation I Project Team Request ratio is used to measure the 
distance between a subject's recommended investment in a project and the request 
for funding by the project team (Variance Treatment). This size and direction of this 
effect confirms the hypothesis that the size of magnitude of variance is significantly 
correlated with the tendency to fully or partially escalate projects with low variance 
and to deescalate projects or abandon projects with high variance. In other words, 
subjects displayed a tendency to allocate more to the project than the original budget 
(rather than correct the overrun through reduced allocations) when small budget 
overruns were requested by the project team (between 5% and I 0%). Conversely, 
subjects tended to deescalate or abandon projects when high budget overruns 
(between 20% and 25%) except where the Zone of Tolerance was high, and this can 
be seen in Figure 4.13 . As was expected, there was no tendency to either escalate or 
deescalate in the Variance control group (No Variance condition). 
Escalation Tendencies at Low Variance Escalation Tendencies at Hgh Variance 
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Figure 4.13: Escalation Tendencies at Low and High Variances 
As further evidence of the effect of budget variances on the tendency to tolerate escalating 
commitment, the following chart represents the mean budget overrun tolerated in each of the 
ZOT, Variance and Alternatives Conditions (Figure 4.14). 
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Figure 4.14: Mean Budget Overrun as a Proportion of the Budget 
Zone of Tolerance 
A marginally insignificant main effect was found for Zone of Tolerance (F(2, 409) = 
11 .375, p = .000, partial eta squared= .053), albeit with a smaller contribution to the 
overall effect than the Variance construct (H 1 Marginally Not Supported). In 
addition, a significant (albeit small overall) ZOT X Variance interaction effect was 
also displayed (F(4,409) = 2.479, p = .012, partial eta squared = .033) and was 
significant at the .05 level (H3 Supported). It is no surprise that ZOT seems to have 
an interaction effect during budget allocation decisions when taken into 
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consideration against the variance from expectations. What is surprising, however, is 
that subjects tended to display a ZOT through their reactions to budget variance as 
well as react to the ZOT built into the decision context. 
Estimated Marginal Means: ZOT 
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Figure 4.15: Recommendation by Request Ratio by Zone of Tolerance 
(Combined across Variance Manipulations) 
Alternatives 
The presence or absence of Alternatives was not found to be significant, either as a 
main effect (F(I,409) = 2.695, p = .101, partial eta squared= .007), nor did it display 
any significant interaction effects with the other factors in the study (H4 and H5 Not 
Supported). This may be due to poor operationalisation of the construct or that the 
operationalisation was not salient enough. Another interpretation is that alternatives 
were only considered after the decision to abandon was made, and this may be 
evidenced by the highly significant effect of variance in the overall model. 
Project Abandonment 
As stated previously, the cases in which projects were abandoned were excluded 
from all previous analysis. This was done for two reasons: Firstly, including cases in 
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which subjects decided to invest $0 into a project would skew the normal 
distribution of the remaining cases. Secondly, results from Analysis of Variance 
(ANOV A) techniques are often skewed or complicated due to missing values. 
Using a binary logistic regression, the only significant factor on the decision to 
abandon a project was Variance (p = 0.00). Figure 4.16 provides an indication of the 
proportion of projects that were abandoned within each cell of the factorial design. 
As can be seen from the following figure , the High Variance condition saw the 
highest number of project abandonments. In the Low ZOT condition, the number of 
project abandonments differed from 33.3% of cases in the Alternatives condition to 
18.5% of cases in the No Alternatives Condition. 37% of projects were abandoned in 
the No Alternatives I No ZOT I High Variance condition. 
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Figure 4.16: Percentage of Abandoned Projects Within Each Factorial Cell 
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Manipulation Checks and Post-Test Questionnaire 
Order effects were not significant in the study (F(8,427) = 0.70, p > 0.68). 
Furthermore, project size (p > .30) and level of completion (p > .II) were not found 
to have significant effects on the recommendations using a linear regression against 
the R/R Ratio. 
A post-test questionnaire was conducted in which all nine project recommendations 
were tabulated on one page. Subjects were then asked to review all their 
recommendations and were asked two questions: (I) if they were satisfied with their 
recommendations and (2) how they believed Senior Management would react to 
these recommendations. These questions were used as manipulation checks against 
order effects (if participants believed they were consistent across their decisions) and 
how ascertain salient the ZOT manipulations were in terms of their satisfaction of 
the experime~t's criteria that recommendations would be amenable to review. The 
post-test questionnaire confirmed that the overwhelming majority of subjects were 
content with their recommendations on review and that they considered the reactions 
of' Senior Management in their decisions. No subjects displayed post-hoc 
reconsiderations relating to the consistency of their decisions across projects or 
across companies which, in a small way, serves to reinforce that the projects were 
indeed considered to be independent of one another by participating subjects. 
Project Status 
Using a univariate ANOVA, we can see subjects' assessment of the status of the 
project was mostly dependent on the Variance (F(2,468) = 151.315, p = .000, partial 
eta squared = .393) and weakly dependent on Zones of Tolerance (F(2,468) = 4.163, 
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p = .017, partial eta squared = .017). Furthermore, there was a weak interaction 
effect evident between Variance and ZOTs (F(4,468) = 3.320, p =.Oil, partial eta 
squared= .028). The Availability of Alternatives was not significant (F(l,468) = 
.014, p = .. 905, partial eta squared= .000). 
These results from the two dependent variables conform to the investment 
recommendations made by subjects. This would suggest that there is no evidence 
pointing to a bias in the findings due to cognitive dissonance and that subjects 
viewed their project decisions consistently when compared to their stated investment 
recommendations. In other words, a subject's affect and actions were consonant, 
their affective 'feelings' about the project were determined by the project context 
and that effective state was brought to bear on their investment recommendations. 
Table 4.8: Project Status Statistics 
Type III Partial 
Sum of Mean Eta 
Source Squares df Square F Sig. Squared 
Corrected 190.189(a) 17 11.188 19.580 .000 .416 M9del 
Intercept 1888.403 I 1888.403 3304.96 .000 .876 7 
ZOT 4.757 2 2.379 4.163 .016 .017 
Variance 172.918 2 86.459 151.315 .000 .393 
Alternatives .008 I .008 .014 .905 .000 
ZOT*VNC 7.588 4 1.897 3.320 .011 .028 
ZOT * ALT 1.053 2 .527 .922 .398 .004 
VNC * ALT .399 2 .200 .349 .705 .001 
ZOT * VNC * 3.465 4 .866 1.516 .196 .013 ALT 
Error 267.407 468 .571 
Total 2346.000 486 
Corrected 457.597 485 Total 
a R Squared= .416 (Adjusted R Squared= .394) 
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Discussion 
As stated at the beginning of this chapter, the purpose of this proof of concept 
experiment were twofold: 
I. To establish the relationships between key constructs and variables (Zones of 
Tolerance, Variance and, as a secondary hypothesis, Alternatives); and 
2. To establish the veracity and validity of the research method, in particular, 
the research design, subject selection and data collection methods. 
This experiment served as an effective and parsimonious proof of concept device 
that empirically tested the effect of a Zone of Tolerance, Budget Variance and the 
Availability of Alternatives on the tolerance of budget variances. Using a 3 (ZOT) X 
3 (VARIANCE) within-subjects design with X 2 (ALTERNATIVES) between-
subjects treatq:lent groups in order to test both the main and interaction effects of 
these constructs on a subject's willingness to tolerate escalating commitment to 
troubled projects. 
We found a strong main effect for the effect of Variances on a tendency to escalate. 
The results show that as budget variances increase, a decision-makers' willingness to 
tolerate it increases to a point and then decreases. For small budget variances, in 
particular, decision-makers found it apt to tolerate said variances without much 
correction. On the other hand, larger budget variances tended to be corrected, either 
through correction back to the budget in the following period, de-escalation or 
abandonment. 
- 188-
Chapter 4 - Proof of Concept Experiment 
That variances affect tolerance, in itself, is no profound finding. What is an original 
finding, however, is the effect of Zones of Tolerance on the willingness to tolerate 
budget variances. Zones of Tolerance have an interaction effect with budget 
variance. Thus, controlling the context around which these budget variances occur 
has a significant effect on the tendency to allow escalation of a project, particularly 
under conditions of high budget variance. In other words, when the organisational 
and structural conditions create low tolerance zones, decision-makers react 
appropriately to the constraints imposed upon them. 
From this it can be seen that escalation is not entirely irrational, but rather takes the 
structural tolerance of budget variations as an undergirding influence. This effect has 
been suggested by Drummond (1994), but hitherto never tested empirically. Case 
studies do not permit such investigation since the organisational conditions are non-
manipulable, and the precedent of single-shot, between-subjects decision tasks (as in 
previous experimental literature into escalation) does not allow for such a 
comparison. To this end, the research design employed in this experiment, hitherto 
untested in escalation literature, was also shown to give a richer picture of 
investment decisions under varying conditions than conventional escalation 
experiments. 
Similar to the original studies of asymmetric loss functions within the forecasting 
field, as well as Lawrence and O'Connor's original postulation of the Zone of 
Tolerance phenomenon, it can be seen that decision-makers respond appropriately to 
the conditions within which they are making a decision to tolerate setbacks. The 
existence of this behaviour strongly suggests that escalation of commitment need not 
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necessarily be irrational (i.e. acting completely antithetical to the reality of the 
project's circumstances). Rather, decision-makers' responses to the structural 
constraints imposed upon them suggest that escalation, despite its prevalence and 
gravity in the real world, can be controlled effectively through appropriate measures 
that constrain the tendency to tolerate setbacks to an unreasonable degree. 
Limitations of the Study 
Alternatives were not a significant contributor to the decision to escalate 
commitment to a course of action. There are several possible reasons for the failure 
to discover significant effects, the most likely of which can be seen to arise through a 
poor manipulation of the Alternatives construct (Type II Error). Similar 
manipulations of the Alternatives construct were used by Keil, Truex & Mixon 
(1995) and Schaubroeck & Davis (1994) and significant results were discovered. 
Their result was found even though the manipulation of the construct used a single 
alternative for investing funds in another project. In this study, it was argued that a 
manipulation presenting just one alternative - another project whose nature, risk and 
return were not stated - contained insufficient ecological realism. To that end, this 
study presented subjects with two alternatives: a new project for potential investment 
or to put remaining funds into a corporate account whose return was equivalent to 
that of government bonds. Nevertheless, despite the addition of a 'safe' alternative, 
no significance was found. 
A second limitation of the study was the lab setting. Lab settings do not provide 
sufficient realism typical escalation situations, which are often fraught with high 
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emotions, organisational conflict and high ambiguity. In the absence of such strong 
emotive cues, subjects may exhibit a greater sensitivity to the demand characteristics 
of the lab setting. Many precautions were taken to negate such risks, the most 
important of which was that subjects were not told of the objective of the task prior 
to commencing it. However, while the results were treated as independent and 
random ordering of treatments were employed, it is not outside the realm of 
possibility to surmise that the objectives of the experimenter would eventually be 
discovered during execution of the task, due to some repeating patterns of budget 
variances (none, low, high). This would taint the subjects' responses with expectancy 
effects. Regardless however, ordering effects were not found to be significant upon 
post-test examination. 
Implications for the Next Experiment 
Understanding the components of decision-maker tolerance within an organisational 
context can be complicated and amorphous. In the next study, we will examine the 
efrect of shifting project conditions over time on the amount of variances accepted 
by project managers. Tolerance is affected by many behavioural and organisational 
sources. For instance, changes of management, shifting user preferences or changes 
in resource availability all may have direct effects on how much tolerance is 
extended towards a project with deteriorating performance and likelihood of success. 
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Concluding Remarks 
This proof of concept experiment sought to establish the relationships between the 
key constructs and variables used in this research programme. In particular, we 
sought to test the effects of Zones of Tolerance and Budget Variances on the 
tendency to escalate commitment to information systems projects. We postulated 
that the structural and organisational conditions that surround a project create 
boundaries within which budget variances (and, more generally, variations from 
expectations) are tolerated. As a secondary hypothesis, we examined the effects of 
Availability of Alternatives on the decision to escalate. Furthermore, the use of proof 
of concept-style research using experimentation establishes the veracity and validity 
of the research method. In particular, it seeks to establish the veracity of the research 
design, subject selection and data collection methods. 
Decision-makers often respond to this ambiguity by tolerating a certain amount of 
variations from their original intentions. This study is an attempt to create a nexus 
between some the conflicting literature debating whether tolerance of escalation is 
inherently rational or irrational. Escalation is a historically laden and context-
dependent phenomenon where real world ambiguity is often acknowledged by 
decision-makers as an unavoidable aspect of project management. Information 
systems escalation literature has typically focused on causes due to project 
management failures during development. Time and cost overruns of IS 
development projects are attributed to mismanagement during the development 
cycle, obstruction by stakeholders and the inability to accept uncompensated losses 
by abandoning failing projects (Abdei-Hamid 1988; Keil 1995; Keil et al. 1995; 
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Newman and Sabherwal 1996). The findings of previous IS escalation studies have 
relied largely on the retrospective rationality of project managers, who are often 
seeking to assign blame or to justify their persistence with failed initiatives. What is 
often ignored, however, are the ambiguities and the tolerance surrounding the 
smaller, seemingly innocuous setbacks early in the project's development. 
This study investigated the behaviour of decision-makers in escalation of 
commitment decisions under Zones of Tolerance, Budget Variance and Alternatives 
conditions. Most escalation situations occur gradually over time through small but 
cascading and compounding variations from expectations. We found that Zones of 
Tolerance and Variance are statistically significant contributors to the continuation 
of courses of action. As expected, we found that small variances from expectations 
( 5%-10%) are likely to be tolerated rather than corrected and that large variances 
from expectations (20%-25%) are more likely to lead to de-escalation or 
abandonment decisions. This finding is at odds with Prospect Theory's assertion that 
small variances from expectations are the largest carriers of marginal utility or 
disutility. Contrary to prior studies (and our expectations) we could find no 
significant effect of Alternatives on either the continue/abandon decision or as an 
interaction effect with either Zones of Tolerance or Variance. This study is a 
preliminary investigation to determine how the presence and function of ZOT's 
affect resource allocation decisions. Nevertheless, decision-makers' sensitivity to 
ZOT' s are intuitively and empirically valid phenomena and have been shown to be a 
key contributor to resource allocation decisions in general and escalation of 
commitment decisions in particular. 
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Figure 4.17: Introductory Cover Story 
Your Role 
You are to imagine that you are a Consultant Project Manager for a series of nine projects 
across three different companies (three projects per company). Your role is to oversee the 
day-to-day progress of the projects that you monitor and make sure that projects run 
according to the plans set out by the Senior Management of each company. 
At the end of every period you report to the Senior Management on the progress of projects 
and make recommendations about how much should be invested into these projects in the 
coming period. 
Senior Management first considers your recommendations and then decides whether or not 
to approve your recommendations. They have the final say in how much gets allocated to 
each project and can independently decide to increase or reduce funding to the project, or 
suspend it if it is not running to plan. 
IMPORT ANT NOTE: 
Your reputation in these organisations is significantly affected by the quality of your 
recommendations to Senior Management. A poor recommendation may be to spend 
too much or too little on a project, or take actions that will lead to project failure. 
You know that a lot of projects are supported by Senior Management- some good and 
some bad- and you need make recommendations that conform to both the Senior 
Management's strategic directives as well as contribute to the value of each company. 
Your Task 
It is now time to review progress in each of these projects and make a recommendation to 
Senior Management about funding these projects in the next period. 
You will be provided with some key project information and you are required to make three 
recommendations for EACH project under your management: 
1. Whether or not the project should be continued; 
2. How much should be allocated to the project in the coming period; and 
3. What you believe the status of the project should be. 
--Alternatives Manipulation Inserted Here--
See Figure 4.9a and 4.9b 
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Figure 4.18: No ZOT Industry Briefing Cover Page 
[- Industry: HOME COMPUTING I Company Name: Atticus-:Hollle Software ] 
Senior Management Directive 
New competitive threats from Google, Microsoft, Apple and other major industry players have severely tightened the market for our products. The essence of the 
new market conditions is cost competitiveness and timeliness of delivery. The current projects have been approved for their market potential as well as their 
implementation of well known and stable technology platforms. 
Project budgets were designed to realistically accommodate for all costs that will be incurred during development, but there is little room for significant changes to 
project size or scope without adversely affecting profitability. 
Spending approvals from management will only be granted to project managers demonstrating the ability to ensure that very tight cost budget controls are placed on 
projects to maintain their viability in the market. This means that cost overruns are approved in exceptional circumstances only. 
Industry Analysis 
Opportunities Risks 
• Mobile devices are becoming more affordable and accepted in the consumer • Large, well-resourced competitors (such as Microsoft, Apple and Sony) use 
market, allowing software developers to access a large and growing market; strongly competitive tactics such as bundling and prohibitively low prices to 
consumers to make competition extremely fierce. 
• Development tools that used here typically involve well-known technologies that 
are stable and mature. It is relatively easy to estimate and manage costs during • Providers must be able to provide services at very competitive prices to beat 
development; and competitors providing very similar services; and 
• Consumer demands from their technologies from this sector tend to be less • Failure to be early entrant into these markets can often mean than slow 
sophisticated and easier to satisfy than in other industry-based sectors of the developments may see investments lost to faster competitors; 
market. 
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Figure 4.19: Low ZOT Industry Briefing Cover Page 
Industry: BUSINESS SOFTWARE 
Senior Management Directive 
Company Name: Harper's Corporate 
Technologies 
Our expectation of this company is that they must focus on the quality of the products they develop. While managing costs within budgets are highly important. it is 
more important that we are a quality leader in the area of business computing. 
We value our client industries and we must be fle~ible to accommodate a moderate degree of changes to plans. We are going to closely monitor all project 
developments and approve those projects that demonstrate strong market value and whose cost and time budgets are proceeding on or close to plan. This means that 
cost budget overruns are accepted in some circumstances but not in others depending on the project's value to the firm. 
Industry Analysis 
Opportunities Risks 
• Key industries such as transport, logistics, retail and hospitality are beginning to • Businesses are notorious for their demand for high quality at a reasonable price . 
see the benefits of mobile technologies to aid staff who are constantly moving Greater buyer awareness has seen quality standards in the industry rise very high; 
and require constant communications with head office; 
• Businesses are now requiring strong after-sales service in this market. Products 
• There has been a new and exciting resurgence of interest in 'big-budget' and services that are not adequately delivered will create additional after-sales 
technology investment by businesses after the dot-com bust of the late 1990's; support costs which erode profits; and 
and 
• Products and services that do not meet quality specifications open suppliers up to 
• Businesses seem willing to pay a little more than in the past for quality mobile the risk of lawsuits by disgruntled business clients; 
devices and software. 
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Figure 4.20: High ZOT Industry Briefing Cover Page 
I Industry: RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT I m-Company Name: Scout Technologies I 
Senior Management Directive 
Our expectation of this Research and Development focused company is that they produce high value investment opportunities for implementation and release in the 
medium to long term. 
There is a degree of tolerance for the uncertainties of developing brand new technologies. So long as projects are strongly profitable, project managers can decide, 
to an extent, how much this quality should cost in terms of time and money. 
Spending approvals from management will be granted to projects demonstrating strong market profitability and evidence that the project will be delivered in a 
timely manner in the longer term. This means that cost overruns are accepted as long as they are not excessive and the project represents real value to the organisation. 
Industry Analysis 
Research and Development (R&D) within the technology sector continues carry a large element of risk because it relies on the development of new and untested technologies 
that may or may not deliver profitable products and services in the market. Although a large number of research and development project fail, the ones that succeed typically 
produce superior profits for the companies that invest in them. 
Opportunities Risks 
• A Harvard Business Review study shows that high-technology product launches • New technologies may take longer to develop or may become more difficult and 
- only 14% of all technology product launches - generate 61% of profits to the costlier than originally anticipated; 
technology sector; 
• Technology under development may not be commercially successful; and 
• Firms in the technology-industry must continually develop new technologies to 
remain competitive; and • Development may be technically unviable given the current state of technology . 
• Historically high failure rates in R&D projects can often be offset by just a 
handful of highly successful R&D-based innovations. 
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--- CHAPTER 5 ---
EXPERIMENT 2: TOLERANCE OVER TIME 
Introduction 
In this experiment, we investigate the effect of time to a decision-maker's tolerance. 
We examine a number of characteristics of a project's performance that may change 
over time, namely (I) the effects of the stability of budget variances over time; (2) 
the magnitude of budget variances over time; and (3) the change in risk preference 
over time. Only a handful of experimental studies have investigated escalation 
decisions over time and these studies used only a limited number of time periods. 
Confirming our conjectures regarding the effects of ZOTs and Time on the treatment 
of escalating courses of action we found a significant effect of ZOTs and a main 
sigli'ificant effect of time on the evaluation of projects and the continuation decisions 
made by subjects within the decision task. Contrary to prior escalation studies 
examining risk preference in loss conditions, this study also shows that losses faced 
within escalation episodes can engender risk aversion, particularly if decision-
makers operate under conditions where escalation is the less risky option when 
controlling project setbacks. This would appear to indicate that persistence despite 
costly setbacks causing escalating commitment episodes is more likely when 
organisational and structural constraints provide high tolerance that would absorb 
this increased spending. 
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Objectives of Experiment 2 
Extending the Causal Model 
In the first experiment, we examined how decision-makers react to budget variances 
at one point in time over several projects. In this second experiment, we seek to 
investigate the importance of time to a decision-maker's tolerance and examine a 
number of characteristics of a project's performance that may change over time. The 
contributory effects of time on tolerance to escalating projects may be driven by a 
number of qualities of the project and organisational context. In this study we focus 
our investigations upon three facets of temporal change within a project's 
development: 
I. The effects of the stability of budget variances over time; 
2. The magnitude of budget variances over time; and 
3. The change in risk preference over time. 
In the first experiment, budget variances were found to have a strongly significant 
effect upon escalation decisions. However, we examined these budget variances at 
specific and distinct points in time within a project. Much of the experimental 
literature into escalation have used single-shot decisions (notably Staw 1976, Arkes 
and Blumer 1958, Garland 1990, Conlon and Garland 1993 among others) However, 
there have been only a few studies that have examined escalation tendencies over a 
number of time periods. 
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Paucity of Studies Investigating the Effects of Time 
Only a handful of experimental studies have investigated escalation decisions over 
time (specifically in reference to a tendency for consistency across decision points 
over time). Three experimental studies in escalation have examined of the effects of 
time on escalation behaviour (Staw 1976; Staw and Fox 1977; Schmidt and Calatone 
2002). However, these studies use a number of limited time periods (see Table 5.1 ). 
This study, by contrast, uses nine time periods to investigate the phenomenon. 
Table 5.1: Within-Subjects Studies of 
Escalation Over Time 
Study Time Periods 
Staw (1976) 2 
Staw and Fox (1977) 3 
Schmidt and Calatone (2002) 3 
Simonson and Staw (2002) 2 
Brody and Kaplan ( 1996) 2 
Staw's (1976) experimental study used two time periods to examine the effects of 
personal responsibility on escalating projects, reasoning that "due to the simple 
consistency of actions over time, one might also expect individuals to increase their 
commitment to a decisional alternative for which they have had some prior choice" 
(p30). He operationalised the effect of personal responsibility by getting subjects to 
make an initial investment decision that they were responsible for in subsequent 
escalation episodes. Staw's (1976) findings suggest that consistency with prior 
decisions may not be the only explanation of escalation tendencies across time. He 
states, 
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"[J}t may well be true that, due to consistency in choice decisions, 
individuals will allocate more money to an investment alternative that was 
personally chosen at an earlier point in time (e.g., under high responsibility) 
than one chosen previously by someone else (e.g., under low responsibility). 
However, when the individual cells of the analysis of variance are examined 
[ .. .}, it appears that the main effect of personal responsibility is not fully 
explained by consistency" (p39). 
Simonson and Staw (2002) also used a two-period decision task, but did not analyse 
these decisions within-subjects, choosing instead to use the initial decision as a 
baseline. 
Staw and Fox (1977) sought to expand upon Staw's (1976) study in order to 
investigate whether escalation of commitment behaviour was a transient 
phenomenon (corrected in subsequent time periods) or one that was persistent over 
time. In doing so, they expanded the number of decision points from the original 
study from two to three (at three-year increments), to see if the third period saw 
correction of an escalation situation arising at time period two (with the first time 
period as the initial responsibility condition). They found a significant main effect of 
time as well as interaction effects with both personal responsibility and the efficacy 
of resources (how effective resource investment would be at addressing issues 
associated with the project). They also found that correction behaviour occurred 
between time periods, where negative information lead to significant correction in 
time period two, followed by a reversal of that correction in the third time period, 
suggesting that decision-makers tended to over-correct their allocations once 
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negative feedback was presented to them (see Figure 5.1). Staw and Fox (1977) 
therefore posit a pattern of behaviour (that no subsequent study has replicated) that 
"[ r ]epeated negative information can lead to a sequence of escalation, 
discouragement and withdrawal, and then reescalation" (p448), leading to behaviour 
that is "quite dysfunctional over time" (p449). 
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Figure 5.1: Interaction of Personal Responsibility and Time 
(Staw and Fox 1977) 
Schmidt and Calatone (2002) while not ostensibly a study in the effects of time, used 
three within-subjects time periods to demarcate stage-gates of new product 
developments from a marketing perspective. They found that perceptions of new 
product failure, funding propensity and self-reported commitment changed during 
the new product development process. Interestingly, while Schmidt and Calatone 
(2002) found that managers identifying negative information and project status were 
less likely to allocate resources in subsequent time periods, they found that these 
same managers increased their perceptual commitment to the failing project. 
-202-
Chapter 5- Tolerance Over Time 
The Effect of Time on Escalation Behaviour 
Why Time is Integral to Escalation Behaviour 
The effect of time is integral to studies of economic decision behaviour generally and 
escalation in particular. Simon (1976) considered the entropy of behaviour over time 
as a defining aspect of strategy, 
"This time-binding character of strategies deserves the greatest emphasis, for 
it makes possible at least a modicum of rationality in behaviour, where 
without it, this would be inconceivable. For example, an individual who has 
spent seven years of his life preparing to be a physician and ten more years 
practicing that profession does not ordinarily have to spend any more time 
deciding whether he should be a physician or not" (Simon 1976, p68). 
Literature into the effect of time generally falls into two categories: that which 
examines the effect of time on decision behaviour and that which examines the effect 
of time on the decision context. Behaviours that affect the nature of strategy and 
action over time are used as a basis for towards tendencies..to complete tasks already 
started (Lewin 1935, Conlon and Garland 1993) and self-justification of prior 
decisions (Festinger 1957). Within a given decision context, ambiguity, costs and 
payoffs change, cascade and compound over time. The resultant effect within an 
escalation dilemma may be to entrap decision-makers into making initial investments 
then subsequently having to persist with those with past decisions after unanticipated 
losses occur (Brockner and Rubin 1985). 
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The Effect of Time on Decision-Making Behaviour 
Conlon and Garland (1993) used theories of task completion to explain the 
psychological basis of the completion effect, the tendency to want to complete a task 
the closer one gets to the end of it. While the causal source of the completion effect 
is not adequately addressed even within escalation literature itself, Garland and 
Conlon (I 998) provide a tentative explanation of the completion effect in terms of 
Lewin's (1935) theories of goal satisficing. Lewin (I 935) postulates that proximity to 
a goal, even if it is unattainable, creates an independent incentive to complete that 
goal. In situations where the primary goal is unattainable, the "attainment of a 
substitute goal, a consolation, or an encouragement is, for a child, to a rather 
considerable degree the equivalent of a genuine success" (p253). However Garland 
and Conlon (1998) fail to report that Lewin's (1935) examination of this hypothesis 
comprised of experiments conducted by testing infants with tasks of varying 
difficulty. Whether these findings can be extrapolated to information systems 
projects is a matter for conjecture. 
K~il (1995b) finds that "a prior success may inhibit a decision-makers's willingness 
to re-examine the current course of action, thus promoting escalation". The effect of 
past decisions has also been found to be a significant determinant of future action, 
particularly in escalation situations. Staw (I 976) applies the theory of cognitive 
dissonance to escalation by proposing 'self-justification theory'. Cognitively, 
individuals strive for consonance in decisions post hoc. This behaviour may become 
aberrant when they "go beyond the passive distortion of adverse consequences in an 
effort to rationalise a behavioural error" (Staw and Fox, 1977, p432). This theory 
states that individuals are most likely to invest additional resources to failing projects 
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in order to justify their previous investment decisions. In such situations, suppressing 
negative information may become a causal source for escalating commitment to a 
failing project. Staw and Fox (1977) find that investment decisions under conditions 
of high personal responsibility are more unstable than under conditions of low 
personal responsibility, however did not find self-justification persisting over time. 
There is research to indicate that a possible reason for the above behavioural 
phenomena is due to the humans' inability to accurately account for time. Soman 
(2001) postulates three reasons for humans' inability to account for time the same 
way as they would other resources: 
I. Time cannot be inventoried or replaced; 
2. It is not as easily aggregated as money; and 
3. Accounting for money is a routine activity, whereas accounting for time is 
not. 
Soman (2001) found no effect of sunk time on decisions because "people have 
neither necessary economic sophistication nor the perceptual apparatus to effectively 
account for time the same way as they account for money" (p 171 ). Often, the 
memory and attribution of consequences of past decisions are imperfect, and 
decision-makers may base future decisions on fallible interpretations of these 
consequences. March and Olsen (1973) state, 
"The past is important, but it is not easily specified or interpreted. History 
can be reconstructed or twisted. What happened, why it happened, and 
whether it had to happen are all problematic. [ .. .} At any point in time, 
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individuals vary in the attention they provide to different decisions; they vary 
from one time to another. As a result, the pattern is uncertain and changing. " 
(March and Olsen 1973, pl2) 
The Effect of Time on the Decision Context 
Time has the effect of narrowing the feasible alternatives to a course of action 
(Simon 1976), binding decision-makers to particular courses of action and providing 
a history upon which future decisions are based (March and Olsen 1973). Perhaps the 
most important feature of the effect of time on the decision context is that it resolves 
ambiguity. Case study research by Keil (1995b) suggests that, in some 
circumstances, escalation is due to the project manager's tenacious attempts to 
salvage the project from failure. Prior escalation studies have examined escalation by 
giving decision-makers the binary decision to either allocate the entire remaining 
budget to complete the project or to abandon the project immediately. 
Negative information, however, does not always lead to considerations of project 
ablllldonment. Project teams may attempt to resolve problems that arise during 
development so that the project may stay viable. Therefore, in order to ascertain the 
veracity of ambiguous cues, project managers may decide to continue investment in 
projects with a view to addressing some of the sources of potential project failure. 
Similarly, project managers may adopt a 'wait and see' approach by delaying the 
decision in order to better understand the likelihood of success or failure of the 
project. This approach to addressing ambiguity in information systems development 
environments effectively involves 'paying a premium' for ambiguity reduction by 
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delaying the abandonment decision until such time as the ambiguities surrounding 
the likelihood of success are better understood (Kunreuther et al. 1995). 
Ironically, tentatively continuing an investment to reduce ambiguity is seen as 
compounding the likelihood of failure by causing the very escalating commitment it 
seeks to avoid. Making continuous small investments in the hope of a large eventual 
pay-off has been termed by Brockner and Rubin (1985) as 'entrapment'. Brockner 
and Rubin (1985) exemplifies entrapment in a situation where one has waited 30 
minutes for a bus and is considering catching a taxi. By waiting a little longer, one 
can hope to 'salvage' wasted time by continuing to wait for the bus to arrive, or one 
can catch the taxi at the expense of time lost and a costly taxi fare. The longer one 
waits for the bus, the more demanding the sacrifice in time becomes for the decision-
maker. Ambiguous decision contexts may operate in the same way. 
Studies of Escalation over Time 
Escalation, by its nature, is a phenomenon with cumulative effects during the life of a 
prbject. Brockner's (1992) definition of escalation defines the phenomena 
specifically as "repeated [rather than single shot] decision-making in the face of 
negative information about prior resource allocations" (p40). The result of time on 
the decision-making process is a result of responsibility for prior investments (Staw 
1976, Garland 1990), proximity to goal attainment (Rubin and Brockner 1975), 
future expenditures (Brockner et al. 1981) and the history of failures associated with 
the project (McCain 1986). 
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Despite the emphasis of time and the history of prior decision-making, most of the 
studies cited above employ single-shot decision tasks requiring the decision-maker to 
imagine that they made the prior decisions, rather than actually making them. This is 
often due to the practical limitations of paper and pencil studies in previous 
experimental tasks. Those studies employing multiple time periods typically use a 
limited number of iterations to test their phenomena. For example, in a test of initial 
versus subsequent responsibility for decision-making Schultz and Cheng (2002) used 
two time periods. Lant and Hurley (1999) use of seven time periods represents one of 
the largest time period investigations to date within escalation research. They found 
that "[p ]rior resource commitments [ ... ] appear to promote escalation of commitment, 
even under conditions of negative feedback" (Lant and Hurley 1999, p432). 
It is our conjecture that budget variances occurring in later time periods are more 
likely to be accepted than in earlier time periods. The effect of time will be 
particularly germane to our investigations of the interaction effects between time, 
budget stability and budget magnitude (discussed in the next section). We also 
prQpose a main effect of time on the tendency to escalate troubled projects: 
Hl: Time has a positive effect on the tendency to escalate troubled projects. 
Zones of Tolerance 
The investigation of incremental investments in projects over time is particularly 
pertinent to our study of Zones of Tolerance. Case studies into escalation suggest that 
escalation is more likely to occur due to setbacks compounding gradually over time, 
rather than with sudden major setbacks. We have argued earlier that escalation is a 
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product of cascading and compounding problems over time that are tolerated because 
the cost of correcting them at that point in time was greater than the cost of tolerating 
them. 
Given the inherent ambiguity within most decision contexts, certain variability in 
budgeted outcomes may be seen as a necessary component of an organisational 
context in flux. Setbacks, therefore, may be seen to be absorbed by the decision 
context given sufficient leeway encoded within Zones of Tolerance. When setbacks 
are viewed as relatively minor, Zones of Tolerance may induce decision-makers to 
actively prefer to not correct them, since they would not impose significant punitive 
damage on the resources or strategies of the organisation. In other words, returning to 
our definition of Zones of Tolerance, non-systematic setbacks that are viewed as 
temporary or ephemeral by decision-makers may not be corrected by decision-
makers, particularly if the costs of not correcting them are immaterial, negligible or 
zero. 
W~ therefore posit an independent main effect of Zones of Tolerance and an 
interaction effect of ZOTs over Time: 
H2: Zones of Tolerance have a positive effect on the tendency to escalate troubled 
projects. 
H3: Zones of Tolerance have a positive interaction effect with Time on the 
tendency to escalate troubled projects. 
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Stability and Magnitude of Budget Variances 
As opposed to the temporary setbacks detailed above, setbacks that are systematic 
may create budget variances that are uniform or predictable. It has been noted 
previously that prior experimental studies in escalation rely on large single-shot, 
single decision-point setbacks that fundamentally and dramatically increase the costs 
of the project or significantly threaten its viability. In this study, however, we 
examine the effects of the stability of budget variances over time. Time may have the 
effect of inuring project managers to budget variances that persist at stable levels 
over time. For example, if project managers persistently experience, say, 25% budget 
variances over multiple time periods, they may develop a tendency to adjust their 
expectations such that 25% overspend becomes the new status quo. This is akin to 
Lyytinen and Robey's (1999) assertion that organisations learn failure through 
repeated and systematic setbacks to projects. In their words, consistently repeated 
setbacks may _be a product of "inefficient practices [that have) persisted so long that 
they have become impervious to change" (p86). By contrast, budget overruns that 
frequently change in magnitude over time may be less palatable to the decision-
maker, who would be unable to settle on a status quo point of reference for an 
acceptable threshold of variation. It is our conjecture that stable budget variances 
tend to be corrected less than unstable variances over time. Formally, we 
hypothesise, 
H4a: Stable budget variances over time are less likely to be corrected than unstable 
budget variances of the same magnitude. 
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H4b: Zones of Tolerance have an interaction effect with the stability of budget 
variances on the tendency to escalate troubled projects. 
In a re-test of the findings of Experiment I, we will re-explore the effect of the 
magnitude of budget variances with the addition of the Time construct: 
HSa: Small budget variances are less likely to be corrected than large budget 
variances. 
HSb: Zones of Tolerance have an interaction effect with the magnitude of budget 
variances on the tendency to escalate troubled projects. 
Risk 
"Risk_ is intrinsically embedded in time, and yet the temporal context 
continues to suffer from neglect in the research literature." (Das and Teng 
1997, p69) 
A large body of research is focused around escalation as a product of risk-seeking in 
the face of losses as conceived through Prospect Theory (Whyte 1986, Brockner 
1992, Schaubroeck and Davis 1994, Johnstone 2002 among others). Prospect theory, 
proposed in Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) seminal paper (the highest cited paper 
in the history of Econometrica and one of the biggest contributors to Daniel 
Kahneman's Nobel Prize in Economics) goes some way to address how preferences 
are formulated and acted upon under conditions of uncertainty. With regard to the 
evaluation of preferences, Kahneman and Tversky ( 1979) postulated the existence of 
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a reference effect created through an initial value position and represents "the neutral 
point in the outcome space" (Tversky 1977, p212). As Kahneman and Tversky 
( 1979) explain, prospect theory concludes that sensitivity to gains or losses are not 
evaluated in terms of total wealth, but by relative gains and losses from a reference 
point, such as a total budget or an expected return. Prospect theory's value function 
is hypothesised as concave for gains and convex for losses (see Figure 5.2). 
In this case, gains and losses are determined in relation to a reference point that 
represents an initial asset position. From this reference point, the magnitude of gain 
or loss from this reference point is the main carrier of value, rather than the absolute 
amount of that change. Kahneman and Tversky ( 1979) exemplifY this relativity by 
showing how individuals tended to value the difference between $1 00 and $200 
much more than the difference between $1100 and $1200, even though there is no 
difference between the two in absolute terms. Furthermore, the value function is 
steeper for losses than for gains, since "losses loom larger than gains. The 
aggravation that one experiences in losing a sum of money appears to be greater than 
th~ pleasure associated with gaining the same amount" (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979). 
'YALUE 
IOSSI::S 
Lc,_ 
~ 
I 
Figure 5.2: The Prospect Theory Value Function (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) 
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Tversky (in Bell et al., 1977, p216) postulated that this reference point corresponds 
to the status quo, "although it may reflect one's expectations or level of aspiration". 
Furthermore, this reference point moves in response to realised gains or losses from 
prior events. Kahneman and Tversky (1979, p286) suggest that inappropriate or 
irrational decision-making occurs when there is a discrepancy between the reference 
point and the current asset position, because of "recent changes to wealth to which 
one has not yet adapted". 
Within the context of escalation behaviour, budget overruns are characterised as 
variations from expectations (i.e. a budget) into the loss domain resulting m 
increased risk-seeking behaviour. Given that decision-makers are risk seeking in the 
domain of losses, the hypothesised behaviour is that decision-makers feel apt to 
allocate more resources to bring themselves into the value-neutral or gains domain. 
One of the most well-known exemplars of the escalation phenomenon as it relates to 
risk behaviour can be seen in Tversky and Kahneman' s ( 1981) account of betting at a 
hQrse track. Their experiment demonstrated that a gambler who had lost most of their 
money by the end of the day would stake riskier, long odds horses in order to return 
to the asset position they had at the beginning of the day. This was seen to compound 
the problem, since betting on riskier options the more one loses will (probabilistically 
speaking) worsen the asset position of the gambler. We therefore posit that a 
decision-maker will weigh their risk preferences against the magnitude of budget 
variances. Specifically, we postulate, 
H6: As variances increase as a proportion of a budget, decision-makers are likely 
to become increasingly risk-seeking. 
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Furthermore, it is our conjecture that ZOTs have a strong interaction effect with risk 
preference and risky behaviour. We postulate that Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) 
characterisation of risk-preference applies to budget variances that occur outside the 
Zones of Tolerance. In other words, the Prospect Theory value function may be 
interrupted by the boundary conditions inhered within the decision context. Within 
ZOTs, a value function may be interrupted such that variations from a reference 
point (such as a budget) may be negligible or zero. Therefore, we postulate: 
H7: The size of a Zone of Tolerance has a moderating effect on the effect of 
Budget Variances on a decision-maker's attitude to risk. 
Research Method 
Experimental Design 
The research design consisted of a 2 (Variance Stability) X 2 (Variance Magnitude) 
X 2 (Zone of Tolerance) between-subjects treatment groups with an X 9 (Time 
Period) within-subjects treatments (with the tenth time period serving as a post-test). 
A non-orthogonal design was employed for the between-subjects treatments and each 
subject was required to make decisions on two projects; one from each column of 
Table 5.2. In other words, they received one project from the stable variance 
condition (either at low stable variance or high stable variance) and one project from 
the unstable condition (either a project whose budget variance progresses from low 
in Period I to high in Period I 0, or vice versa). As for the within-subjects conditions, 
each subject made decisions on each project over ten periods, in which they made 
both Project Status determinations and decisions about how to address project risks. 
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Table 5.2: Design of Experiment 2 
Variance Magnitude Variance Stability 
(%Overrun) Beginning- End of 10 Time Periods 
Low - Low (5%) Low (0%) - High (50%) 
High - High (25%) High (50%) - Low (0%) 
The ZOT between-subjects manipulation was operationalised through subjects 
receiving either a Low or High ZOT condition for each of their projects. It is argued 
that ZOT should be treated as between-subjects since each project was randomised 
such that interdependencies between either manipulation are 'washed out' by the 
randomised research design and through careful stipulation that each project is 
independent of each other. Upon completion of the first project, subjects were 
instructed that "you have completed the first project" and told that they were to now 
make some decisions on another project under their control. Thus, the two projects 
were explicitly stated as independent and no resources or decisions carried over 
between them. 
Dependent Variables: Project Status and Risk Preference 
Project Status 
The Project Status measure becomes the primary dependent variable for this study. In 
Experiment 2, we removed the R I R ratio (from Experiment 1) in order to simplify 
the response to a more complex decision-task within the limitations of time and 
pragmatism. Furthermore, the 'Alternatives' condition was not manipulated, 
necessitating a slight change to the Project Status measure. This is illustrated in 
Figure 5.4. 
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Figure 5.3: Experiment 1 Project Status 
I. The project is progressing on or close to track 
2. Variations are occurring but no action needs to be taken at this stage 
3. Variations are occurring and we need to be careful about future 
spending 
4. Serious budget and scope cuts are needed for this project 
5. The project should be suspended immediately 
Experiment 2 was designed in a slightly more complex fashion than Experiment I 
given the introduction of time as a 9 factor-level within-subjects measure for time. 
To that end, the measure of Project Status was combined with their resource 
allocation decision. If subjects chose a project status stating that they were either 
satisfied with the project or that they needed to remain vigilant of budget overruns 
(values 1-3 in Figure 5.3), then the project's funding continued uncorrected. If, 
however, the subject chose the option that 'serious budget and scope cuts are needed 
for this project' (value 4 in Figure 5.3), the project's funding reduced by 10%. A 
graphical simulation depicted the effect of this project status prior to a subject 
confirming this option. Finally, subjects choosing the option 'the project should be 
suspended immediately' withdrew all funding from the project (value 5 in Figure 
5.3). 
A caveat must be noted at this point: while there is a certain amount of valid 
criticism that the selection of these measures and associated actions do not conform 
well to face validity considerations, the choice of manipulating the project in this 
way was to make way for measurement of an additional construct (Project Risk), in 
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which subjects were required to decide upon their treatment of how certain setbacks 
experienced by the project were to be handled. In truth, the decision to tie decision-
makers' selected project status with funding continuation was borne of pragmatism-
a need to condense the number of decisions a subject made within each of the ten 
time periods in order to ensure the experiment was completed in under an hour, given 
additional complexities in the task. As it stood, the experiment required 30 decisions 
by the subject. Retaining the bi-partite feedback structure of the first experiment 
would have required subjects to have made 50 decisions in under an hour9• 
Project Risk 
The inclusion of project setbacks involving risky prospects in situ of the decision 
context provides us with the opportunity to examine the effect of risk preference and 
the interdependencies between the magnitude and stability of budget variances, 
Zones of Tolerance and time. In order to test risk preference, subjects were presented 
with a randomly assigned a risky decision at every second period within the I 0 
periods of each project, (i.e. five risky propositions for each project) (see Table 5.3). 
D~cision-makers were asked to make a decision about the way in which a certain 
setback facing the project should be dealt with. Subjects were presented with a two-
option choice of a 'sure cost' of resolving a setback versus the proposition of leaving 
the setback unaddressed with the risk that doing so would incur a higher cost in the 
9 ldealJy, common dependent measures across all three experiments would improve the comparability 
between experiments and allow for better cross-analysis to enhance the richness of the findings. It 
would be worthwhile to retest these experiments with two common dependent variables (the resource 
allocation decision and the project status) measured in exactly the same way, however time and cost 
constraints did not allow for this to occur prior to the completion of this dissertation. Rather, 
appropriate care was taken when analysing these results and when making generalisations from the 
findings. Both the changes to the dependent measures and the reasoning behind them are discussed 
throughout this chapter and within the chapters detailing each experiment. 
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"'"'"-"" "Zl""'- \...,._, .. ,,, ... , '""" ~ •• ,_.,.,.'I ----· ........ .., .... ---· .......... - ---J ... -·-
Lack of End-User Commitment Your client users are starting to become suspicious of the new 
development and seem a bit resistant to change which might affect the 
implementation in the future. 
Misunderstanding Requirements Discussions between Business Analysts and your client users have 
discovered that there is a possibility of previous misunderstandings about 
some of the project requirements. 
Lack of Knowledge I Skills While developing the components of the graphical interface, you suspect 
that there might be a lack of knowledge about certain technologies being 
used within your team. 
Changing Scope I Objectives Your client has come to you with some additional requirements for the 
project. These new requirements are not core to the project, but would be 
"useful" to the client. 
Introduction of New Technology The technology platform you are using has just experienced a significant 
upgrade. You might consider paying additional unforseen costs to 
upQrade your technoiO~lY platform. 
Failure to Manage Expectations Some of your developments to date may not be meeting user 
expectations and you might consider spending some effort to clarify 
them. 
Insufficient /Inappropriate Your staff are getting a bit overworked and may you might consider 
Staffing bringing in some additional people from head office to join your team in 
order to meet your deadlines. 
Conflict Between Departments There seems to be some disagreements between the client and your 
analysts about the best solution to a certain issue. 
Lack of Cooperation from Users Your Business Analysts have reported that there is a possibility some 
users might not cooperate with them because they perceive the new 
L.__ 
--·-··- -
s~tem as a threat to their jobs. 
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Risky Cost 
Sure Cost of of Not 
VVI I C''-'llll VVI I 'CH,,Ul 1M 
$5,000 $6,250 
$12,000 $24,000 
$2,000 $ 10,000 
$7,000 $8,750 
$11,000 $22,000 
$4,000 $20,000 
$10,000 $12,500 
$6,000 $12,000 
$5,000 $25,000 
Probability 
of Risky 
VV-!11 
80-100% 
40-60% 
20-40% 
80-100% 
40-60% 
20-40% 
80-100% 
40-60% 
20-40% 
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following time period. These setbacks were identified from the ten highest risks to a 
project as identified by Schmidt et a!. (2001) and are listed in Table 5.3. Each 
setback was operationalised using two options - one certain cost and one risky cost -
with identical expected utilities. These options were presented to the subject with the 
description of the issue, the certain cost of correcting the setback, the financial risk 
of not correcting it and the probabilistic likelihood that the risk will obtain (see 
Figure 5.5). If the subject chose to take a risk by not addressing the issue, a random 
number was generated. If this random number (between 0 and I) was within the 
probability of obtaining, the cost was incurred. For instance, referring to Figure 5.4, 
if the risk was "highly likely" (a probability greater than 80%) and the subject chose 
to take the risk a random number greater than .8 would result in the risk obtaining in 
the following period. Subjects were informed of this and the additional cost was 
added to the following period's expenses. Thus, the use of these gambles would 
allow one to identifY (at least in theory) whether or not a decision-maker is risk-
seeking or risk-averse at that point in time depending on whether they choose the 
certain or the risky option. 
This approach used to analyse risky prospects relates to the commonly found 
escalatory behaviour of addressing issues through increased spending. To that end 
we attempted to balance the ecological validity of typical business problems (and 
their typical solutions) with the exigencies of research design. To address ecological 
validity, we used Schmidt et al.'s (2001) list of the ten biggest risks to project 
development as identified though a Delphi study of IT project managers. In order to 
address the latter issue of research design, these risky propositions are stated similar 
to those ofKahneman and Tversky (1979) in their study of Prospect Theory, with a 
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key difference that these risk options were embedded within context of an 
organisational decision dilemma. It seeks to test the conjectures of Whyte ( 1986), 
Brockner ( 1992), Schaubroeck and Davis (1994), Johnstone (2002) that a Prospect 
theoretic interpretation that loss aversion and increased risk-taking behaviour explain 
the escalation phenomenon. 
Section B: Prolect Risk Assessment ~·s'llls? J 
Issues At End of Period 1 .111d Potential Issues Next Period IPerlod 21 
Actual spending exceeded the revised budget by 6.4''• in the 1,1st period. 
Your client users are starting to become suspicious of the new development and seem a bit 
resistant to change which might all'ect the Implementation In the future 
In Orcler To Aclchess This Issue Next Period tPeri ocl 2) Choose To Either: 
(1) Incur thrs CERTAIN cost to avoid financial exposure to this rrsk: r-I---:$5:::-::,0CJJ:::::----.,1 
OR 121: 
Do not spend funds to fix this issue and risk financial exposure of 
Wrth the probab1hty of financial e~posure 
Risk Likelihood: Inter relation 
ReWiwely U..ely Even CIMnce 
~40% 40%·60'Yo 
~.-.--.f~! 
Your Decision 
Please Select 3 
···~-.,r; 
Incur Additional Costs to Address Th1s Issue 
Do Not Incur Additional Costs to Address Thrs Issue 
Figure 5.4: Risk Preference Operationalisation 
Indepemlellt Variables: ZOTs, Budget Stability and Budget Variance 
Zone of Tolerance (Within-Subjects) 
Similar to Experiment 1, this study used a cover story describing the organisational 
context within which a project is operating. Unlike Experiment 1, however, this 
study used only two levels of ZOTs - low and high and corresponded to one project 
for each ZOT treatment. In the high ZOT condition, 'Project Romulus' was couched 
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within a Research and Development division. The Senior Management Directive for 
this project stated that the project was being developed as a high value investment 
opportunity for release in the medium to long term and that there were a number of 
uncertainties around developing new technologies. Further, subjects were instructed 
that spending approvals from management would be approved so long as the project 
demonstrated a potential for profitability and that it be delivered in a timely fashion 
in the longer term. An industry analysis of the Research and Development sector, 
followed outlining both risks and opportunities, stressed high failure rates of R&D 
projects, but added that those that succeed tend to have high returns (see Figure 5.5). 
Research and Development Division 
"Project Romulus" 
Protect~: To dewlap a lnllrument for P*nllalt.e In the MIOI'IaUIIoal and marttlme lncUtrlet. 
Senior .llam1~ement Directire 
Our npeclatloa of tbh RH~arcll aDd Dn~lopiDftlt focu.wd d~\'tlopm~at Is lllat It product ltlglr tVIII" '"'~'""'"' opporlllflitln for 
lmp~-aladoa aad rtnK Ia Ill~ -.~lam lo loa& tum. 
Tll~rt h a M&r~ of tol~raau for Ill~ uac~rtat.!Ms of cln&pl•& braad •- lecllaologlH. So loaa a~ projnts are stroagly profilabk, project 
m .. ag~n cu d~clde, lo •• nlnt, llcno mado tllis q8DIIt)' slloald coslla lums of tlmt aad moa~y. 
I 
Sl!•·ndln& •l!l!ro,ah [rorn man!~<nlfnt "Ill ht• &rantt'd lu l!r<>l«h drmnn,tralln& •lrnn& mark•tl!mfitahilill and t\idtnrt thallhr l!r<'it'<' l "ill 
hr dtlhtrt'd In a llmrh· manntr in thr lon&tr lrrm. 
-1 hi" mt""all"- th•t t"o\t nvf'rTUn" arr arrretf'd •~ lon1: ., 1thrv art not f'XCf"''h'f" ant.l thr l!mitd n.·l!t~t~nt\ rtaJ Yalur 1i• lhf (,, a:•n•IJdion. 
Industry .·111oh"lil 
Re~ and D.!~·elopmnot {R&D) wnlun the oechnoloay sector coolonues carry a larae el~ol of nsk beca'"" il rdoes on the de\'dopmnot of new 
and untesled technologoes that may or may nol deh\'er profitable products aod in'VIC<S on the market Although a larg~ number of research and 
de,-elapm~nl prOJect fRo I. the ones that succeed typocally produce supenor profits forth~ companies that in\'~st on them. 
ICIJ/IB 
. A HarvaJd Busmeu Rn,..,. study sho\\ s that bJgh-~bnoloay product . l'~ t«hnologoes ma)· laic~ longer to develop or may become mo>re 
launcoo - only 1-l~o of all technoloay product laund~s - ameratt dlflicult and costher lban onainally anticipaled· 
61•• ofprofils to the 1cchnology S«tor; 
• Technology under d~·elopment ITUIY not be commercially successful; 
• Forms in the technology·ondustry mu>l continually dc\'clop new and 
technologies 10 rcm11m competlli,·c. and 
. 0<!\'elopmenl may be lechnJcally UD\'oable gi\'en the currno1 stale of 
. Hostoncally Juab faolure rates in R&D prOJects can often be offset by technology 
JUSt • handful of luably successful R&[).baJ.ed iMo\·auons 
,...lt ... L. u ..... .- T-. D.--:- T.._l..- r"t- t.--.l I 
Figure 5.5: High ZOT Manipulation 
In the low ZOT condition, 'Project Remus ' operated in a competitive environment in 
which large technology companies provided stiff competition. The subject was 
instructed by Senior Management that cost competitiveness and timeliness of 
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delivery were their main priorities. Further, they were instructed that spending 
approvals would only be granted to those projects displaying tight budget controls. 
Similar to the high ZOT project, the industry analysis included opportunities and 
risks with an emphasis on the stability and maturity of the technologies used for 
development and a significant market size. The risks included competitive threats as 
well as risks associated with failure to be an early entrant in the market (emphasising 
the timeliness constraint) (see Figure 5.6 below). 
Consumer Electn»nics Division 
"Project Remus" 
PNIId Allnl: To dlllllcD • IP IDr DOelniW we In,_ OIINIII'IW IMibl 
s .. ,;,., UlltWg<'lllt'lll Dir.-cth· .. 
N..., competitive tbre•t• from Gooalt, !lllcroooR, Apple ond other mojor laduttry ployen bon ••nrtly li&bteaed tbe morket for our 
produ<tJ. The e .. eau of the new morktt coadltloao lo cost corHp«titit•tfltSS ODd tilfftlinns of dtlit•tf)'• Tbt current project boo bt«n opprond 
for ib morkot potutiol OJ" eU 01 their lmpltm .. totloD of ,...Jt kaOWD ODd t loble lKbDOio&Y plotformJ, 
Tht projtcl budatt ""' dtSI&•td to rHU.ti<oU) ucommodate for oU <Gilt t.bot wUI lot lecu~d dariD& dnelopme•t, but lbtre Is • lllllt room 
for mloor d, .. , .. to project ilze or ><opt ,. klto11t lldnnf!ly alrt<tl•& profttabiUty. 
"t(!f'adlna; »[![!rov•l" frum mAna~~•m•nC "lll onh' hr 1r11nlrd to l!roi•·' 1 ma~aaa:,• 1 ~ Jt>mun,tratia~; thl' •hjlitv to .-n,uf'f' ,rhat , . . !l. tir,lrt C"tnt lmd.zr!._ 
(f."!r"l! Its: cl•u:s! 2D nroiK'' Jo U!!iD•I![I! ll!tl[ , .i•hilit,· ig tht m![b"S:I, 
Ulil mS:IDllb•l S~'· f)'"S:[[U!!:l•[t !CI![2'tsllD S::'CtJlCional cirt-um ... I•DS:"' nob I 
Jmlu\frl' A 11olrfi' 
• .-J ... 
o MOI>I < ~~ICH or< beCOnlll>8 mar.. IIJOUI81>1e llD4 ICC<J>l<CI m lb< • Lor&<. W<ll•rnouruQ COmptlllors (SUCh OS Ml<rOSOII, ll.ppk 01111 
consumer morl<t. ollowmg sofiwar< deHioptn to 14:C<n a larg• and Sony) u.. strongly <ompeum~ tactics such u bundhng o.nd 
uowins marl..<t. prolubtllwly low prices to coD>umers 10 mak• compeulooo ex~mely 
fi<rc• 
. !Nv<lopmn>l tools that ustd h<'l'< typicolly on•oln w<U-bwwn 
t<ebnolOIJ .. that ar< stabl• aod matur<. ll i• ~latl\<ly easy 10 .,;tomal< . Provodtrs must bt obi• 10 provode 0<1'\~CH 11 V<'l')' competitiH prier. 
ond I!WUIS< coots dunng de\·elopm<nl; ond to btot compthlon pro~,du!g • <1')' sinulor wnicr~. aod 
. 
. C'onsum<r d<mands from lh<~r l«:bnoloiiJ•• from tim ...,,or t<nd to bt . Follur• to bt <arl) m .tnnl mlO th<K markets co.n ofkn m<an than •lo" 
l<n wphisllcal<d and <OSJ<r to ••ttSf)' thllll 111 oth<'l' mdustry·butd de• <lopmmts may- mnsunmtt lost to fut<r comptlltors; 
soctors of lh• mork<L I ""U-~ U-.- T-. 11-.-t- T1..t-. 1""111-l.--.6 
Figure 5.6: Low ZOT Manipulation 
Magnitude of Budget Variance and Stability of Budget Variance 
Three levels of budget variance (no, low and high) were manipulated in Experiment 
1. By contrast, this study reduced the number of stable budget variances conditions 
to two - low (an average of 6% across the entire project) and high (an average of 
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25% across the entire project), similar to the magnitudes used in Experiment I. For 
the stable budget variance condition, these budget overruns remained relatively 
constant and persistent throughout the entire project. Table 5.4 delineates the per 
period budget variance for each condition. 
In the case of unstable budget variances, two levels were adopted. In the Low-High 
treatment, budget variances increased by around 5% every period from Period I 
through to Period 10, starting at 3.7% and escalating to 47.7% (an average variance 
of 25.7% - similar to that of the high stable variance condition). In the High-Low 
treatment, these budget overruns were reversed, starting at 4 7. 7% and gradually 
reducing over the ten periods (see Table 5.4). 
The aim of the unstable variance treatment was to compare the decision behaviour of 
project managers between these treatments and those of the high stable variance 
treatment. In all three cases, the average budget overrun over the I 0 periods 
averaged to around 25%. However, we conjecture that decision-makers would react 
diffecently in each case as budget overruns interact with ZOTs and as decision-
makers attempt to address budget overruns for which no stable reference point (other 
than the budget) might exist. 
This is the most significant departure from the previous experimental studies into 
escalation. As we have discussed earlier, no experimental study to date has 
investigated the escalation phenomenon with this many time periods, even though 
escalation itself is a time-dependent phenomenon, couched within the attenuation of 
alternatives, ambiguity and resources over time. 
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Table 5.4: Budget Variance and Stability Treatments 
Stable Unstable 
Period Low High Low-High High-Low 
1 6.4% 26.8% 3.7% 47.7% 
~--- --·-· -···-······-···-···-··-· ·--· ···----·· ·-··---- ··-· --·-·····-·-·-··-· 
2 6.6% 27.6% 7.8% 43.9% 
··-··-··-·---- ·---------- --·------------· --··· .. ··---··--·----·--·---- --~-~-------------
3 9.1% 22.7% 12.8% 37.4% 
·---- -------~· --·--·- ------·----------.. ---- ---~·---· .. -·--·--~-·---
4 5.4% 26.9% 15.6% 34.9% 
[.. --1 +---·----···j· ·----·-·--··-----···1---·-··--·-·-····· 
27.2% 24.4% I 28.6% 5 5.7% 
6 7.0% 24.9% 28.6% 24.4% 
···-·--·······-··-·····-···-·-1-·-····---··-- ·-·--·-·-··- ·····---··· ..... - .......... -·-· ... ··-·-
7 5.1% 23.1 34.9% 15.6% 
. ·-·~ ____ , _________________ ---·-·--~·----
8 6.6% 25.2% 37.4% 12.8% 
~- -·- ----··--·· -··-··---··----·----- ··--·······-·---· 
9 5.2 23.2% 43.9% 7.8% 
·-· ---·----~-·---- -·-------·------.. ·--- ----·------
10 5.3% 23.1% 47.7% 3.7% 
Average 6.2% 25.1% 25.7% 25.7% 
The Decision Task- Experimental Apparatus 
The study was executed using a computer simulation of two projects that were 
de'>;eloped over ten time periods each. Each subject was presented with an 
introductory statement and cover story prior to making investment decisions of the 
two projects (See Figure 5. 7). 
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I Attlcus Solutions Pty. Ltd. Your Role 
You 1re to knaguw thM you.,. the Pfotecf m.,..r f« two protects unckr dev~t within Arucus SOiutiOM. 
Your ~ h to ov.,.... tht ct.y-to-day progtnl or the Pfofkts that you monltot •nd make •ure th•t prof4tcts run according to the JUns set out by the Senior 
.Management or NCh company. 
At the end o1 ewry porlod you ropon to the Son lor MaMgement on tho progreu or projects ond make rocommendotlons about how much should bo Invested Into lhHe 
projocts In tho coming porlod. 
You mu.t also make soma de<:lskms about how to contr~ the rftks thllt the protect m~y face end bal•nc• these decisions •oalnst the .-.strlctlons on how much you can 
~on the project 
I Important Note 
Your raputallon In IMM organiZations Is algnlflcantly affected by 1M quollty of your racommendatlona to Senior Management A poor racommandatlon 
may be to apand too much or too little on a project. or take actlona that will lead to project failure. 
You know that a lot of projects are supported by Senior Management- some good and aome bad- and you need make recommendation• that conform to 
both tile Senior Management's strategic dlrectlveo ao well u contribute to the value of aach company. 
I Your Task 
You win now be preoelltod with your nrot project which you will haw to manage over 10 periods. 
In reality. moot projeCts do not flnlah exactly on time and on budget 
Decisions about what to do with projects that are going over budget should be made on e caM-by-case basla and you should consider what 11 In the b .. t 
lnterolls of the organisation when maklnglnv .. tment decisions. 
This 11 becauu the.-. Is alWays the mk or clrcur:nltancn ar111ng that ~ore unfors .. n when plans were nrst made. That Is a risk of doing business and a 
project monager must alWays be ready" to adapt to changing circumstances" 
Cancelling projects that have already started oflan mean loolng a lot of money that hu already been apont You may even lose your job or profe1alona1 
reputation If you ora responalble fO< 1 project that had to be cancelled. 
HOWEVER THERE IS A POINT WHERE FAILING PROJECTS MUST BE ABANDONDED. JUDGEMENT IS NEEDED TO KNOW WHEN PROJECTS HAVE 
TURNED FROM GOOD TO BAD" 
Click Here to Begin 
_j 
Figure 5.7: Experiment 2 Cover Story 
The study placed the decision-makers in a scenario in which they were a project 
manager for two projects. Each project represented one level of the ZOT condition 
(either low or high) and one treatment of the variance condition (stable low, stable 
high, unstable low-high or unstable high-low). Their role was to make project status 
recommendations as part of end of period reporting to each of the two project' s 
' 
Senior Management and to select how they were to address the various setbacks that 
occurred during the project (either paying to resolve them or taking a risk of higher 
spending in the following period by not resolving them). The experiment was 
operationalised using a computer simulation that dynamically updated budget and 
risk information each period. A main screen was used to track project status during 
each period and provided historical budget information, the Steering Committee 
brief, a panel displaying setbacks and risky options, and finally a panel where 
subjects entered their Project Status (see Figure 5.8). 
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Section C: Steerlna Committee Brief w~-n•,. 
There Is only a little room for minor changts to project size or 
scope without adversely affecting profitability. This means that cost 
overruns should be approved In EXCEPnONAL CIRCUMSTANCES 
ONLY. 
Chaptt!r 5 - Toleranc-e 0\.·er Time 
Section B: Prolect Risk Assessment IU.J141Ul 
Actua l spending exceeded the revised budget by 47.7•• In the last period. 
The risks Ide ntifie d last pe riod 010 NOT manifest and you didn't need to 
spe nd anything to resolve it. 
Overall Assessment of the Project 
[ Please Select 3 
Send Report 
Section B 
Project 
Risks 
Section D 
Project 
Status 
Figure 5.8: Project Template 
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Sample Selection 
Overview of Subject Selection 
A total of fifty subjects participated in the experiment. This experiment was 
conducted with 25 subjects for each of the two ZOT -Stability treatment groups. The 
decision on the sample size was made due to the presence of two between-subjects 
levels and a minimum of 25 subjects per treatment group. Subjects were recruited 
from final year undergraduate accounting students enrolled in an auditing and 
assurance course at the University of Sydney in 2006. 
Subjects voluntarily participated in the task and were reimbursed for their time at a 
flat rate of $30 in cash, paid upon completion. Reimbursement was not tied with their 
performance of the decision task. 
Selection Procedure 
The researcher attended several tutorials for the accounting course attended by the 
students of the Undergraduate Business degree at the University of Sydney. The 
pro'spective subjects were presented with a brief announcement at the beginning of 
their tutorial classes. In this announcement they were told that the experiment related 
to a resource allocation task within a project management context that would test 
their judgement and decision-making skills. They were instructed that the experiment 
was to be conducted in the following week and would take up to one hour of their 
time. Further, they were told that there was no pre-requisite of prior knowledge of 
the task domain, no preparation necessary and participation in the task was 
completely voluntary. To stress the anonymity of their participation, they were 
assured that the lecturer-in-charge of the course in which they were enrolled would 
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not know who participated or their proficiency at the task and that the task was non-
assessable10. 
Sampling Method and External Validity Considerations 
Final year undergraduate students were chosen as an acceptable surrogate for 
Information Systems project managers. The advantages and disadvantages of 
selecting students for experimental tasks are examined in detail in the Research 
Methods section. Briefly, several studies on the effects of student samples on 
observed results have found little or no evidence of systematic differences between 
observed responses when compared to industry professionals (Peterson 200 I, and 
Host et al. 2000 among others). It must be reiterated, however, that it would not be 
possible to make broad generalisations based on any empirical findings based on this 
research. However, external validity through generalisability is not the prime 
objective of this experiment. 
By retaining students from the same class as the entirety of the sample, while posing 
sigqificant challenges to external validity, serves to assist the research design. By 
selecting subjects from a relatively homogenous sector of the population of interest, 
the possibility of random error due to individual differences reduces as a validity 
threat. Random allocation of subjects to tasks can largely reduce and control for this 
validity threat. 
10 All procedures relating to subject recruitment were approved by, and conformed with, the 
requirements of the Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) at the University of Sydney. These 
are stringent controls imposed upon University researchers by the University in which a11 recruitment 
procedures, participation incentives (i.e. payments to participants), data co11ection instruments and 
analysis techniques must be approved by the HREC prior to the commencement of the research. 
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Special Sampling Procedures for Student Samples 
We employed a number of the suggestions from Carver, Jaccheri et al. (2003) on the 
use of students in IS-related experimental tasks (applied in Experiment I and 
discussed in more detail within the previous chapter). 
I. The goals, measures and analysis method were not revealed prior to 
executing the experiment. 
2. Subjects were given an opportunity for feedback to justifY their decisions. 
3. Subjects (if they so requested) were given the chance to receive feedback on 
their performance in the task. 
4. Subjects were given a realistic time estimate of one hour to complete the task. 
While told the experiment would take up to an hour to complete. On average, 
subjects took between 45 minutes to one hour to complete the computer 
simulation task, including reviewing the cover material, making their project 
recommendations and completing the post-test questionnaire. 
5. Finally, students were allowed to choose from a range of possible times to 
attend so as to avoid conflicts with their lesson schedules. Multiple session 
times were held over a one week period in which students could choose their 
preferred time for attendance (See Figure 5.3). 
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Procedure 
Subjects were given a number of alternative times to attend the experiment session. 
Each session was held in a computer laboratory at the University of Sydney. Upon 
arrival, subjects were instructed to take time to read through the Ethics materials and 
sign Participation Consent F orrns as per the requirements stipulated by the Human 
Research Ethics Committee at the University. Subjects were given a short 
introduction about what to expect during the experiment task. They were told that 
they were to receive two projects in which they needed to make investment 
decisions. Time was allowed for questions. 
In order to preserve the ordering of decisions subjects were issued with a number that 
corresponded to a unique randomised treatment within the computer simulation .. 
Table 5.5 describes the order in which projects were shown to subjects. 
Table 5.5: Presentation Order of Tasks Within the Simulation 
Page(s) Purpose 
1 Participant Information Sheet 
2 Participant Consent F orrn 
3 Introductory Cover Story 
4 ZOT Manipulation 1 
5 Project 1 
6 ZOT Manipulation 2 
7 Project 2 
16 Summary and Post-Test 
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Introductory Statement, Cover Story and Enhancing Ecological Realism 
Each subject was provided with an introductory statement and cover story detailing 
their role as a project manager whose role is to "oversee the day-to-day progress on 
projects that [they] monitor and make sure that projects run according to the plans set 
out by the senior management of each company." They were then instructed they 
were to review the progress of their projects and make recommendations to senior 
management about each project at the end of each period. 
In order to make the importance of 'good' project investment decisions, subjects 
were told the following, 
"In reality, most projects do not finish exactly on time and on budget. 
"Decisions about what to do with projects that are going over budget should 
be ma?e on a case-by-case basis and you should consider what is in the best 
interests of the organisation when making investment decisions. 
"This is because there is always the risk of circumstances arising that were 
unforeseen when plans were first made. That is a risk of doing business and a 
project manager must always be ready to adapt to changing circumstances. 
"Cancelling projects that have already started often mean losing a lot of 
money that has already been spent. You may even lose your job or 
professional reputation if you are responsible for a project that had to be 
cancelled. 
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"However, there is a point where failing projects must be abandoned. 
Judgment is needed to know when projects have turned from good to bad." 
"You know that a lot of projects are supported by Senior Management - some 
good and some bad - and you need too make recommendations that conform 
to both the Senior Management's strategic directives as well as contribute to 
the value of each company." 
As with Experiment I, The reason behind providing this information is to discourage 
participants from making opportunistic investment decisions that are skewed 
excessively towards escalating projects to preserve their reputations or to kowtow to 
Senior Management despite their assessment of the project as failing. By this, 
subjects were induced to balance the relative importance of the ZOT manipulations 
(management's strategic directives and the industry brief) with the Variance 
manipulation (the efficiency with which the project was progressing according to 
plan). 
Random Allocation of Tasks 
Sixteen randomised decision sequences were created to negate ordering effects and 
these decision sequences were randomly assigned to subjects. The presentation of the 
ZOT, budget magnitude and budget stability conditions were completely randomised 
between the treatment groups, such that all possible permutations of these levels 
were tested. The treatments were ordered in this way to completely negate ordering 
effects for the between-subjects treatments and the ZOT treatment. Table 5.6 details 
the sixteen randomisation sequences. 
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Table 5.6: Randomised Ordering of Projects 
Subject Project 1 Project 2 
Treatment ZOT Variance ZOT Variance 
1 High High Low Low-High 
2 High High Low High-Low 
3 High Low Low Low-High 
4 High Low Low High-Low 
5 High Low-High Low High 
6 High Low-High Low Low 
7 High High-Low Low High 
8 High High-Low Low Low 
9 Low High High Low-High 
10 Low High High High-Low 
11 Low Low High Low-High 
12 Low Low High High-Low 
13 Low Low-High High High 
14 Low Low-High High Low 
15 Low High-Low High High 
16 Low High-Low High Low 
Methodology 
Analysis Methodology- Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance (ANO VA) 
The 2 (Variance Magnitude) X 2 (Variance Stability) X2 (ZOT) between-subjects 
and X 9 (Time Period) within-subjects factorial design was tested using a repeated 
measures ANOVA and Kruskal-Wallis Chi Squares. Two separate analyses were 
conducted- one for the Project Status dependent variable and one for the project risk 
dependent variable. 
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Analysis and Results 
Dependent Variable: Project Status 
We found a significant effect of the Time Period (F(8,736) = 4.893, p = .000) on the 
evaluation of projects (Project Status) made by subjects within the decision task (HI 
Supported). We also found a significant Time X Variance Magnitude interaction 
effect (F(8,736) = 3.423, p = .000). The Time X Variance Stability interaction effect 
was marginally insignificant (F(8, 736) = 3.423, p = .073), although this result will be 
examined further in post tests. We could not find a within-subjects interaction effect 
between ZOTs and Time Period (F(8,736) = .5.329, p = .140) suggesting that 
subjects did not change their reactions to ZOTs over time (H3 Not Supported). The 
within-subjects effects are listed in Table 5.7. 
Table 5.7: Within-Subjects Effects 
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
~::~=: -t~: =Psl~=r:~~~ 
'····-·---·-.. ---·-·---~ +--8-···r~~~~~~:::T 7~91~]--·:~~~ .. Period * Magnitude 
Period * ZOT * 
27.3X2 
1.497 8 .187 .433 .902 
Stability 
Period* ZOT * . ·1-----·-·-·-··--··-.f----~ ...... -............. - ... -................... .. 
3.607 8 .451 1.042 .402 
Magnitude 
--Period* Stability * ~----...... ·-·-+---+ .... --............. __ .. _ .. _ .. ,_ __ ·-·· 
10.094 8 1.262 2.917 .003 
Magnitude 
-·- Period * ZOT ··;·---~· --··-····-----+----+---.. -............... _ .................... _ ............... . 
2.290 8 . 286 .662 .726 
Stability * Magnitude 
......... E~~or(Period)·-·---h!s.395--·t-73(,-i·-·:433··+-.. - ........ ______ _ 
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Source 
Intercept 
ZOT 
Stability 
Magnitude 
ZOT * Stability 
ZOT * Magnitude 
Stability* 
Magnitude 
ZOT * Stability * 
Magnitude 
Error 
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Table 5.8: Between-Subjects Effects 
Type III Sum 
of Squares 
6752.440 
9.467 
.422 
6.315 
I 0.213 
1.833 
4.762 
.132 
247.183 
df 
92 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
6752.440 2513.213 .000 
9.467 3.524 .064 
.422 .157 .693 
6.315 2.350 .129 
10.213 I 3.801 I .054 
1.833 .682 .411 
4.762 1.773 .186 
.132 .049 .825 
2.687 
The between-subjects effects in the model are listed in Table 5.8. Zones of Tolerance 
had a marginally insignificant main effect (F{l,92) = 9.467, p = .064) and a 
marginally insignificant interaction effect with Variance Stability (F(l,92) = 3.801, p 
= .054) (H2 and H4b Not Supported). Variance Magnitude and Variance Stability did 
not' have independent main effects on the overall model (H4a, H5a and 5b Not 
Supported). 
Post-Test Analyses ofZOTs and Unstable Budget Variances 
Table 5.9 displays the means for the project status dependent measure. On its face, 
the disappointing results would seem to indicate that ZOTs did not have much effect 
on the overall model. However, a separate post-test analysis isolating the Variance 
Stability condition over time (n=50) shows a significant main effect of ZOTs under 
conditions of unstable budget variances (F(l,46) = 5.064, p = .029) (Table 5.10). 
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Table 5.9: Means for Dependent Variable- Project Status 
Measure: Proiect Status 
ZOT Stability Variance Period Mean Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound I Upper Bound 
~-- ~0.. - ~t~bl= ___ _:~~-----~- t:=H~~::::t-:-~!!- +--+~i---+ -H~~-
H6~ j ··· H:~ 4 
3.039 
2.712 3.621 
Low Stable High 1 2.583 .236 2.115 3.051 
---------- -· ------------ ----·-·---··-··---·--·-·-... -· ,, ____ - ,, ______________ _ 
2.833 .219 2.399 3.268 
------------------------·---------------- ---- ........... ,_,, ______ , _____________ , ____ ---.. ·-·---·--.. ·-·---·-·--··---·--
'
········ - - -- ---- ········ - :)__ _2.58~--- .:1_94 . . . ... 2_.19_8 ~-9~~ 
4 3.083 .225 2.637 3.529 
.. . .................................................................................................. .. ,,.····1--···---- -··--··--· ......................... . 
2.833 .230 2.377 3.289 
.. ---·-·---.. ·--· ------ ----- _______ , _____ ..................... _____ , _________ _ 
6 3.250 .229 2.796 3.704 
---------------------------- -----------·----- ------ - ______ , ______ .......... , _____ , _____________ , 
1-···- . ... -····-··--········-···············---·---7__ ~~~ .250 2.419 3.414 
8 3.167 .269 2.633 3. 700 
·--·----·-""'" ··---·---.... --·-·-·----.. ·---·-·----.. ·-·---·-·----·--·---·------------ ---·---·---·-"""'"' 
9 2.917 .284 2.352 3.482 
Low Unstable Low 1 1.769 .226 1.320 2.219 
-····· ···-···-···---···············-·---·-·-··--····- f------ ---·-· ---···-·- ········-··---·--·-·· ·-· 
2 2.462 .210 2.044 2.879 ~::::::=::::::==:=.::::::::::=:~=::= r--- 2.538 .186 - ::=~=:3j_?_ll_ -·- ___ 2.909 
4 2.615 .216 2.187 3.044 
--------- 5 3.308 r--··-·~2-21- --2.869···-- ·--·--i-74-6 ---
·-·--··· ··········-··---- --- r------- ························--· ···················-·· ............ ·············-···-····· 
l---·-·-··-·-·-·---·-·-----·~6-+---....:::3·c:.53=,8=---r----·2_2_o_ ----~-~-~-~---·-+----3==.9:::7_;:5 I 1 3.3o8 .241 2.83o 3.785 1-------·----- . r---r-·--·- --···--····· 1--- -·-·-------- 8 3.231 .258 2.718 3.744 
-··--·-·--·· . ·9·· 3.385 .273 ·--·2.842 3.927 
Low Unstable High 1 3.154 .226 2.704 3.603 
........................................................ ~ .......................... , ... ·1--·--------1------ r-- ·--. .... - ····----···-··- ··-
2 3.231 .210 2.813 3.648 
··-· -:::::=-=:::::::·::::::::::::::=::==~:= r-· 2.692 . 186 ·:; :=:~:.3.33== _ ~- 3.os~:=·::: 
!·······················-························ ···························-·················-··-o4o··-··-l--3:.:.:·3..::.08:__ _ ~--16 ___ ------~:87_~----- __ _3. 7:3_6___ . 
•-················-···········--···--··············-·· ··-·············-······-5, ........ f- 3.385 .221 2.946 3.823 
1
_ .::. . .. ____ -··-·· -····· ....... _ ···- -~ -----Hf}-- ---1~~ ·: ~=::~i1r·:·: :· =~!~~:~_:: 
8 2.769 .258 2.256 3.282 
.................... -·-·- .. ·--·-.. ·----·-·-- .. , .. ,_, _______ ,, __ ,,_, ___ ,,________________ ·-- ---·-·--............... _ .... , _______________________ , _____ _ 
9 3.000 .273 2.457 3.543 
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Table 5.9 (Continued): Means for Dependent Variable- Project Status 
Measure: Project Status 
ZOT Stability Variance Period J Mean 1 Std. Error 1 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound I Upper Bound 
High Stable Low 1 ~ 2.000 .236 1.532 2.468 
,=:=:=::=::=::=::=-~=:=: ··==:~ E= -=::~~r- =--~~lE= -=:=:J~~E== · -:::J:~~~=::: 
4 2.417 .225 1.971 2.863 
---------------------------~-~-------- ---~--~ -------------- ----------------------------- - -------~---------------------
5 2.417 .230 1.961 2.873 
6 3.000 .229 2.546 3.454 
':=::.==:: ___ :====•====·-·- -~- L:I~~L:i=:~;t __ ,_ ·----~:.!~6. __ _ 
.284 2.102 
2.169 3.164 
3.784 
9 2.667 3.232 
High Stable High 1 2.571 .218 I 2.138 3.005 
---------------~------------------~------------------------------------------1----~------------1--------------~-------1----~---------------------.&--------~---~-----
2 1=•==--- 3 ·• =: ~·~~i=: _:1~~ =•:•==·~·~m_:::= •-=•=:til~::=::: 
4 3.143 .208 2. 730 3.556 
--------------------~-----~-----------~-- . ---~---- --------- --------------- ----------------------
1---·---···-·-·-·-···---·--·--·-:_ ___ ----~c~~-~----· .213 2.221 3.0~--
6 3.214 .212 2.794 
~---------~------ ------~ ----------- --------------- ---------------------------------
1 
7 2.786 .232 2.325 3.246 
==·=========-~= =:2c9~:=: ___ :~2~9-= =::::-3~~~~·-== =:=:::~~~~~·=== 9 2.714 .263 2.191 3.237 
I_ Hi== ~:stab~:--~:-+~~~~ 
5 
1 · ~r~ = ~ ~- i--
High Unstable High 1 ~ 2.500 .236 2.032 2.968 
--·-···-·-···------·····-··-······· ------- -·--·--t------
2 3.000 .219 2.566 3.434 
--·-·--·-·--··-·---·--·-········- ------- -· . 
3 2.417 .194 2.031 2.802 
-··-·-·--·····-·--·--·--··--······-·-·--···········.·.··· ·--·------+-··----t--
4 2.500 .225 2.054 2.946 
-·----·---···-----·-·-··-s·· ·· ----2.5oo ____ ····-· .230 · ·-· 2.04~---- __ 2.956 __ _ 
2.212 3.121 
-----1--·--6 ! 2.667 ~ .229 ·-···--·-·--···-·-···---········-·--··--···-- --- ·---==--+--
7 2.417 .250 1.919 2.914 
·-·-···-··-·-·-······-·····---·-··--·-·-~---- -- ~·~~-- --:~:. ~.:~~ ~.:~; 
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Table 5.10: Between-Subjects Effects in Unstable Variance Treatments Only 
Type Ill Sum Mean 
Source of Squares df Square F Sig. 
Intercept 3434.741 1 3434.741 882.889 .000 
- - -ZOT 19.701 1 19.701 5.064 .029 
------·- -----
Variance .055 l .055 .014 .906 
- -- - - -· 
ZOT* 
Variance 
Error 
Cl) 
I: 
3.5 
:g 3 
::E 
c; 
I: 
c, 
; 2.5 
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1.477 
178.956 
2 
1 1.477 .380 
46 3.890 
~~ 
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.541 
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Figure 5.9: Low-High Variance Stability Condition X ZOT 
' 
We can sec from Figure 5.9 above that Low ZOTs have the effect of heightening a 
subject's 'worry' about the project and this is reflected in the Project Status metric in 
the 'low to high' Budget Variance condition. Subjects facing projects in which the 
budget variances increased over the life of the project tended to become more 
concerned (as reflected by the project status) in the Low ZOT condition than in the 
High ZOT condition. This effect was more pronounced in the converse 'high to low' 
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By contrast, subjects with projects of the opposite unstable variance treatment, where 
budget variances progressed from high (i.e. over 50% in Period 1) to low (i.e. to less 
than 5% in Period 1 0), tended to report Project Statuses that were initially negative 
and remained that way throughout the entirety of the project (see Figure X above). In 
other words, where projects started well and ended poorly, subjects' views on the 
project adapt commensurately with the level of budget variance. On the other hand, 
subjects never seemed to improve their assessment of a project that started poorly 
and ended well. Their concern and awareness of budget variances at the beginning of 
the project did not change even as project perfonnance demonstrably improved. The 
mean project status over time between the two unstable variance treatments is 
directly compared in Figure 5.11 below. 
35 
! 
• 
• ~25 
' " :.
) 2 
~ 
~ 
.n 
15 
3 4 5 
Period 
Treatment 
-L.cw-Hogh 
-High-low 
Figure 5.11: Mean Project Status in Unstable Variance Conditions 
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Depemlent Variable: Risk Preference 
In this experiment, the binary Risk Preference dependent measure was coded thus: a 
choice of a taking a risk and not correcting a setback (in the hope that the risk would 
not eventuate) was coded as -1 and the choice of the certain cost of correction was 
coded as+ l. Therefore, in our analysis, risk-seeking behaviour would reveal average 
values of the Risk Preference dependent variable closer to -I and risk aversion would 
reveal averages closer to + 1 (with 0 representing indifference). The only significant 
effect on risk preference in this model is a main effect of ZOTs. A Kruskall-Wallis 
test reveals the Chi Square statistic X2( 1, N = 487) = 5.923, p = .0 15). H7 implied that 
ZOTs had an interaction effect with ZOTs in its effect on risk preference, yet we 
found an unexpected main effect of ZOTs on risk-seeking behaviour. We found no 
effect of either stable budget variances (X2( 1, N = 249) = .265, p > .05)) or unstable 
budget variances (X2(1, N = 238) = .000, p > .05) or an effect on risk preference due 
to time (X2( 4,.N = 487) = 6.151, p > .05) (H6 Not Supported). 
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Figure 5.12: Risk Preference by ZOT and Variance 
(Values closer to + I indicate risk nverseness, values closer to -I indicate risk-seeking, 0 indicates indifTerence) 
-241-
Chapter 5- Tolerance Over Time 
Figure 5.12 above reveals some interesting patterns of behaviour (in this diagram, 
values closer to +I indicate risk averseness whereas values closer to -I indicate risk-
seeking, with 0 as the point of indifference). Under conditions of high ZOTs, 
decision-makers tend to be generally more risk-averse, and tend to be indifferent 
between risky options at low ZOTs. The only exception to this was that the 
difference between ZOT treatments was not significant for the High-Low variance 
condition (X2(1, N= 118) = .034,p > .05). 
The marked difference in risk preference within the High-Low unstable Variance 
condition may be, at least in part, explained by the aberrant effects we observed 
within the Project Status metric of the same treatment. As discussed earlier, subjects 
in this treatment tended to start the project with negative Project Statuses and this 
persisted throughout the course of development. Perhaps this heightened sense of 
awareness over the project's budget overruns washed out the effects of ZOTs as a 
dominant effect in risk preference. 
Project abandonment 
Of the 100 projects undertaken by subjects in this study (50 subjects, two projects), 
only five projects were abandoned, all of which were in the Low ZOT condition. 
Four ofthese projects in the unstable variance condition. Of these, two projects were 
abandoned in the High-Low condition where Period I saw a 48% budget variance. 
One of these projects was (rather presciently) abandoned in Period I while the 
second was de-escalated for first three periods before it was abandoned in period 
four. Two projects were abandoned in the Low-High variance condition mid-way 
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through the project, as budget variances started to exceed 25%. The fifth abandoned 
project was in the high stable variance condition and was abandoned in Period 8. 
Discussion 
The original hypotheses proposed in this Experiment did not seem to bear out upon 
testing. The only hypothesis to be supported (HI), however, supports one of the 
central tenets of this study - that time has a significant effect on the tendency to 
escalate commitment to a course of action. We did, however, make some unexpected 
findings in relation to the effect of the stability of variances and Zones of Tolerance 
on the overall model. We found that subjects who experienced high budget variances 
at the beginning of a project tended not to adjust their 'worry' of a project even as 
variances decreased over time. Under conditions of high ZOTs, decision-makers tend 
to be generally more risk-averse, and tend to be indifferent between risky options at 
low ZOTs. We also found an unexpected main effect of ZOTs on risk preference: 
risk-aversion under High ZOTs and indifference to risk within low ZOTs. 
As a post-test, subjects were asked to evaluate their project's performance in the final 
time period of each project (period 10). Subjects were given a 5-point Likert-scale 
rating ranging from I (I am very satisfied with the way I managed this project) to 5 (I 
am very dissatisfied with the way I managed this project). We can see that the effect 
of high ZOTs where subjects tended to evaluate their performance more favourably 
than in low ZOT conditions. Their mean responses are presented graphically below 
and grouped by ZOT (Figure 5.13 and 5.14). A clear distinction is evident between 
the confidence with which decision-makers in high and low ZOT conditions. High 
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ZOT decision-makers tended to be more satisfied with the way they managed 
identical projects to those in low ZOT conditions. This general level of satisfaction, 
driven through the ZOT conditions can be seen to affect manifest behaviours 
throughout the experiment - affecting the vigilance with which projects were 
monitored, the tendency to detect and correct project setbacks and the tendency to 
vary risk preferences between high and low ZOT contexts. 
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We are now starting to paint a richer picture of escalation behaviour over time. Time 
has a compounding effect on decision-maker's perceptions of variations from 
expectations, particularly when budget variances change over time. Much of the 
limitations of prior studies owe to their low technology implementation, relying 
mostly on pen and paper to execute experiments and collect responses. Staw and Fox 
(1977) using three time periods, relied on a pencil and paper exercise where subjects 
needed to return their responses to the examiner after each time period (perhaps 
inducing greater experimenter expectancy effects in the process). In this study, by 
contrast, computer simulations allow for a faster, more interactive participant 
experience in which a larger number of responses can be collected in a shorter time, 
thus facilitating a multi-period escalation study. 
Simon's (1975) theories on the effect of time on fundamental strategy hold true -
persistent variations from expectations tend to increase the frustrations of decision-
makers over time. The relatively few project abandonments are evidence of the 
'Catch-22' of time: as troubled projects yield persistent variations from expectations, 
they, become simultaneously less palatable to continue as well as also harder to 
abandon. While it comes as little surprise that decision-makers tend to increase their 
vigilance of projects facing compounding setbacks over time, it is a key contribution 
of this study that we examine the effects of escalation across time. 
In this study we also examined the effect of Zones of Tolerance and time on the 
escalation behaviour under various conditions of budget overruns. Perhaps the most 
significant finding from this study is the main effect of Zones of Tolerance and its 
undergirding influence on the treatment of fluctuating budget variances throughout a 
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project's development. Zones of Tolerance have an impact upon the vigilance with 
which decision-makers apply to project overruns and setbacks, and also influence 
their risk preferences when dealing with said setbacks. 
Perhaps the most important treatment within this study was the 'low to high' unstable 
budget overrun condition, the treatment most similar to escalation of commitment 
episodes. We can see that under conditions of high ZOTs, decision-makers tended to 
be less concerned about budget overruns and, as we can see from experiment I, less 
vigilant about correcting overruns as they occur. The resultant effect of this high 
ZOT conditions is that decision-makers tended to tolerate budget overruns to a 
greater extent, take less action to reduce budget overspend (as shown by the risk 
preference results) and generally not detect escalation episodes as efficiently as under 
low ZOT conditions. 
Contrary to prior escalation studies examining risk preference in loss conditions, this 
study shows that escalation episodes can also engender risk aversion, particularly if 
deci~ion-makers operate under conditions where escalation is the less risky option 
when controlling project setbacks. Rather than 'cut comers' in order to reduce 
spending on projects, setbacks causing higher spending tended to be tolerated under 
high ZOT conditions to a greater extent than under low ZOT conditions. The 
implications of this are significant - they seem to indicate that persistence despite 
costly setbacks causing escalating commitment episodes is more likely when 
organisational and structural constraints provide high tolerance that would absorb 
this increased spending. 
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Limitations of the Study 
The decision to reduce the number of key dependent measures to one (project status, 
with risk preference a secondary measure) was made due to the practical limitations 
of subjects' time as well as to facilitate easy understanding of the complex decision 
task. As it stood within the present study, subjects were required to make 30 
decisions in all (I 0 project status decisions and five risk decisions on each of two 
projects). However, the single dependent variable of Project Status across time did 
not allow us to develop as rich a picture of the relationship between decision-makers' 
perceptions and behaviours in escalating projects. As we saw in Experiment I, 
understanding the distinction and relationship between perception and behaviour is 
very important to understanding escalation. The use of one dependent variable did 
not fully capture the complexity of the thought-processes of decision-makers. In 
hindsight, it may have been worthwhile to include a metric to assess subjects' actual 
resource allocation behaviour (this is addressed in Experiment 3). 
The dependent variable measuring risk was particularly problematic. We could find 
no significant effects of risk preference the model with the exception of the 
relationship to ZOTs. We challenged the efficacy of gambles to test risk behaviour 
within the literature review and these problems have seemed to bear themselves out. 
The problems with this dependent measure were twofold. In attempting to maintain 
the same style of risky option mix as Kahneman and Tversky (1979) we reneged 
some claims to face validity. In truth, studies involving Prospect theory in escalation 
have largely been theoretical (Whyte 1986, Johnstone 2002) or conjectured through 
survey data (Keil et a!. 2000) and this study shows how difficult it is to apply 
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expected utility models of risk within context of an organisational escalation 
dilemma. 
Implications for the Next Experiment 
In the next experiment we will reintroduce dependent variables associated with 
resource allocation in order to assess how resources are distributed between multiple 
projects in a portfolio in which escalation is evident. Further, we will use both time 
and cost metrics to gamer a richer picture of resource allocation behaviour when 
multiple resources are distributed across multiple projects when one or more of those 
projects are escalating. We continue our investigation of time's effect on escalating 
situations as the effect of time is important, significant and under-investigated within 
the oeuvre of escalation research. In addition to this, we will return to a simpler 
(though still more complex than extant literature) mixed factorial designs of 
escalation tasks in order to improve upon the research design model and enhance the 
effectiveness of computer-based simulations in understanding escalation behaviour. 
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Concluding Remarks 
In this experiment, we investigated the importance of time to a decision-maker's 
tolerance. We examined a number of characteristics of a project's performance that 
may change over time, namely (I) the effects of the stability of budget variances over 
time; (2) the magnitude of budget variances over time; and (3) the change in risk 
preference over time. Only a handful of experimental studies have investigated 
escalation decisions over time and these studies used only a limited number of 
limited time periods in their study. This has largely been due to the constraints 
imposed upon experiments by pencil and paper exercises that do not adequately 
allow for feedback and dynamic responses across a number of iterations of the task. 
Confirming our conjectures regarding the effects of ZOTs and Time on the treatment 
of escalating courses of action we found a significant effect of ZOTs and a main 
significant effect of time on the evaluation of projects and the continuation decisions 
made by subjects within the decision task. We could not, however, find a within-
subjects interaction effect between ZOTs and Time suggesting that subjects within 
this task did not change their perceptions or reactions to ZOTs over time. We also 
found a significant effect of the difference between low-stable and high-stable 
variances over time. However, we could not find an interaction effect between the 
stable budget variance treatment and time. While we could find no direct effect of the 
stability of budget variances on subjects' decisions, we found a significant 
interaction effect between the stability of budget variances over time. 
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The only significant effect on risk preference in this model is a main effect of ZOTs. 
Contrary to prior escalation studies examining risk preference in loss conditions, this 
study shows that losses faced within escalation episodes can engender risk aversion, 
particularly if decision-makers operate under conditions where escalation is the less 
risky option when controlling project setbacks. This would appear to indicate that 
persistence despite costly setbacks causing escalating commitment episodes is more 
likely when organisational and structural constraints provide high tolerance that 
would absorb this increased spending. 
In conclusion, the examination of the effects of ZOTs on risk and time on escalation 
were the two biggest contributions of this study. We are now obtaining a richer 
picture of the effects of ZOTs as a main effect that seems to permeate the behaviours 
and perceptions of decision-makers to the extent that decisions are skewed in the 
direction implied by the ZOT. We also found that the effect of time has not been 
fully appreciated nor explored in prior studies and this is worthy of further 
investigation in the final study of this research programme. 
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--- CHAPTER 6 ---
EXPERIMENT 3: RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
BEHAVIOUR IN TROUBLED PROJECT 
PORTFOLIOS 
Introduction 
Over thirty years of research into the 'escalation of commitment' phenomenon has 
not yet identified credible early warning indicators that signal impending trouble. 
This study takes a significant step towards understanding how tolerance of minor 
setbacks (termed 'Zones of Tolerance', or 'ZOT's') affect future tendencies to persist 
with a challenged course of action. Applying linear programming, it both 
theoretically and empirically demonstrates how tolerance for troubled projects 
systematically and sub-optimally draws resources away from well-performing 
projects within a portfolio. This experimental validates a hitherto unapplied method 
of measuring the extent to which decision-makers depart from objectively optimal 
decision strategies during escalation of commitment dilemmas. 
By the time failure is inevitable, the decision to redirect or abandon a course of 
action can become exceedingly difficult, and extant literature has gone a long way 
towards exploring how sunk resources and psychological commitment inhibit 
difficult project abandonment decisions. This study examines the influence of 
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tolerance for setbacks, the extent to which alternative resource allocations are 
available and the way in which projects change over time. We hypothesise that ZOTs 
inhered within the decision context lead to increasingly suboptimal resource 
allocations between troubled and untroubled projects over time. The study compares 
objectively optimal resource allocation strategies against decision-makers' actual 
allocation decisions in a portfolio of two projects. 
Research Objectives 
In this chapter, we will be opening a line of inquiry that has hitherto remained a 
major gap in escalation of commitment literature. We ask two questions which will 
serve as both a capstone to these investigations into Zones of Tolerance; and to 
establish the significance of these ZOTs on project management practice in the 
context of project portfolios. 
Research Objective 1: 
Research Objective 2: 
To investigate how budget overruns within one 
project affect decision-making within an entire 
project portfolio? 
To compare decision-making under ZOTs to a 
decision-maker's achievement of optimal resource 
allocations? 
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As has been evidenced by this programme of research, escalation of commitment 
episodes often occur due to a lack of regard for budget limits placed on a project. It 
would seem clear from escalation of commitment case study literature that budget 
variances do not contain, in and of themselves, sufficient impetus to influence 
decision-maker to control or correct project setbacks despite representing one of the 
best measures of the efficiency with which a project plan is executed (Yelton et al. 
2000). Rather, the greatest emphasis and influence on escalation seems to arise 
through managerial issues - most notably management support, user dissatisfaction 
and organisational conflict. If these issues are given preferential standing within a 
project management organisation, budget variances may become a secondary 
consideration. 
Revisiting the Findings of Experiment 1 -Alternatives Reconsidered 
In the first study, we could find no influence of alternative investments on the 
decision to escalate, and speculated that the lack of a finding (where other studies 
have found significance) may have been due to a poor operationalisation of the 
Alternatives construct. These findings were at odds with Keil et al. (1995a) and 
Northcraft and Neale {1986) and were consistent with the findings of Schaubroeck 
and Davis (1994) and Keil and Mixon (1994). 
The operationalisation of the Alternatives construct in Experiment I, consistent with 
those of Arkes and Blumer {1985) among many others, could be conjectured to have 
induced decision-makers to create the following decision structure: if the current 
project is deemed likely to fail, then abandon the project and take the alternative. 
That means that there is temporal precedence is given to decision regarding the 
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troubled project. That is, the decision to continue in the failing project arose before 
the decision to take an alternative course of action. 
Turning the Decision Structure Around 
Organisations have limited resource capacities. In short, there is an opportunity cost 
to every escalation decision. Expending resources in excess of that which was 
originally anticipated would necessarily imply that those resources are being taken 
away from other courses of action for which they may have been committed. 
Applying this to escalation of commitment dilemmas, one could argue that a project 
manager's decision to extend resources in excess of that which was originally 
anticipated creates opportunity costs to (at least) the value of the additional resources 
spent on the project. However, applying our new understanding of Zones of 
Tolerance, it is possible that these budget variances are not appropriately considered 
as opportunity costs by the decision-maker, since small budget variances are 
tolerated to the extent that they may be considered endogenous to the project and do 
not affect the project portfolio writ large. If this was the case, there may be a lack of 
consideration for the effects of these variances outside the project itself. 
A possible weakness of the Alternatives manipulation in Experiment I as well as in 
the manipulations of Arkes and Blumer (1985) and Keil et a!. (1995) is that it 
assumes that troubled projects are evaluated in isolation to the entire project 
portfolio. Indeed, the first two experiments made no assumptions about the effect of 
resource limits on project investment decisions and how those resource limits would 
affect other projects. This is a long-standing weakness within experimental escalation 
research - that single-shot decisions on single projects do not take into account the 
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overall impact of escalation decisions on the organisation's resources writ large and 
does not include consideration of technical side-bets (Becker 1960). As Drummond 
(1994) points out, projects are rarely, if ever, ad hoc ventures but reside within the 
organisation overall. 
Consider: in real-world settings, would it not be more appropriate that project 
investment decisions in both failing and non-failing projects had to be made 
concurrently? This decision structure is more appropriate to project portfolios, where 
multiple project investment decisions are required at the same time. Thus, the 
decision-maker's choice of continuing with a troubled project in excess of orignial 
budget expectations would have to be made with the implication that such a decision 
would necessarily draw limited resources towards the failing project and away from 
other possible investments. This decision context is perhaps more appropriate to 
project portfolio management as opposed to project management, where portfolio-
based requires decisions on a range of projects with common objectives. 
Invrstigating the Effect on Project Portfolios 
Project portfolios are characterised by multiple projects with common objectives that 
compete with one another for the limited resources available to the project 
organisation. In addition to this competition for resources, projects within a portfolio 
compete for the support and attention of senior management. This places greater 
emphasis on a more global resource focus that requires better governance and 
planning than discrete or ad hoc projects. Each project within a portfolio comprises 
one piece of the overall objectives of that portfolio. Resource allocation decisions 
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may become more complex as the need for efficient resource allocations and 
maintenance of management buy-in increases. 
Managing a portfolio of projects requires a strong concentration on appropriate 
resource allocation. Project or programme managers must possess an ability to 
schedule the necessary resources during a specified period of time. Given resource 
limits, changes to resource requirements of any one project may affect all projects in 
the portfolio by diminishing the available resources available. Essentially, resource 
allocation decisions therefore become a maximisation problem, defined by Langholtz 
et a!. (2003) as occurring when "the decision-maker is attempting to reach the 
maximum possible level of a goal while not consuming more than a fixed amount of 
resources" (p4). 
Resource Maximisation in Escalation Situations 
During escalation situations, projects experience setbacks which may cause 
additional resource requirements not previously anticipated when making initial 
budget decisions. When these resource demands change mid-development, project 
managers are forced them to make decisions about their response to these changing 
circumstances. If indeed a project manager chooses to tolerate these additional 
resource demands placed upon a project by these setbacks, then he/she would need to 
decide from where these additional resources should come from. When all resources 
in the project organisation are committed, the decision dilemma would necessarily 
require that resources be taken away from another activity. 
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Using Linear Programming to Evaluate Resource Allocation 
Behaviour 
Linear programming (LP) is a mathematical tool that is used to find optimal resource 
allocation strategies when certain variables are known (Langholtz et a!. 2003) and 
was first proposed by Danzig (1963) in his book Linear Programming and 
Extensions. Linear programming is a popular modelling technique used within the 
management sciences to discover possible optimisations where there are multiple 
resources used within competing activities. It is used primarily within the fields of 
logistics, scheduling and network optimisation (Langholtz eta!. 2003). 
While linear programming is a parsimonious way of addressing some fundamental 
questions in resource allocation strategies, it relies on a relatively simple picture of 
the decision context. The complexity of linear programming models increases as the 
number of resources and activities increases. Furthermore, "(t]he model is often 
difficult to construct because of the richness, variety, and ambiguity of the real 
world" (Danzig 1963, p 34). Generally, there are two varieties of common 
optimisation problems when using linear functions within LP -'maximisation 
problems' (based on the maximisation of some outcome based on constrained 
resource inputs) or 'minimisation' problems (the minimisation of resource 
expenditure to achieve certain outcomes). At its simplest, LP problems identify the 
feasible outcomes based on the resource constraints available and the linear functions 
that determine the combinations of possible outcomes. 
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Assumptions in Linear Programming 
Danzig (1963) identifies some assumptions that must be made when simplifying 
decision tasks down to linear programming problems, namely assumptions of 
proportionality, non-negativity, additivity and the presence of a linear programming 
function. The proportionality assumption states that "the quantities of flow of the 
various items into and out of the activity are always proportional to the activity 
level" (p32). Put simply, this means that it is possible to assign a per unit resource 
requirement for each resource or activity. The non-negativity assumption states that 
"[w]hile any positive multiple of an activity is possible, negative quantities of 
activities are not possible" (Danzig 1963, p32). For the purposes of this study, this 
would simply mean that it is not possible to complete a negative amount of a project, 
nor assign a negative amount of cost or time (or any other resource) to a project. The 
additivity assumption requires that "the total amount specified by the system as a 
whole equals the sum of the amounts flowing out" Danzig 1963, p32). Finally, the 
linear objective assumption states that resources are finite and scarce. Furthermore, if 
the objective of the exercise is to, say, maximise the total completion of all projects 
in u portfolio, then the amount of resources expended on each activity directly affects 
this objective. 
The Basic LP Representation of the Problem 
This research does not attempt to further the voluminous literature on LP, but rather 
will apply its methods to the escalation problem. However, even at this basic level, 
we have identified a method of evaluating escalation situations that has hitherto 
never been applied in over 30 years of research into the phenomenon. 
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Say that you, as a project manager, were in charge a portfolio of two projects, Project 
E and Project Nu Furthermore, assume that, there are two independent resources 
available to you: labour hours (time) and money (cost). In this case, one could 
reasonably assert that your objective as a project manager is to complete as much of 
the two projects as possible given the time and cost resource constraints incumbent 
upon you. 
In order to put these constraints in proper mathematical form for LP, we can 
represent the problem of maximising the total completion of both projects, C, with 
the following: 
Goal: Maximise C = PE + PN (objective function) (I) 
Where PE = Percentage of the Project E completed within one period 
PN =Percentage of the Project N completed within one period 
Note that PE and PN are expressed as a proportion of 100% completion of the project. 
For example, if PE had a value of I 0, this would mean that I 0% of Project E is 
completed in that month. 
Time and money are the two resource constraints incumbent upon you in order to 
maximise the sum of (PE + PN}, and let us further assume that expenditure of both 
these resources can be expressed as a linear function of completion. Given this 
11 In practice, LP can be used calculate optimality for any number of constraints and activities. This 
two-project (two-dimensional) illustration is used as a simple exemplar of the properties of LP when 
applied to escalation problems. 
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constraint, we can express both of these resources as variables within a linear 
function: 
Subject to: 
Where 
Cost Budget :S {ME.PE + MN.PN} (money constraint) (2) 
Time Budget :S {T E·PE + T N·PN} (time constraint) (3) 
Where: PE, PN :S 0 (non-negativity constraint) (4) 
ME= The money investment required to complete I% of the 
Project E 
MN = The money investment required to complete I% of the 
Project N 
T E = The time investment required to complete I% of the 
Project E 
TN = The time investment required to complete I% of the 
Project N 
Formulae (2) and (3) simply state that there is simple multiplicative relationship 
between the overall cost and time budgets based on the per unit cost and time of both 
projects. Formula (4) represents the non-negativity constraint which stipulates that, 
for mathematical tractability, you cannot complete less than 0% of either project in 
any given time period. 
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A Special Case of LP 
The following illustrative case makes a critical assumption that represents just one 
possible syntax of alternatives available during LP programming. This research uses 
a portfolio of two projects in which time and cost efficiency is converse between 
projects as its example. In other words, we will use a case in which Project E incurs 
more cost per unit of completion than Project N, but uses relatively less time per unit 
of completion. To illustrate, in the first time period of this study, the following per 
unit cost and time requirements were used: 
Table 6.1: Sample Monthly Cost and Time Requirements Per 1% Completion 
Money($) Time (labour hours) 
Time (t) ME MN TE TN 
1 2400 2000 100 120 
Total Money Budget (for one month)= $44,000 
Total Time Budget (for one month) = 2,200 labour hours 
You will notice that the cost to complete I% of the Project E is $2400 (ME) while the 
cost per unit of completion for an equivalent I% of Project N is $2000 (MN). 
Conversely, completing I% of Project E takes I 00 hours, whereas the time taken to 
complete I% of Project N is relatively more resource intensive (120 hours). Put 
simply, Project E incurs more cost and less time to complete than Project N. This is 
an important assumption to make, as this study examines just one simple two 
dimensional problem in which an optimal is possible. 
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In this example, the optimal completion of Project E is 10% for that month, and the 
optimal completion of the Project N is also J 0%. This results a total cost outlay (ME 
.P£+ MN.PN) of $44,000 (equal to the budget) and total of 2,200 labour hours (T E·PE+ 
TN.PN)-
Representing the LP Problem Graphically 
Given that the above constraints form two linear functions (one for each of the time 
and cost constraints) we can graphically represent this information in order to 
identify the feasible set of possible combination of PE and PN completion levels. 
Using the illustrative figures provided in Table 6.1, we can represent the above LP 
problem thus: 
"? 
~ 
.... 
..... ~ 
~ 22 
a 
~ 
~ 
Cost Constraint: 
Cost Budget ~ {2400.PN + 2000.PE} 
Feasible 
Region 
Most attractive corner 
((10,10) 
Time Constraint: 
Time Budget ~ { 1 OO.PN + 120.PE} 
JO 22 
PE (% Completion) 
Figure 6.1: Basic Graphical LP Representation 
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In the above representation of the problem, we can see that the effect of the opposing 
time and cost efficiencies of the two projects create a polygon known as the 'feasible 
region' within which any combination of completion of the two projects is possible. 
The region outside of this feasible set represents a violation of the time, cost or non-
negativity constraints. Since this is a maximising problem (as the project manager is 
given the task of maximising her completion of both projects (PE + PN)), LP allows 
us to identify the 'most attractive corner' which is illustrated above as the top-right 
corner of the polygon. This comer denotes the maximum combination of PE and PN 
possible within the feasible region. In this way, LP allows decision-makers to 
determine (at least in theory) the optimal allocation of resources between multiple 
activities given constrained resource inputs. 
Extending the LP Problem to Escalation Situations 
In the above example, completing I 0% of Project E and I 0% of Project N represents 
the optimal allocation of time and cost resources in order to maximise the combined 
completion of both projects. The use of LP in this way is not novel, however, as we 
shall see, an extension of this problem can be applied to escalation situations -
hitherto never applied in escalation of commitment research. 
As has been determined throughout this research programme, escalating projects are 
characterised by increasing and unanticipated costs to complete a project. In the 
previous two studies, we have seen that small increases in costs (i.e. small budget 
variances) tended to be tolerated and this was particularly so if high Zones of 
Tolerance inherent within the project context induced decision-makers to make 
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project investment decisions that favoured absorption of these variances, rather than 
correction. 
Now let us apply the LP problem to a multi-period context. If the same linear 
functions and the same resource constraints were prevalent within each period up 
until completion of the two projects, then the decision-maker would, ceteris paribus, 
be apt to continue completing both projects at a rate of PE and PN each month until 
the completion of one project, and then subsequently invest all resources in following 
time periods into the completion of the second until completion of I 00% of both 
projects. 
Now let us say that PE represents an escalating project and is experiencing setbacks 
that are resulting in increasing costs per unit of completion, while PN represents a 
non-escalating project whose costs per unit do not change. In other words, ME is 
increasing while MN, TN and T E remained constant. The resultant effect on the 
graphical representation of the LP linear cost function would be to increase the 
gra~ient of the function to reflect the higher cost per unit to complete the escalating 
project PE. Graphically, we can represent this new situation thus: 
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Figure 6.2: Graphical Representation ofLP when Costs Increase 
The above representation suggests that decision-makers would be best served by 
completing less of the escalating project (i.e. reducing PE) and more of the non-
escalating project (i.e. increasing PN). The significance of this to the current research 
' programme is significant. The previous two experiments found that decision-makers 
tend to allocate more to escalating projects when budget variances occur when, in 
fact, this case of objectively optimal linear modelling dictates that the optimal 
resource allocation strategy should be the opposite. In the previous experiments, we 
found that when faced with relatively small budget variances and Zones of 
Tolerance, decision-makers actively prefer to allow budget variances to be absorbed 
through greater resource expenditures on troubled projects. Most escalation literature 
seems to support these fmdings. 
-265-
Chapter 6 - Project Portfolios 
Positioning the Non-Escalating Project as an Alternative Investment 
As stated earlier in this chapter, Experiment I could find no evidence that the 
presence of an alternative investment influenced a decision-maker in their extension 
of resources to troubled projects. This lack of finding may have been due to the poor 
operationalisation of the alternatives construct, although several experiments in 
related literature found significant results using similar techniques and measures 
(Arkes and Blumer 1985 among others). Positioning the alternative investment 
concurrently with the escalating project may shift the dynamics of the decision, 
particularly since the salience of the opportunity cost may emphasise to a decision-
maker that tolerating budget overruns to a troubled project would necessarily entail 
drawing those same resources away from other projects within the portfolio. 
In this study, we will seek to place the decision-maker in situ of a project portfolio 
within which resource allocation decisions have a direct and immediate impact upon 
the alternative course of action in terms of an opportunity cost. Manipulating a 
decision context in this way provides a more powerful test of the alternatives 
col\struct since (in this case) the opportunity cost is salient and immediate, as 
opposed to distant and notional. Furthermore, by operationalising the above problem 
as a multi-cycle decision, where the escalating project progressively deteriorates over 
time (such as in Experiment 2) one may be able to see just how close to optimal 
decision-makers allocate resources and the conditions within which they choose to 
depart from optimal in order to maintain investment in a troubled project. 
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Objectives of Experiment 3 
The objective of this experiment is to establish a simple yet tractable model to 
measure the extent to which manifest resource allocations diverge from objectively 
optimal allocation strategies within escalation situations. Rather than examining the 
linear programming solution, this research uses a simple two-dimensional LP 
problem formulation as a base against which one may objectively evaluate how 
tolerance of variations affects the efficient use of scarce resources. 
To that end, we postulate a number of founding research questions germane to the 
investigation: 
Research Question 1: 
To what extent do decision-makers efficiently allocate resources between 
projects when faced with escalating commitment to a project within a 
portfolio? 
PoJsible Resource Allocation Strategies 
There are a number of alternative decisions a project manager may make within this 
project context. Assuming a multi-period resource allocation task where the unit 
costs of the escalating project increased over time, s/he would maintain resource 
allocations close to optimal by progressively reducing their commitment to the 
troubled project over time (i.e. de-escalating the troubled project) and increasing 
their resource commitment to the project that was performing according to plan. 
Alternatively, if decision-maker behaved in a way that remains consistent with our 
findings in the previous two experiments, and tolerates the cost increases in the 
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troubled project in order to maintain planned completion levels, then we would see a 
progressive departure from optimal where s!he would be allocating too many 
resources to the escalating project and not enough to the non-escalating project The 
resultant effect would be a sub-optimal resource allocation that would diminish the 
overall completion of both projects. 
In the above example (which will serve as a template for the following experiment) 
we postulate that the optimal resource allocation strategy should be to draw resources 
away from escalating projects and towards non-escalating projects within a project 
portfolio12 • The results of this research programme thus far indicate that decision-
makers, by contrast, have a tendency to maintain or increase resource commitments 
to troubled projects when budget variances exist within ZOTs. Even if a decision-
maker maintains their commitment to the troubled project, this would represent a 
departure from the optimal allocation strategy. To that end we ask: 
Research Question 2: 
How do decision-makers react to budget variances in a project that exists 
within a project portfolio and how adequate are their resource allocation 
adjustments when faced with setbacks to one or more projects within a 
portfolio? 
12 It is important to reiterate that this represents a special case in which an optimal resource allocation 
point is possible within the LP problem space. 
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Influences Upon Resource Allocation Behaviour 
Langholtz et al. (I 994) provide the basic framework and essential structure upon 
which the present study is based. In their study, the researchers investigated the 
effects of 'harsh' and 'benign' environments on resource allocation behaviour in an 
experimental task involving the allocation of fuel and personnel between two US 
Coast Guard patrol boats. Langholtz et al. (1994) defined these two environments 
through the possibility of losses of either of these two resources. They defined 
'benign' environments as characterised through situations where "heavy losses never 
occur" (p30) and 'harsh environments' as those in which "essential resources are so 
scarce that a Jack of optimality can make continued activity impossible" (p30). In a 
compelling corollary to the current research, they state that 
"We know little about peoples' strategies for coping with such a harsh 
environment, how they plan to prevent being caught off guard by unexpected 
losses, how they react to multiple losses, and how harsh an environment can 
get before people lose the ability to complete the task reliably" (p30). 
Their findings give us a clue as to the possible performance by subjects on this task. 
They found that while subjects generally performed close to optimal (about 90% of 
the optimal solution) they found that subjects in the 'harsh' resource constraint 
environment performed particularly well, since subjects were forced to preposition 
themselves, consider savings strategies and generally allocate resources more 
carefully than in a benign environment in which their losses could be absorbed. 
However, they also found that while subjects in harsh resource conditions performed 
close to optimal, their allocation strategies were not sufficient to complete the task -
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an indication that while an attempt was made to carefully allocate resources, the 
adjustment was not sufficient to assure completion. 
While the Langholtz et al. 's ( 1994) study provides a framework that is germane to 
the current investigation, there are some fundamental differences in the 
characterisation of the 'environment' and the way in which both harsh and benign 
environments would be operationalised. In their study, the researchers characterised 
'failure' as one of resource depletion before the end of the task, and the 
'environment' as the resource base of the decision task. By contrast, this research 
adopts a broader definition of project success and failure that corresponds closer to 
the nature of IT project organisations. Within these contexts, the environment is 
generally better defined through the strategic objectives, competitive environment 
and organisational characteristics that overlay the project organisation and the project 
team. 
Furthermore, the definition of 'failure' as operationalised by Langholtz and his 
colleagues was seen as occurring when resources were depleted to the extent that the 
minimum requirements for a course of action could not be maintained. However, a 
definition of failure that is more amenable to information systems literature is 
predicated upon the withdrawal of one or all of the key decision-makers or 
stakeholders which would signify that the project can no longer maintain the support 
necessary for its eventual implementation (Sauer 1993). 
This is where Zones of Tolerance come in. Rather than a resource-based view of 
project success, and an organisational 'environment' based on the amount and type 
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of those resources, a ZOT -view of the resource allocation process sees organisational 
decisions as interdependent upon resources, strategy, organisational mores and 
purpose. It is quite likely that 'harsh' (low) and 'benign' (high) Zones of Tolerance 
have a direct effect on resource allocation behaviour that is distinct from the resource 
limits (time and cost) incumbent upon the decision-maker. 
This study will examine the effects of Zones of Tolerance, resource limits, time and 
variance within escalation situations involving multiple and simultaneously 
developed projects within an organisation's project portfolio. 
Zones of Tolerance 
Research Question 3: 
How do Zones of Tolerance affect a decision-maker's ability to adequately 
adjust resource allocations when faced with setbacks to one or more projects 
within a portfolio? 
Continuing the main theme of this research programme, we postulate that Zones of 
Tolerance will change the perspective that decision-makers bring to the resource 
allocation problem. As we have seen in the first two experiments, Zones of Tolerance 
have a significant effect on decisions to continue funding to escalating projects. 
In a two-project portfolio similar to the LP problem discussed earlier in this chapter, 
we see how the optimal resource allocation strategy would be to complete less of an 
escalating project and more of a non-escalating project as the costs to complete the 
escalating project increase. We have seen through the last two studies, however, that 
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decision-makers tend to tolerate these cost increases when they lie within Zones of 
Tolerance (particularly under conditions of high ZOTs). If we were to extrapolate 
from the findings of the previous study, decision-makers would prefer to maintain 
their commitment to an escalating project (i.e. tolerate budget overruns). One of two 
decision outcomes is possible. The first would be that a decision-maker tolerates the 
budget overruns at the expense of the global project budget, in effect spending more 
than the resource limits placed upon them through the budget. The resulting effect 
would be to allocate resources at Point A in Figure 6.3. In this case, by virtue of the 
budget overrun, the decision-maker would be allocating resources outside of the 
feasible region. On the other hand, if the decision-maker chose to (or was compelled 
to) remain within the global budget constraints, the alternative course of action 
would be to draw resources away from the non-escalating project and towards the 
escalating project (Point B in Figure 6.3). 
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Figure 6.3: Feasible Strategies to Maintain Commitment to Escalating Project 
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Points A and B represent two options available to decision-makers should slhe 
choose to maintain their commitment to a troubled project. However, the ZOT 
studies conducted so far suggest that, while decision-makers would adjust their 
resource allocations somewhere between these two points, they may do so 
inadequately. Thus, we conjecture that as the ZOTs inherent within the decision 
context rise (i.e. become more lax) decision-makers would allocate their resources 
between the two projects in an increasingly suboptimal fashion. As a (completely 
unscientific) conjecture, it is likely that decision-makers would allocate resources 
between projects within the region ABC in Figure 6.2) if they were presented with 
Zones of Tolerance that permit such budget overruns. Put simply, decision-makers 
would be likely to adjust their completion of the escalating project (albeit 
insufficiently) while leaving completion on the non-escalating project unchanged. In 
consideration and support ofLangholtz et al.'s (1994) findings we conjecture: 
Hl: Resource allocations will be relatively closer to optimal under conditions of 
low ZOTs than high ZOTs within project portfolios. That is, there is an 
independent effect of ZOTs on the efficient allocation of resources to 
escalating projects. 
Resource Limits 
Strict resource limits are a widely debated aspect of both organisational and strategic 
decision-making research, but their effectiveness in controlling resource allocation 
decisions and continue I abandon decisions is by no means universally accepted. 
Strict resource limits - characterised by resource exhaustion once breached -
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represents a bright line which serves as an unambiguous, conspicuous and unique a 
focal point of interest. 
Unlike the Zone of Tolerance manipulations used within this research programme, 
that employ ambiguous or fuzzy reference points to decision-making behaviour, 
resource limits serve as unambiguous constraints upon action; acting as a point of 
salience and a focal point which "fills the vacuum of indeterminacy" in an 
ambiguous problem space (Schelling 1980, p68). A wealth of related literature 
suggests that constrained resources lead to better organisational performance. This 
literature points to two main motivators of better decision-making performance under 
conditions of strict (as opposed to slack) resource constraints. In a longitudinal study 
of 900 private firms, George (2005) found that harsh resource constraints have a 
positive effect on firm performance and these results support the findings of Baker 
and Nelson (2005) and Mosakowski (2002). The argument made by these researchers 
is based on Levi-Strauss' notion of 'bricolage' - that decision-makers would be 
compelled to become more creative with what little is at their disposal, finding 
th~mselves only able to utilise the resources that are ignored by, or not captured by, 
larger and more resource-laden firms. 
The alternate explanation of better resource allocations under strict resource 
constraints is put forward most notably by March and Shapira (1992) in their 
investigation of the effects of 'survival reference points' -those points that represent 
resource exhaustion. Under conditions of resource slack, they argue, decision-makers 
tend to allocate less attention to the actual decision-making process: 
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"Where slack is plentiful, it is pictured as leading to a relaxation of controls, 
reduced fear of failure, institutionalised innovation, increased 
experimentation, and thus to relatively high levels of risk-taking" (March and 
Shapira, 1992, pl72). 
Their findings suggest that attention to a survival reference point leads to a resultant 
reduction in risk-taking. Antonelli (1989) offers a somewhat contradictory account of 
manifest behaviour, finding evidence to suggest that research and development 
organisations are often driven by a 'failure-induced' model of innovation that occurs 
only after performance falls below some minimum threshold. 
There appears to be some contradictory explanations of why resource constraints 
would improve decision-making. George (2005) and others argue that strict resource 
controls improve creativity - in essence increasing the novelty of approach with 
which those resources are used, hence increasing risk taking. March and Shapira 
(1992) on the other hand, argue that stricter resource constraints lead to more 
con~ervative investment strategies and decreased risk taking. The evidence from 
Experiment 2 suggests that riskiness may not be as important a factor in decision-
making as has been suggested in previous literature. 
By contrast, Langholtz et al. (1994) surmise that strict resource constraints affect the 
allocation of attention paid to the resource allocation decision process and that, under 
such conditions, resources are 'husbanded' more carefully. In short, a "harsh 
environment demands improved performance" (Langholtz et al. 1994, p42). Under 
such conditions, decision-makers are compelled to consider prepositioning and 
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saving strategies that may not have otherwise been considered under conditions of 
resource slack. They found that those decision-makers recognising the risk embedded 
within a harsh resource context tended to adjust their resource allocation strategies in 
the appropriate direction, however generally did not do so adequately enough to 
wholly stave off eventual failure. As a result, while resources were husbanded more 
carefully under strict resource constraints, decision-makers did not adjust their 
resource allocation strategy adequately enough to compensate for losses. 
In light of the results of Experiments 1 and 2 that found that: (1) Zones of Tolerance 
tend to affect the adequacy with which resource investment strategies adapt to budget 
variances, and (2) that explicit risk was not as significant as the harshness or 
benignity of the environment; we propose that Langholtz et al. 's (1994) explanation 
of resource husbanding best conforms to our findings so far. Therefore we 
hypothesise that: 
H2: Resource allocations will be relatively closer to optimal under conditions of 
strict rather than loose resource constraints within project portfolios. That is, 
there is an independent effect of resource constraints on the efficient 
allocation of resources to escalating projects. 
H3: We further hypothesise that there is an interaction effect between Zones of 
Tolerance and resource constraints within project portfolios in the directions 
implied by H2 and H3. 
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Applying the construct of resource constraints to an LP problem, we are able to 
conjecture how decision-makers may view the problem and which alternative 
investment strategies they might consider. In the previous experiments, we have seen 
how decision-makers tend to tolerate small but escalating budget overruns. The 
tendency was to maintain their completion of a project under these conditions, rather 
than correct budget overruns or reduce investment in troubled projects. Under 
conditions of resource slack and within the context of an LP problem, we may 
conjecture that a decision-maker would replicate this pattern of behaviour (similar to 
Figure 6.3). If, say, the troubled project experienced escalating costs such that a new 
LP cost constraint was manifest (Figure 6.4), decision-makers with loose resource 
constraints would be able to maintain their commitment to both projects (Point A), 
effectively allocating resources outside the 'feasible' region and absorbing the cost 
mcrease. 
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Figure 6.4: Investment Strategies Under Differing Resource Constraints 
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If, on the other hand, the new cost constraint was fixed and inviolable, decision-
makers would be forced to allocate funds within the feasible region, and would likely 
allocate funds somewhere between Points B and C. If decision-makers preferred to 
maintain their completion commitment to both projects despite budget overruns, 
harsh resource constraints would, ceteris paribus, most likely induce better relative 
optimality than loose resource constraints. 
For H3, the strength of the interaction effect is clearly determined by the relative 
strength of the effect of each of the ZOT and resource constraint constructs. 
Generally, we can hypothesise both low ZOTs and harsh resource constraints 
combine to compel decision-makers to make the best resource allocation decisions 
(i.e. closest to LP optimality) and can be expressed in a matrix of interaction effects 
as in Figure 6.5 below: 
Harsh 
Resource 
Constraint 
Benign 
Zone of Tolerance 
Low High 
Better Resource 
' 
Allocations 
' 
' 
_..-"-' Poorer 
_.--' Resource Allocations 
...... "' 
Figure 6.5: Hypothesised ZOT X Resource Constraint Interaction Effect 
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Increasing Costs over Time 
Revisiting the findings of Langholtz et al. (1994) within their follow-up paper 
(Langholtz et al. 1995, p275) the researchers found "curious, and potentially 
important result" that subjects did not seem to expect, nor plan for, possible losses, 
even the explicit risk of such losses was extremely high (75% in the case of the 1994 
experiment). Rather, the subjects of the Langholtz et al. (1994) experiment reacted to 
losses only after they happened, and failed to anticipate losses by strategies of 
prepositioning or saving. "The lack of anticipation was shown by almost all subjects; 
the effect was large, robust, and replicable" and it "seems so potentially important 
that is deserves further research" (Langholtz et al. 1995, p275). 
Despite high likelihood of losses within the tasks presented by Langholtz et al. 
(1994) and gains within the Langholtz et al (1995) task, subjects were repeatedly 
shown not to anticipate resource changes and consequently failed to adequately 
address these changes once they occurred. 
Could this finding be relevant for escalation situations? In the first two experiments 
we did not objectively measure the efficiency or optimality with which subjects 
allocated funds when faced with escalating budget overruns. Our findings were 
limited to the extent to which adjustments were made by decision-makers within 
differing contexts. With the benefit of casting the escalation problem as a simple LP 
problem, we may now conjecture that the true effect of cost increases over time true 
within escalation dilemmas flows from a seemingly myopic treatment of budget 
variances that leads decision-makers to only address these as they occur (and 
insufficiently even when they do). 
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By applying escalating costs over time to a troubled project, we can see the effect on 
an optimal resource allocation strategy in Figure 6.6. As the costs of the escalating 
project increase, the optimal strategy would be to decrease the completion of the 
escalating project and to increase the completion of the non-escalating project from 
Points A through C (assuming that the time constraint remains constant). 
~~ 
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Optimal at t = 3 
Optimal at t = 2 
Optimal at t = 1 
Escalating Project Completion 
Figure 6.6: Optimal Allocation Strategies as Variances Escalate Over Time 
We can conjecture several possible reasons why this may not happen in escalation 
situations. As the Langholtz et al. (1994, 1995, 1997, 2003) studies have pointed out, 
learning may occur over time, but corrections tend to be inadequate and might 
deteriorate over time. If Zones of Tolerance or resource slack permitted such sub-
optimal behaviours, decision-makers may not learn to adjust their resource 
allocations at all, since no punitive action would be evident or manifest by 
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maintaining their commitment to the troubled project. Indeed, it would confirm the 
surmise of Lyytinen and Robey (1999) that organisations fail to learn due to 
disincentives to learning and organisational designs. They suggest that a failure to 
learn and adjust to changing organisational influences over time create management 
myths of competence and a focus on short-term optimisation. In the case of 
escalation, the focus on the short-term would encourage decision-makers to 
incompletely assess the longer term viability of the project, so long as they are able 
to ensure its continued short-term support. 
A second possible reason may confirm the findings of Experiment I: that when faced 
with a troubled project with opportunity costs, decision-makers fail to see the effects 
on the portfolio writ large. By allocating more to troubled projects than suggested by 
the LP optimal, decision-makers are, in effect, taking resources away from well 
performing projects for the sake of maintaining or supporting poorly performing 
ones. Once again, we also hypothesise that Zones of Tolerance and resource 
constraints serve to either promote or inhibit such behaviours by influencing the 
att~ntion paid towards the careful husbanding of resources, and thus we would expect 
an interaction effect to be evident. 
H4: Decision-makers will skew their resource allocation behaviours towards 
escalating projects when budget variances increase over time to one or more 
projects within a project portfolio. 
H5: There is an interaction effect between Zones of Tolerance and tolerated 
budget variances over time within project portfolios. 
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H6: There is an interaction effect between resource constraints and tolerated 
budget variances over time within project portfolios. 
If we were to graphically represent the departure from optimal resource allocation 
strategy within a project portfolio under conditions of High ZOTs, we could do so 
similar to that in Figure 6.7. Simply put, the departure from optimal resource 
allocation would increase as the budget variance increases for both the escalating and 
non-escalating project. In the case of the escalating project, tolerance of budget 
variances is likely to result in over-commitment of resources to the escalating project 
and a commensurate under-commitment to the non-escalating project. 
Over-commitment 
Resource 
Allocation 
•- Distance 
from LP 
Optimality 
Under-commitment 
Budget Variance 
Non-Escalating Project 
Figure 6. 7: Hypothesised Resource Allocation Behaviour 
in a Two-Project Portfolio with High ZOTs 
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Conversely, under conditions of Low ZOTs we have seen that budget variances tend 
to be corrected to a greater extent than with High ZOTs. We could represent this 
correction behaviour as initial tolerance of low variances and correction of high 
variances (bringing resource allocations closer to optimal) (Figure 6.8). In practical 
terms, this could be evident through de-escalation of the troubled project once 
variances exceed that of the ZOT. We can further surmise that resource constraints 
would have a similar effect on resource allocation decisions. 
Over-commitment 
Resource 
Allocation 
-Distance 
from LP 
Optimality 
Under-commitment 
Escalating Project 
Budget Variance 
Non-Escalating Project 
Figure 6.8: Hypothesised Resource Allocation Behaviour 
in a Two-Project Portfolio with Low ZOTs 
Research Method 
Sample Selection 
Overview of Subject Selection 
A total of thirty-four subjects participated in the experiment. Subjects were recruited 
from postgraduate project management students enrolled at the University of New 
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South Wales and final year undergraduate project management students enrolled in a 
Business Information Systems course at the University of Sydney in 2007. Subjects 
voluntarily participated in tbe task and were reimbursed for tbeir time at a flat rate of 
$20 in cash, paid upon completion of the task. Reimbursement was not tied with their 
performance of tbe decision task. 
The sample size within each of tbe two between-subjects groups breaks down thus: 
Table 6.2: Sample to Group Breakdown 
Resource Constraint 
Zone of Tolerance Harsh Loose 
~~:1 :8 I :6 I 
The sample size is relatively small compared to the previous experiments. This was 
due to the exigencies and limitations of tbe available sample of enrolled students tbat 
were homogenous to tbe samples used in tbe previous two experiments. Additional 
subjects from other courses may have threatened tbe homogeneity of the sample set 
and, thus, were not approached for participation. However, it must be noted that this 
sample size is in line witb Langholtz et al.'s (1993, 1994, 1997) papers published 
within tbe journal Organisational Behaviour and Human Decision Processes 
(OBHDP), and tbis was seen as an appropriate benchmark for sample size 
determination (see Table 6.3 below). 
Table 6.3: Langholtz OBHDP Sample Sizes 
Study Total Treatment Average Subjects Sample Groups per Group . 
Lan~holtz eta/. (1993) 24 3 8 
Langholtz et a/. (1 994) 30 3 10 I 
Lan~holtz et a/. (1 994) 20 2 10 I 
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Selection Procedure 
The researcher attended one lecture for a project management course within the 
School of Business Information Systems which was attended by students of the 
Masters of Business degree at the University of Sydney. The researcher also attended 
one lecture for an undergraduate project management course within the Australian 
Business School at the University of New South Wales. The prospective subjects 
were presented with a brief announcement at the beginning of the class that the 
experiment was to be conducted. In this announcement they were told that the 
experiment related to a resource allocation task within a project management context 
that would test their judgement and decision-making skills. They were instructed that 
the experiment was to be conducted at various times during the following week and 
would take no more than one hour of their time. As with the previous studies, 
potential participants were told that there was no pre-requisite of prior knowledge of 
the task domain, no preparation necessary and participation was completely 
voluntary. To stress the anonymity of their participation, the lecturer-in-charge left 
the; room during the presentation and potential participants they were assured that the 
he would not know who participated or their proficiency at the task and that the task 
was non-assessable. 
Following the announcement, an Expression of Interest form was passed throughout 
the class and subjects were asked to arrange a time to attend following the 
completion of the lecture. The Expression of Interest form requested subjects' 
contact details (email and phone) and their preferred time to attend. The form also 
contained key information relating to human research ethics requirements mandated 
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by the University of Sydney. As with the previous experiments, all procedures 
relating to participant recruitment, experiment administration and handling of 
confidential information conformed to the requirements of the Human Research 
Ethics Committee (HREC) at the University of Sydney prior to the commencement 
of the research. 
Sampling Method and External Validity Considerations 
Postgraduate students were chosen as an acceptable surrogate for project managers 
(Remus 1986). Final year undergraduate students were also selected. The advantages 
and disadvantages of selecting students for experimental tasks are examined in detail 
in the Research Methods section. Once again it bears reiteration that it is not possible 
to make broad generalisations based on any empirical findings based on this 
research. As with previous experiments, external validity through generalisability is 
not the objective of this research programme. It should be noted, however, that the 
Zones of Tolerance and budget variance constructs are benefiting from several 
replications using different subjects and this goes towards enhancing the 
gen_eralisability of these constructs to a limited extent. 
Special Sampling Procedures for Student Samples 
As with the previous experiments, we employed a number of the suggestions from 
Carver, Jaccheri et al. (2003) on the use of students in IS-related experimental tasks. 
I. The goals, measures and analysis method were not revealed prior to 
executing the experiment. 
2. Subjects were given an opportunity for feedback to justify their 
decisions during a post-test. 
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3. Subjects (if they so requested) were given the chance to receive 
feedback on their performance in the task upon completion. 
4. Subjects were given a realistic time estimate of one hour to complete 
the task. On average, subjects took between 30-45 minutes to 
complete the computer-based task, including reviewing the cover 
material, making their project recommendations and completing the 
post-test questionnaire. 
5. Finally, students were allowed to choose from a range of possible 
times to attend so as to avoid conflicts with their lesson schedules. 
Design and Procedure 
Experimental Design 
A 2 (Zone .of Tolerance) X 2 (Resource Constraint) between-subjects and an 
additional X 9 (Variance over Time) within-subjects factorial design was employed 
to test both the independent and interaction effects in the mixed model. In all, each 
subject made decisions on two projects simultaneously with I 0 time iterations (the 
final time period was excluded to negate any 'end of game' effects13). Of the two 
projects, one project faced escalating costs per unit of completion and the other faced 
zero or negligible cost increases. This experimental design was based on the 
Langholtz et al. (1993, 1994, 1997, 2003) investigations into resource allocation 
behaviour using linear programming principles. 
13 See Analysis Results section for a discussion on the ·end of game' effect. 
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Linear Programming Experiment Design: The Optimal Model 
The experiment was constructed such that the participating subject had a goal to 
maximise the total completion (the objective function) of both projects in the 
portfolio over 10 time periods. One of these projects experienced progressively 
escalating costs per unit and the other did not have cost increases. Subjects were 
given a global budget of both money (cost) and time (labour hours) in order to 
complete this goal. Both money and time represented the resources available to the 
decision-maker that had a direct linear relationship to the completion of both 
projects. In the case of this experiment, subjects were given $44,000 and 2,200 
labour hours each month with which to complete as much of both projects as 
possible. We can represent the money and time budget constraints in simple terms 
(based on the treatment by Langholtz et al. 2003): 
Total Monthly Money Budget ::: Money Spent on Escalating Project+ 
Money Spent on Non-Escalating Project 
To!al Monthly Time Budget > Time Spent on Escalating Project+ 
Time Spent on Non-Escalating Project 
Using formal linear programming conventions and we can express this goal thus: 
Goal: 
Where 
Maximise C = PE + PN (objective function) (1) 
PE =Per cent completion of the escalating project within one period 
PN = Per cent completion of non-escalating project within one period 
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Subject to: 
Where 
$44,000 :o; {ME.PE + MN.PN} 
2,200 hours :o; {TE.PE + TN.PN} 
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(money constraint) (2) 
(time constraint) (3) 
Where: PE, PN :o; 0 (non-negativity constraint) (4) 
ME The money investment required to complete I% of the 
escalating project (PE) 
MN = The money investment required to complete I% of the 
non-escalating project (PN) 
T E = The time investment required to complete I% of the 
escalating project (PE) 
TN = The time investment required to complete I% of the 
non-escalating project (PN) 
Dependent Variables 
Ratio of Stated Completion to Optimal Completion 
As ver the LP problem identified above, we require an objective function (project 
completion) to determine the linear association between the resources available (time 
and cost). The use of the percentage completion of both projects (escalating and non-
escalating) within a two-project portfolio, we are able to identify: 
I. the level of completion of both projects as decided upon by the decision-
maker; and 
2. the LP 'optimal' completions that are suggested by the LP function. 
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From this we would be able to determine any divergence between the optimal and 
stated resource allocation strategies and further be able to objectively measure the 
effect of the dependent variables (ZOT and resource constraints) upon the decision 
process. Project completion, thus, provides a metric that is relevant, salient, easily 
understandable (to the decision-maker) and easily measurable (for the researcher). To 
date, no experimental studies in escalation have used this metric as the dependent 
variable. 
As can be inferred from the above model, the most appropriate key dependent 
variable would be the amount of project completion for each of the two projects 
(escalating and non-escalating) per period. By using this metric, we can identify (I) 
the actual investment strategy of the subjects, and (2) the distance of this from the 
optimal resource allocation model. By measuring the distance between stated 
completion and optimal completion one can assess whether a project is being over-
invested or under-invested and how the decision to invest in one project affects the 
investment in the second within the portfolio. For instance, in a two-project portfolio, 
over-investment in one project would necessarily indicate underinvestment in 
• 
another. Therefore, the formula used to calculate the dependent variable described is 
calculated thus: 
Actual vs. Optimal Completion Ratio = Actual Project Completion by Subject 
LP Optimal Completion 
A subject completing a project at the LP optimal level would have an actual vs. 
optimal completion ratio of 1.0. A subject completing more of a project than what is 
prescribed as optimal would have a ratio of greater than I. Alternatively, a subject 
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completing less than prescribed by optimal would have a ratio of less than I. 
'Completion' was operationalised as the amount of each project that is completed as 
a percentage of the entire project. Subjects were told prior in their briefing that the 
initial plan states that I 0% of each project should be completed in each period. 
Therefore the subject (as the project manager) should have completed 100% of both 
projects over the course of the I 0-period task. 
Project Status 
As with the previous two experiments, subjects were asked to rate their perceptions 
of both projects within each time period (Figure 6.9). From there, we are able to 
ascertain whether their progress towards completion is attendant with 'worries' about 
the project and allows us to gamer some insight into how those worries manifest in 
behaviour. 
Figure 6.9: Project Status Options 
How would you rate project Atticus? 
I. The project is progressing on or close to track 
2. Acceptable variations are occurring 
3. Unacceptable variations are occurring 
4. Serious budget and scope cuts are needed 
5. The project should be suspended immediately 
If a subject were to choose the fifth option, that the project should be suspended 
immediately, a warning message flashed up on screen stating "you are choosing to 
cancel Project [Name]. Are you sure you want to do this?" followed by a Yes I No 
required input by the subject. However, the project was not formally abandoned until 
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the subject decided to progress to the following period. As the subject chose to move 
to the next period, s/he received another warning that: 
"You are about to cancel Project [Name] and lose all resources already spent 
on it! You will note be able to restart this project at a later time. Are you sure 
you want to cancel this project?" 
The purpose of the multiple warning messages was twofold. Firstly, it eliminated the 
chance of user error and allowed the decision-maker to reverse their decision if they 
so chose. More importantly, it was structured in this manner to intentionally covney 
the salient difficulty and gravity with which a project abandonment decision would 
be made. 
Independent Variables 
Variance Over Time (Within-Subjects) 
As distinct from Experiment 2, budget variance covaried with time. In this case, 
budget variance was manipulated through rising costs per unit of completion for the 
esC1llating project while the non-escalating project experienced minor variations in 
order to maintain some experimental realism (less than 5% ). As ME and MN changed 
in each month, a new optimal completion strategy was required for each iteration. 
The optimal resource allocation points over the ten months suggest that resource 
commitments to the escalating project should decrease over time; whereas resource 
commitments for the non-escalating project should increase. Simply put, in this case 
LP suggests that the optimal resource allocation strategy is to divert resources away 
from the escalating project and towards the non-escalating project. 
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Over the ten periods given to complete as much of both projects as possible, the time 
constraints were left unchanged. However, the escalating project's budget variance 
for money increased randomly and cumulatively between 3%-7% per period, with a 
final unit cost of almost 50% over the original budget. The non-escalating project's 
budget variance varied randomly between 0% - 5% per period in order to retain a 
measure of experimental realism. 
Table 6.4: Variance Manipulations 
Money($) Time (labour hours) 
Time Escalating Non-Escalating Escalating Non-Escalating 
(t) Project (ME) Project (MN) Project (T E) Project (TN) 
(Budget (Budget 
Variance) Variance) 
1 2400 (0.0%) 2000 (0.0%) 100 120 
2 2477 (3.2%) 2062 (3.1%) 100 120 
3 2657 (10.7%) 2066 (3.3%) 100 120 
4 2820 (17.5%) 2062 (3.1%) 100 120 
5 3031 (26.3%) 2016 (0.8%) 100 120 
6 3113 (29.7%) 2052 (2.6%) 100 120 
7 331>2 (37.6%) 2082 (4.1%) 100 120 
8 3420 (42.5%) 2032 (1.6%) 100 120 
9 3509 (46.2%) 2014 (0.7%) 100 120 
10 3593 (49.7%) 2092 (4.6%) 100 120 
' In the first month, it was possible to meet the budgeted completion for both projects 
(I 0% per month) without incurring overruns. However, in period 2 onwards the cost 
of completion gradually but uniformly rises for the escalating project which makes 
meeting budgeted completion levels impossible without incurring budget overruns. 
Unit costs for the escalating project rose to almost 50% over budget during the task. 
Faced with these cost variances, the decision-maker can choose to either reduce their 
completion below planned levels, incur budget overruns, or a combination of the 
two. The optimal allocation strategy for each period is detailed below. 
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Table 6.5: Optimal Completion for High ZOT Escalating Project 
Escalatine Pro_ject Non-Escalatine Project 
Time (t) Variance (%) Completion (PE) Variance(%) Completion (PN) (%) (%) 
I 0.0 10.00 0.0 10.00 
2 3.2 8.17 3.1 11.53 
3 10.7 6.55 3.3 12.88 
4 17.5 5.62 3.1 13.65 
5 26.3 5.21 0.8 13.99 
6 29.7 4.55 2.6 14.54 
7 37.6 3.72 4.1 15.23 
8 42.5 3.91 1.6 15.08 
9 46.2 3.87 0.7 15.11 
10 49.7 3.05 4.6 15.79 
In table 6.5 above, the completion levels reported represent the LP optimal allocation 
for each month. Obviously, the total completion of either project cannot exceed 
I 00%, but while the optimal completion of PN combines to over I 00% over the I 0 
months it was our conjecture that there will only be a small number of incidences of 
either project being finished early by subjects (which was the case). 
Zone of Tolerance (Between-Subjects) 
The Zone of Tolerance construct was operationalised in a slightly different way to 
• 
Experiment 2 in order to account for some of the methodological weaknesses evident 
in that study. A similar high I low ZOT manipulation was used, albeit with less detail 
than in previous experiments (See Figure 6.1 0). 
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Figure 6.10: Senior Management Directives (ZOT Manipulation) 
Low ZOT Condition 
This project is to be released into a highly competitive market and there 
is little tolerance for budget overruns. 
Money and time variances are approved in exceptional circumstances only. 
Strict completion schedules apply. 
High ZOT Condition 
There is some tolerance for time and cost overruns as long as the 
project is on track for its planned completion. 
Money and time variances are accepted as long as the project is running on 
or close to schedule. 
Consistent with the research programme so far, both the high and low Zone of 
Tolerance manipulations were presented to the decision-maker. The previous 
experiments were designed such that, while all ZOTs were presented to the decision-
maker, project were discrete and treated as independent. In contrast to the previous 
two experiments however, both ZOT manipulations were presented to the decision-
m¥:er simultaneously (one for each project). 
Decision-makers were required to allocate their global 'bank' of money and time 
between the two projects, and as such, were induced to consider trade-offs and 
opportunity costs to pursuing an escalating project. The reason for the designation of 
ZOT as a between-subjects factor is due to the allocation of the high and low ZOT 
condition between the two projects. Thus, half the respondents received the treatment 
where there was a low ZOT for the escalating project and a high ZOT for the non-
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escalating project, while the other half of respondents received the opposite 
treatment. 
In this experiment, we included an additional ZOT manipulation. Note that in the low 
ZOT condition (see Figure 6.9) included an expression stating that "strict completion 
schedules apply". In this experiment, we sought to further strengthen the 
manipulation of the Low ZOT manipulation such that the Steering Committee would 
not approve any less than 7% of a low ZOT project in any given period (unless the 
subject decided to abandon the project). Subjects attempting to complete less than the 
required 7% per period in the Low ZOT condition received an error message stating 
that the project "has strict completion schedules that cannot be violated". In the High 
ZOT condition, there was no minimum completion per period enforced on the 
subject. 
As can be seen in Figure 6.lla below, including a 7% minimum on the project with 
the low ZOT treatment reduces the feasible region of resource allocations. It is 
imJ;>ortant to note that imposing a constraint so that subjects cannot complete less 
than 7% of a Low ZOT project would change the calculation of an LP optimal if a 
low ZOT was applied to the escalating project. In this case, the resultant feasible 
region is represented by: 
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Figure 6.11b: Low ZOT Resource Constraints on Escalation Situations 
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If the costs associated with completing the escalating project were to increase, this 
may have the effect of moving the optimal point away from the intersection of the 
money and time constraint (See Figure 6.11 b). The decision-maker would find 
themselves in a position of rapidly diminishing options (represented by the feasible 
region). While it is still possible to complete both projects, the non-escalating project 
is now also suffering from a diminished capacity for completion at the expense of the 
heightening costs of the escalating project. The objective of manipulating ZOTs in 
this way is to examine how behaviour manifests in this case. 
When adding a strict schedule of completion to a project, we change the optimal 
resource allocation points by adding the further constraint of a minimum completion 
for the Low ZOT project: 
Where: PE:::. 7 (Low ZOT for Escalating Project) (5a); or 
PN?:. 7 (Low ZOT for Non-Escalating Project) (5b) 
In the between-subjects treatment where the low ZOT condition is enforced for the 
' 
escalating project, the optimal resource allocations change from Table 6.4 above to 
Table 6.6 below. 
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Table 6.6: LP Optimal When ZOT for Escalating Project is Low 
Escalatinl( Project Non-Escalatin2 Project 
Time (t) Variance(%) Completion (PE) Variance (%) Completion (PN) (%) (%) 
I 0.0 10.00 0.0 10.00 
2 3.2 8.17 3.1 11.53 
3 10.7 7.00 3.3 12.30 
4 17.5 7.00 3.1 11.77 
5 26.3 7.00 0.8 11.30 
6 29.7 7.00 2.6 10.82 
7 37.6 7.00 4.1 10.03 
8 42.5 7.00 1.6 9.87 
9 46.2 7.00 0.7 9.65 
10 49.7 7.00 4.6 9.01 
From this we can see the influence of management controls on optimal resource 
allocation. By stating strict minimum completion levels we find that it would still be 
possible in this instance to complete the non-escalating project: optimal resource 
allocation allows for a theoretical cumulative completion of I 06.27% over the ten 
months. However, the margin for error is smaller. We also see the portfolio effect of 
such constraints, as failing projects that maintain commitment in effect draw scarce 
resources away from projects performing well. 
Resource Limit Manipulation- Harsh vs. Benign Budget Conditions 
A further between-subjects manipulation was used to determine whether or not the 
subjects were permitted to invest resources in excess of the total monthly budget. 
Around half of the subjects had strict resource constraints in which they were not 
able to allocate resources in excess of the $44,000 and 2,200 labour hours budgeted 
for that period. The other half were allowed to allocate resources in excess of these 
monthly budgets. Subjects in both groups were not permitted to save resources from 
previous budgets for future spending. 
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Under loose resource budget constraints it becomes possible to complete projects in 
excess of the LP optimal. In effect, a decision-maker could allocate resources outside 
the feasible region and therefore maintain their I 0% per period completion of both 
projects. It is therefore up to that decision to determine their reaction to budget 
variances and Zones of Tolerance when determining if such allocations are 
appropriate this determination and this is integral to our continuing investigation into 
the influence of ZOTs and budget variances on the decision-making process in 
escalation situations. 
The Decision Task 
The experimental task used to examine these phenomena used a computer-based 
simulation. The screen used to manage these projects is presented in Figure 6.12. 
The task was to place subjects in the position of project managers who have to 
allocate a monthly budget of $44,000 and 2,200 labour hours between two projects 
under their control, one of which was escalating (Project Atticus, indicated by Point 
A in Figure 6.12) and one of which was non-escalating (Project Lazarus, Point Gin 
Figure 6.12). Their goal was to maximise the combined completion of both projects 
within 10 time periods (Point F on Figure 6.12). The original plans for both projects 
state that I 0% of each project should be completed each month, thus stipulating that 
both projects were planned to be completed in ten months. 
For each of the two projects, decision-makers were provided with a Steering 
Committee briefing that outlined the strategic objectives of the project (ZOT 
manipulation) (Point Bin Figure 6.12). Further, decision-makers were provided with 
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budget information (Point D in Figure 6.12) and details of the constraints on their 
decisions (Point J in Figure 6.12). Each month, subjects were given revised money 
and time investment constraints (Point C in Figure 6.12). These constraints were 
expressed as the money and time required to complete I% of each project. A 
'calculator' was displayed to allow decision-makers to compute the total money and 
time investments for each project in each month (Point K on Figure 6.12) as well as a 
graphic to track the level of completion of both projects as compared to budget 
(Point H on Figure 6.12). 
For each time period, subjects had to make four decisions, two for each project. They 
could not manipulate any other information on the screen other than the lower panel 
in Figure 6.12. Their decisions included (I) how much of each project should be 
completed within the time period (Point E on Figure 6.12); and (2) what their 
assessment of the project's progress should be (Point I on Figure 6.12). Upon making 
these decisions, the subject moved to the next time period iteration. 
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Procedure 
Subjects were given a number of alternative times to attend tbe experiment session. 
By contrast to previous experiments, the experiment was administered using smaller 
subjects groups owing to tbe added complexity of the task. Each session was held in 
a computer laboratory at the University of Sydney. Upon arrival, subjects were 
instructed to take time to read through the Ethics materials and sign Participation 
Consent Forms as per tbe requirements stipulated by the Human Research Ethics 
Committee at the University. 
Subjects were given a short introduction in which screen shots were displayed to 
explain the processes involved in tbe task how the computer simulation worked. To 
avoid experimenter expectancy effects, subjects were not told about the nature of the 
research, except that tbey would be allocating a budget of money and time between 
two projects over ten periods and tbeir goal was to complete as much of the two 
projects as they could. Time was allowed for questions. Table 6.7 describes the order 
in which projects were shown to subjects. This order conforms to the experimental 
procedures used in tbe previous two experiments. 
Table 6.7: Presentation Order of Task 
Screen Purpose 
I Participant Information Sheet 
2 Participant Consent Form 
3 Introductory Cover Story 
4 Experiment Task 
5 Summary and Post-Test 
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Introductory Statement, Cover Story and Enhancing Ecological Realism 
Each subject was provided with an introductory statement regarding their role as a 
Project Manager whose responsibility was to allocate resources to projects at the 
beginning of every month (see Figure 6.13). As with the previous experiments, 
subjects were told the following, 
"Your reputation is significantly affected by the quality of your 
recommendations to Senior Management. A poor recommendation may be to 
spend too much or too little on a project, or take actions that will lead to 
project failure. 
"In reality, most projects do not finish exactly on time and on budget. 
Decisions about what to do with projects that are going over budget should 
be made on a case-by-case basis and you should consider what is in the best 
interests of the organisation when making investments in projects. 
Subjects were given information about the nature of the task, including their global 
budget, Steering Committee Directives, details that I 0% each project was originally 
planned for each period, and the fact that costs for completion may vary over time. 
These instructions remained available via a projector at the front of the room while 
participants progressed through the task. 
Random Allocation of Tasks 
Four variations of the task were created and randomly distributed between subjects 
(see Table 6.8). The variance-over-time within-subjects construct manipulation 
remained constant throughout all treatments. 
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Table 6.8: Randomisation for Experiment 3 
ZOT for Non-
Randomisation Resource Limits 
ZOT for Escalating 
Project Escalating Project 
I Harsh High Low 
2 Harsh Low High 
3 Loose High Low 
4 Loose Low High 
Post-Test Questionnaire 
Upon completion ofaii!O periods, subjects were shown a screen (see Figure 6.14) in 
which they were presented with the final results of their allocations over the ten 
months and asked to choose from the following options: 
I. Their overall satisfaction with the way they managed each project 
I am very satisfied with the way I managed the project. 
I am somewhat satisfied with the way I managed the project. 
I am neither satisfied nor dissatisfied with the way I managed the 
project. 
I am somewhat dissatisfied with the way I managed the project. 
I am very dissatisfied with the way I managed the project. 
2. Their priorities when managing each project 
Finishing the project on time 
Keeping the project within the time and cost budgets 
Following the Senior Management Directives 
3. Their estimation of how costs per unit increased over the course of 10 months 
(numeric percentage). 
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Hieronymus Solutions Pty. Ltd. 
Your Role 
You are to Imagine that you are an Information Technology project manager within Hieronymus Solutions Ply Ltd. 
At the beginning of every month you report to Senior Management on the progress of your projects and decide how much should be Invested into them for that month. 
How To Complete This Task 
You will be presented with two IT .focussed projects which you will have to manage over 10 months. 
The original plans state that 10% of each prolect should be completed every month (i.e. both projects should be 100'!. completed In 10 months). 
You have a monthly budget of $44.000 and 2200 labour hours that you can allocate between the two projects. This monthly budget cannot be saved for future months. 
YOU DO NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO APPROVE BUDGET OVERRUNS. 
Your goal is to complete as much of each project as possible without violating the Senior Management Directives set for each project 
Each month you will be given the time and cost required per 1% completion of each project which may vary over lime. You can use this to calculate total spending. 
Both projects have EQUAL strategic and economic value to the organisation. 
However, each project has a different Steering Committee Directive and you should take these into consideration when allocating resources. 
Important Note 
Choplc•r t\ - P~/rct Portrnlin ... 
Your reputation is significantly affected by the quality of your decisions. A poor decision may be to spend too much or too little on a project, or take actions that w ill lead to project failure. 
In reality, most projects do not finish exactly on time and on budget. Decisions about what to do with projects that are going over budget should be made on a case-by-case basis and you 
should consider what is In the best interests of the organisation when making Investments In projects. 
Cancelling projects that have already started often mean losing a lot of money that has already been spent You may even lose your job or professional reputation If you are responsible for a 
project that had to be cancelled. 
HOWEVER THERE IS A POINT WHERE FAILING PROJECTS MUST BE ABANDONDED. JUDGEMENT IS NEEDED TO KNOW WHEN PROJECTS HAVE TURNED FROM GOOD TO BAD. 
Click Here to Begin 
Figure 6.13: Introductory Statement for Experiment 3 
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Please Answer Some Final Questions ... 
• 
Project Atticus Project Lazarus 
Project Atticus had the following historical costs at period 10 Project Atticus had the following historical costs at period 10 
Budget Actual Variance Budget Actual Variance 
Completion 100.0% 100.0% 0.0% Completion 100.0% 60.4% -39.6% 
Money($) $240,000 $301 ,935 25.8% Money($) $200,000 $123,535 -38.2% 
Time (hours) 10,000 10,000 0.0% Time (hours) 12,000 7,248 -39.6% 
How satisfied are you with the way you managed Project Atticus? How satisfied are you with the way you managed Project Lazarus? 
Please Select 3 I _:] 
What was your biggest priority when managing this project? What was your biggest priority when managing this project? 
I 3 I . I 
Estimate Project Attlcus' unit costs increase between periods 1 and 10. Estimate Project Lazarus' unit cost increase between periods 1 and 10. 
11~1 0/o II~ I 0/o 
Figure 6.14: Post-Test Questions for Experiment 3 
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Analysis and Results 
Controlling for the 'End of Game Effect' 
Although subjects were presented with ten time periods within which they were 
given the goal of completing as much of both projects as possible, we excluded the 
tenth (final) time period from our analysis. The reason for this is due to our 
endeavour to achieve a robust experiment design. The 'end of game effect' occurs 
when subjects treat the final period of a task as a capstone, making resource 
allocation decisions that are different to the resource allocation decisions of the 
previous nine time periods. There may be a motivation to complete anything 
outstanding in the project, and thus incur significant budget overruns in doing so. 
Van Bruggen et a!. (1998) were able to negate their 'end of game effect' by not 
actually informing subjects about which iteration would be their final for the task. 
However, this experiment was designed a little differently and with a different 
purpose. Instead, we eliminated period I 0 from our analysis in order to negate the 
possibility of finding false positives in our budget overrun and completion metrics. 
Difference between Resource Allocation Behaviour and LP Optimal 
Consistent with our expectations, decision-makers failing to correct early variations 
from expectations can be shown to significantly diverge from optimal allocations 
when ample tolerance exists within the decision context. Conversely, when there is 
low tolerance for variations within the context, we see earlier detection and 
correction of variations from budgets and more optimal resource allocation 
behaviour overall. A second interesting fmding is that decision-makers tend to make 
allocation decisions that are closer to optimality when the organisational constraints 
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manifest low tolerance and, counter-intuitively, when provided with loose, rather 
than strict, resource constraints. This is possibly due to a belief that loose resource 
constraints connote the ability to freely move resources between projects. 
We found some striking evidence of how Zones of Tolerance affect a decision-
maker's ability to achieve optimal allocation of resources (see Table 6.9). In a 
compelling confirmation of our conjectures that high Zones of Tolerance permit 
decision-makers to continue to allocate funds to failing projects, we found a 
significant main effect of ZOTs (F(I,30) = 26.166, p = .000) on the ratio of stated 
resource allocation decisions vs. optimality (HI Supported). As budget variances 
increased over time (from 0 to almost 50%), subjects attempted to de-escalate their 
commitment to the escalating project by reducing its completion (see Figure 6.16). 
However, they did so insufficiently and failed to adequately adjust their resource 
allocations to take this into account. 
Table 6.9: Between-Subjects Results for Experiment 3 
Type III Sum of 
Source Squares df Mean Square F Sie. 
Intercept 710.632 I 710.632 3456.352 .000 
ZOT 5.380 I 5.380 26.166 .000 
Resource .478 I .478 2.323 .138 
ZOT* 
.967 I .967 4.704 .038 Resource 
Error 6.168 30 .206 
As Figure 6.16 below indicates, a simple comparison of mean completion by project 
reveals that while subjects made an attempt to control escalation and they did not 
adjust their completion of escalating projects sufficiently. This was particularly the 
case when the escalating project was experiencing high ZOTs (see Figure 6.15). 
Even at low ZOT' s, where the optimal completion level was strongly suggested 
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through a 'minimum completion per period ' constraints, subjects tended to complete 
more than they were required to in order to maintain their achievement of budgeted 
completion targets. 
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Figure 6.15: Mean Actual vs. Optimal Completion of Escalating Project 
Turning to a ratio comparison of allocation vs. optimal , recall that a decision-maker's 
allocations are more optimal the closer they are to 1.0 over time. When an escalating 
project experienced high ZOTs the resource allocation decisions became increasingly 
sub-optimal over time. By contrast, when an escalating project experienced low 
ZOTs, their resource allocation decisions were much closer to optimality. 
Interestingly, Figure 6.16 below suggests some correction behaviour at around period 
6 (when cost overruns reached almost 30% above the original budget on the 
escalating project - similar to that of our 'high variance ' conditions in the first two 
experiments). 
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Figure 6.16: Mean Ratio of AIJocated I Optimal Completion on the Escalating 
Project 
As budget variances within the escalating project rose over time, decision-makers 
tended to also reduce the completion of the non-escalating project in order to 
compensate for the increasing costs of the troubled one; in effect drawing resources 
away from good investments in favour of bad ones. Figure 6.17 below indicates that 
while escalating projects were typically heavily over-invested, projects that perform 
well suffer by association. By maintaining commitment to an escalating project, we 
can see how the strain on resources draws funds away from well performing projects . 
. 
In the case where there was a high ZOT for an escalating project (and low ZOT for a 
non-escalating one), we found that the non-escalating project in the portfolio 
gradually and progressively went under-invested in an LP optimal sense. On the 
other hand, in the case of escalating projects in low ZOT and non-escalating projects 
in high ZOT, we see that correction behaviour brings both projects closer to optimal. 
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Figure 6.17: Mean Ratio of Allocated I Optimal Completion on the Non-
Escalating Project 
Time-Variance 
Escalating costs over time had a significant main effect on the proximity to optimal 
allocations within this decision task (F(8, 232) = 3.790, p = .000) as well as a 
significant interaction effect with ZOTs (F(8, 232) = 5.008, p = .000) (H4 and H5 
Supported, see Table 6.1 0). What this indicates is that decision-makers failed to learn 
over time that they were insufficiently adjusting their completion rates on projects. In 
fact, their decisions tended to get worse (i.e. further from optimal) over time as costs 
increased. This was largely due to their attempts to bolster their completion of the 
escalating project while keeping completion of the non-escalating project relatively 
unchanged. 
These results tend to confirm our previous findings that the stability of variances 
over time tends to play a hand in a decision-maker's inability to manage troubled 
projects effectively. As in Experiment 2, we can see how unstable and rising costs 
over time create decision dilemmas that do not seem to improve with time. Subjects 
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did not seem to radically adjust their resource allocation strategies even after it 
became clear that a project was experiencing significant cost overruns. Rather, 
subjects seemed to prefer to 'tweak' their allocation strategies and, in this case, this 
was insufficient to guarantee successful completion of either project. 
Table 6.10: Between-Subjects Results for Experiment 3 
Type Ill Sum 
Source of~ares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Project 47.172 1 47.172 127.351 .000 
Project • ZOT 13.853 1 13.853 37.400 .000 
Project " Resource 
.235 1 .235 .633 .432 
Project "ZOT " Resource 2.419 1 2.419 6.530 .016 
Error(Project) 11.112 30 .370 
Period 1.709 8 .214 2.982 .003 
Period* ZOT 2.732 8 .341 4.767 .000 
Period " Resource 
.316 8 .040 .551 .817 
Period " ZOT " Resource 
.450 8 .056 .786 .616 
Error( Period) 17.193 240 .072 
Project" Period 7.475 8 .934 7.377 .000 
Project " Period " ZOT 10.791 8 1.349 10.649 .000 
Project " Period " Resource 
.523 8 .065 .516 .844 
Project " Perio~ " ZOT" 
.763 8 .095 .753 .645 Resource 
Error(Project'Period) 30.400 240 .127 
Resource Limits 
We did not find a main effect from resource constraints (F(1,30) = 2.323, p = .138) 
(H2 Not Supported). However, we did find a significant ZOT X Resource Limit 
interaction effect (F(1,30) = 4.704, p = .038) (H3 Supported). There was no 
discernible effect from the interaction between budget variances over time and 
reource limits (F(8,240) = .316, p = .817) (H6 not supported). Figure 6.18 below 
indicates that there appeared to be a difference between the allocation I optimal ratios 
of low vs. high ZOTs when resource limits were harsh. However, this difference is 
smaller under conditions of benign resource constraints. Thus while resource 
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constraints did not seem to have a direct main effect, the interaction effect suggests 
just how salient the ZOT manipulation was and how it impinged upon the decision-
making processes of subjects. 
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Why would resource limits not be significant upon a subject 's ability to achieve 
optimality, except as an interaction effect with ZOTs? On the face of it, strict 
resource limits would seem to drive decision-makers to look for resource allocations 
that lay within the feasible set, thus setting a constraint upon their decisions that 
' 
would positively affect their achievement of optimality. 
Project Status 
A second set of interesting findings can be found when tracking a subject' s 'worry' 
about their resource allocations against their allocation decisions. The Project Status 
dependent variable was coded using the values in Figure 6.9. In sum, escalating 
projects affect the way subjects viewed the untroubled projects in their portfolios. 
Project status experienced a direct main affect from the time-variance condition 
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(F(8,240) = 18.479, p = .000) and through the ZOT condition (F(l ,30) = 7.949, p = 
.000). This can be seen graphically through Figure 6.20 below. 
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Figure 6.19: Project Status Across Time 
As we can see from the figure above, a particularly marked difference between the 
'worry' that was exhibited when the escalating project experienced high ZOTs. 
Despite the fact that subjects in the high ZOT condition for escalating projects tended 
to allocate their resources in a much more sub-optimal fashion, subjects within that 
condition tended not to be as worried about the effects of the escalating project on 
the portfolio. In other words, a decision-maker's ability to extend tolerance to absorb 
escalating projects seemed to be less concerned about their resource allocation 
decisions to the entire portfolio. This would confirm Lyytinen and Robey's (1999) 
conclusion that decision-makers tended to focus on local optima and did not learn 
from experiences when learning was inhibited by the decision context. By contrast, 
decision-makers finding themselves managing an escalating project through a 
'difficult' (i .e. low ZOT) organisational context tended to perform better and 
improve their decision-making and resource allocation behaviour over time. 
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ZOTs Promote Careful Resource Allocations 
Langhotlz et al. 's (1994) conjectures about careful husbanding of resources seem to 
bear themselves out through this research. Low ZOT's created 'harsh' environments 
(to use Langholtz et a!. 's (1994) term) that force decision-makers to consider the 
implications of their decisions and weigh them against stricter organisational mores. 
The end result is a better overall allocation of resources and earlier detection of 
escalating projects. By contrast, organisational conditions that are considerably more 
generous tended to allow decision-makers to absorb the overruns of poorly 
perfonning projects, thus (in many cases) failing to identify and correct troubled 
projects. 
Perhaps the most compelling evidence if this can be seen through the post tests. 
Subjects were asked how much they thought the costs per unit of each project 
changed from period l to period 10. Bearing in mind that the answer to this question 
was that the escalating project's costs per unit rose 50% during this time; Table 6.11 
below shows a marked difference between the low and high ZOT conditions in this 
estimate. 
Table 6.11: Post-Test Estimate of Budget Overruns 
Escalating Non-Escalating 
ZOT for Escalating Project Project 
Project Variance Variance 
Low Mean 18.34 7.00 
N 16 16 
Std. Deviation 15.339 8.515 
High Mean 10.04 5.17 
N 18 18 
Std. Deviation 13.682 9.439 
----- -
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In a marked difference between the two groups, both of which experienced identical 
cost increases, subjects in the low ZOT escalating project condition estimated that 
costs rose 18%, while those in the high ZOT condition estimated only 10%. This 
would indicate that low ZOTs actually made decision-makers pay more attention to 
the cost and budget metrics of the project, and that they were more aware of these 
budget variances as they occurred. This can be seen through the greater amount of 
correction behaviour in the low ZOT condition, and the lack of correction behaviour 
in the high ZOT condition. 
Project Abandonments 
The number of abandoned projects was very low. Only five out of the 35 subjects 
(14.3%) decided to abandon a project in their portfolio. Of these, four abandoned the 
escalating project and one abandoned the non-escalating project (with high ZOTs and 
harsh resource limits). Interestingly, no projects were abandoned in the 'harsh' 
resource limits treatment group (see table 6.12). It would be difficult to make any 
conclusions from this low number of project abandonments about what induces one 
to abandon a project, and the fact that the abandoned escalating projects were in the 
benign, rather than harsh, treatment condition seems contrary to our overall findings. 
Table 6.12: Count of Abandonment Decisions for Escalating Projects 
Res Harsh 
Benign 
Low 
0 
3 
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Discussion 
To summarise our results: decision-makers attempted to maintain their completion of 
the escalating project while keeping completion of the non-escalating project 
relatively unchanged during escalation of commitment episodes occurring within 
project portfolios. We found a significant main effect of ZOTs on the ratio of stated 
resource allocation decisions vs. optimality (HI Supported). As budget variances 
increased over time (from 0 to almost 50%), subjects attempted to de-escalate their 
commitment to the escalating project by reducing its completion. However, they did 
so insufficiently and failed to adequately adjust their resource allocations to take this 
into account. We did not find a main effect from resource constraints (H2 Not 
Supported) nor from the interaction between budget variances over time and resource 
limits (H6 not supported). Nonetheless, we did find a significant ZOT X Resource 
Limit interaction effect (H3 Supported). Escalating costs over time had a significant 
main effect on the proximity to optimal allocations within this decision task as well 
as a significant interaction effect with ZOTs (H4 and H5 Supported). 
It has been discussed previously in the literature review and by Y etton et a!. (2000) 
that project managers tend to disregard budget variances as critical to project success. 
As a result, decision-makers tend to absorb budget variances, particularly when the 
organisational context allows for this absorption to pass without significant downside 
for the decision-maker. Despite this, budget variances are a good measure of the 
efficiency with which project managers execute organisational plans and strategy. 
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This research challenges the conventional wisdom that budget variances are of 
secondary importance to the success of projects. It both theoretically and empirically 
demonstrates how budget variances can affect entire project portfolios. Decision-
making behaviour in escalating projects can now be seen to lead to suboptimal 
resource allocations, thus constraining the successful development and 
implementation of other, non-escalating projects. In these situations, project 
managers can be seen to insufficiently adjust to escalating situations and, in effect, 
draw resources away from well performing projects to bolster underperforming ones. 
Project management literature into escalation and project failure are often driven by 
the pursuit of early warning signals. In truth, escalation situations are so multi-
dimensional and context specific that such indicators may be difficult to ascertain. 
What seems more germane to the problem is to enhance the attention paid to the 
resource allocation process. Under conditions of low Zones of Tolerance, where 
organisational constraints and oversight are strong, decision-makers were shown to 
husband resources and detect escalation situations earlier more effectively. By 
coqtrast, under conditions where ZOTs were high, little if any correction behaviour 
was evident. 
Yet even when ZOTs are low and a decision-maker identifies escalating costs early 
in a project's progress, they tend to insufficiently adjust their resource allocations to 
reflect the true extent of the escalation situation. Perhaps this confirms Langholtz et 
al.'s (1994) conclusion that decision-makers have rather impulse-driven reactions to 
setbacks and address them as they happen, rather than anticipating for them ahead of 
time. This study supports this notional idea of reaction to budget variances, since 
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decision-makers tended to inadequately correct budget variances despite these 
variances increasing in a uniform pattern (from 0% in period I to 50% in period I 0). 
This was particularly pronounced under conditions of high ZOTs where budget 
variances were systematically absorbed by subjects. 
Low Zones of Tolerance on poorly performing projects seems to direct attention to 
setbacks and also improves the focus on the alternate investments and opportunity 
costs within the organisational context. This is evidenced by the increase in 'worry' 
for both escalating and non-escalating projects when setbacks are evident within 
projects under low ZOTs. In other words, when low ZOT projects experience 
problems, decision-makers are compelled to consider the entire portfolio. In a related 
finding, perhaps the reason why setting global resource limits do not have a main 
effect on allocations to individual projects. Budget limits have greater effect when 
combined with strong ZOTs (hence the significant interaction effect between ZOT 
and resource limits). Conversely, high ZOTs on a project experiencing setbacks 
seems to inure decision-makers from seeing the effects of setbacks on the whole 
portfolio. In sum, when projects are situated in contexts allowing the absorption of 
setbacks, decision-makers tend not to identify and correct them and fail to appreciate 
the effect of these setbacks on the entire portfolio. This is evidenced quite markedly 
in Figure 6.16 where escalating projects under high ZOTs not only were allowed to 
continue uncorrected, but the situation was compounded since subjects did not 
exhibit 'worry' for the other project in the portfolio. 
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Limitations of the Study 
The natural limitations to experimental settings (student samples, lack of realism) 
play an unaviodable role in limiting the extent to which we may make generalisations 
from these findings. However, three studies have now empirically established the 
effects of Zones of Tolerance on decision-making behaviour. 
It must also be noted that this experiment used a special case of LP problem in which 
an optimal was evident and achievable by the decision-maker. It would be interesting 
to explore how different variations on the L problem would manifest different 
behaviour. In particular, one interesting counter-intuitive anomaly would arise in the 
following case (Figure 6.20). 
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In the above example, a stable cost constraint but a shifting time constraint 
(indicating time overruns on the escalating project) would suggest that the new LP 
optimal would require one to increase their completion of the escalating project and 
decrease completion of the non-escalating project It would be difficult to make a 
reasonable business case from this new recommended optimal as it would appear to 
encourage the escalating project to the detriment of the non-escalating project Yet it 
would be interesting to see how decision-makers reacted to a situation such as this. 
Concluding Remarks 
This study takes a significant step towards understanding how tolerance of minor 
setbacks affects future tendencies to persist with challenged courses of action. It 
examined the influence of tolerance for setbacks, the extent to which alternative 
resource allocations are available and the way in which projects change over tim 
We hypothesised that ZOTs inhered within the decision context lead to increasingly 
suboptimal resource allocations between troubled and untroubled projects over time. 
Tire study compared objectively optimal resource allocation strategies against 
decision-makers' actual allocation decisions in a portfolio of two projects. 
Applying linear programming, we both theoretically and empirically demonstrates 
how tolerance for troubled projects draws resources away from well-performing 
projects within a portfolio. It validates a hitherto unapplied method of measuring the 
extent to which decision-makers are departing from an objectively optimal decision 
strategy during escalation of commitment dilemmas. Consistent with our 
expectations, decision-makers in ZOT conditions permitting absorption of cost 
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mcreases fail to detect early variations from expectations and failed to correct 
escalating projects. By contrast, subjects in low ZOT conditions tended to be more 
aware of increasing costs and generally attempted to correct said variations, leading 
to better resource allocations overall. However, subjects generally failed to 
adequately adjust their resource allocation strategies to ensure optimal completion of 
their projects and can be particularly shown to significantly diverge from optimal 
allocations when ample tolerance exists within the decision context. 
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--- CHAPTER 7 ---
CONCLUSION 
The Basic Premises of the Research 
This research programme has made novel and significant extensions to over thirty 
years of escalation of commitment literature. The escalation problem is relevant to 
contemporary project management practice and IS project development and has been 
shown to be a pervasive problem that, as yet, does not have an adequate solution. 
The research detailed here has provided a critical clue in developing a methodical 
approach to addressing the issue - by managing our behavioural reactions to extant 
boundary conditions inhered within ZOTs, we are able to identify problems faster, 
more efficiently and with greater awareness of project setbacks. 
Project performance is characterised by the metrics of time, cost and functionality. 
Along with project completion, budget variances are the key measure of the 
efficiency with which a project manager executes the planning, development and 
implementation of projects (Yetton et a!. 2000). The efficiency with which IS 
projects meet their time, cost and quality objectives in a project setting has not 
improved with time, despite the improvements in development technologies such as 
reusable components and object-oriented design that should make IS developments 
and implementation less time consuming and more efficient, customisable and better 
suited to meeting organisational requirements (Welke 1994). 
Chapter 7 - Conclusion 
This research programme investigated the phenomenon known as the escalation of 
commitment: the tendency to persist with troubled projects despite evidence 
suggesting that setbacks within the project could lead to its eventual failure. The 
tendency to escalate commitment to troubled projects by investing greater amounts 
of time, money and effort than originally anticipated, have been shown to be strong, 
persistent and contrary to conventional economic prescriptions. There should be few 
technical reasons for organisations to "experience the backlogs and delays that 
plagued systems development 20 years ago" (Lyytinen and Robey 1994, p85). Yet 
information systems development projects are notoriously prone to escalation of 
commitment and failure. The pervasive problem of time and cost overruns is 
compounded by a seemingly cavalier attitude to budget overruns by IS project 
managers that has been supported in a number of studies (Ewusi-Mensah and 
Przasnyski 1991; Yetton et al. 2000).We asked ourselves three questions at the outset 
that informed the direction of the research programme: 
RQl: To what extent are setbacks tolerated by a project's constituents? 
RQ2: To what extent can setbacks be absorbed by the environment within 
which the project is undertaken? 
RQ3: Is there an interaction between a decision-makers tolerance of 
project setbacks and the extant conditions evident in the 
organisational environment? 
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In order to answer these questions we postulated that project support, escalation and 
failure are determined primarily through a decision-makers reaction to Zones of 
Tolerance, the extant set of boundary conditions within which variations from 
expectations are recognised but carry no significant utility or disutility to the 
decision-maker. Within a Zone of Tolerance, variations from expectations are 
considered comparatively small and (importantly) acceptable. 
Escalation of commitment dilemmas find their foundations within the extant 
organisational environment within which a project is undertaken and it was argued 
that the organisational and structural factors are the undergirding structure upon 
which the economic, social and moral incentives and disincentives within the 
organisation are based. These factors can either promote or inhibit escalation and are 
posited to be of fundamental importance to projects that are (as in reality) situated 
among a portfolio of differing activities with interdependencies and common 
constituencies. We made two propositions that were tested in three experimental 
studies: 
Proposition 1: Decision-makers' reactions to variations from expectations 
associated with a project (overruns, errors, setbacks and other problems) 
depend upon Zones of Tolerance inherent within the project context. 
Proposition 2: It is therefore proposed Zones of Tolerance are constructed 
through the interplay of organisational and structural factors within the 
decision context that define the economic, social and moral incentives and 
disincentives for continuing with projects experiencing setbacks. 
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Figure 7.1: Hypothesised Effect of Zones of Tolerance 
Zones of tolerance therefore, are a product of the distance between reference points 
inherent within the organisational and structural context such as time and cost 
budgets , explicit strategic directives, the nature of the industry and the qualities of 
the alternative courses of action available. Rather than tolerance being viewed as 
inherent to the decision-maker, we surmised that this tolerance is a product of the 
context of the decision and the proximity of outcomes to these reference points 
(Figure 7.1 ). 
We examined how the presence of a Zone of Tolerance affects project managers' 
willingness to tolerate budget variances (in both cost and time) and project slippage 
within IS developments. This willingness to tolerate resource expenditures in excess 
of initial expectations is dependent upon the qualities of the behavioural, 
environmental and resource constraints imposed within a project setting. 
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Empirical Demonstration 
Experiment 1: Proof of Concept 
In the first study, we empirically demonstrated how decision-makers tolerate minor 
variations from expectations, and how, if these seemingly minor variations are 
allowed to cascade and compound over time, they create the historically antecedent 
conditions typical of escalation of commitment episodes. Paradoxically, we found 
that comparatively low budget overruns (which tend to be tolerated) lead to greater 
total resource commitments than high budget overruns (which tend to be corrected). 
In addition, we find that alternatives to the decision to escalate commitment to 
troubled projects had no significant effect on the said decision, contrary to prior 
studies (Arkes and Blumer 1985, Conlon and Garland 1993, Shaubroek and Davis 
1994, Keil et al. 1995a). 
Experiment 2: Extension of Concept- Projects Over Time 
In this experiment, we investigated the importance of time to a decision-maker's 
tolerance. We examined a number of characteristics of a project's performance that 
may change over time, namely (I) the effects of the stability of budget variances over 
time; (2) the magnitude of budget variances over time; and (3) the change in risk 
preference over time. Confirming our conjectures regarding the effects of ZOTs and 
Time on the treatment of escalating courses of action we found a significant effect of 
ZOTs and a main significant effect of time on the evaluation of projects and the 
continuation decisions made by subjects within the decision task. We also found a 
significant effect of the difference between low-stable and high-stable variances over 
time, and a significant interaction effect between the stability of budget variances 
over time. 
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Confirming our conjectures regarding the effects of ZOTs and Time on the treatment 
of escalating courses of action, we found a significant effect of ZOTs and a main 
significant effect of time on the evaluation of projects and the continuation decisions 
made by subjects within the decision task. This study also shows that losses faced 
within escalation episodes can engender risk aversion, particularly if decision-
makers operate under conditions where escalation is the less risky option when 
controlling project setbacks. This would appear to indicate that persistence despite 
costly setbacks causing escalating commitment episodes is more likely when 
organisational and structural constraints provide high tolerance that would absorb 
this increased spending. 
Experiment 3: Project Portfolios 
In the final experiment, we hypothesised that ZOTs inhered within the decision 
context lead to increasingly suboptimal resource allocations between troubled and 
untroubled projects over time. Applying linear programming, we both theoretically 
and empirically demonstrated how tolerance for troubled projects draws resources 
awl!y from well-performing projects within a portfolio. Consistent with our 
expectations, decision-makers in ZOT conditions permitting absorption of cost 
increases fail to detect early variations from expectations and failed to correct 
escalating projects. By contrast, subjects in low ZOT conditions tended to be more 
aware of increasing costs and generally attempted to correct said variations, leading 
to better resource allocations overall. However, subjects generally failed to 
adequately adjust their resource allocation strategies to ensure optimal completion of 
their projects and can be particularly shown to significantly diverge from optimal 
allocations when ample tolerance exists within the decision context. 
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Contributions to Theory 
Zones of Tolerance were originally postulated as a phenomenon by Lawrence and 
O'Connor (2005) within forecasting research. We extend the concept of Zones of 
Tolerance and apply them to a wider organisational context, empirically 
demonstrating how ZOTs are germane to organisational decision-making writ large. 
This research programme takes a significant step towards understanding how 
tolerance of seemingly minor setbacks affects future tendencies to persist with 
challenged courses of action, and by doing so challenges the conception of the 
boundary between rational and irrational behaviour. We showed how escalation of 
commitment, while seemingly irrational, finds its root causes within ostensibly 
rational (albeit sub-optimal) micro-decisions that cascade and compound into 
dilemmas that threaten the very survival of strategic courses of action. Using both 
behavioural decision-making apparatus and by applying linear programming (in 
Experiment 3 ), these studies theoretically and empirically demonstrate how tolerance 
for troubled projects is extended when variations from expectations manifest within 
Zones of Tolerance. Furthermore, it demonstrates ways in which the structural and 
organisational constraints on decision-making affect the way in which decisions are 
made and troubled projects are handled. 
The third study, based on Langholtz's (2004) application of linear programming, 
makes another conclusion hitherto never discussed within escalation of commitment 
literature. It theoretically and empirically demonstrates the ways in which troubled 
projects draw resources away from well-performing projects within a portfolio. It 
validates a hitherto unapplied method of measuring the extent to which decision-
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makers are departing from an objectively optimal decision strategy during escalation 
of commitment dilemmas. 
At the outset of this research we stated that internal validity was of higher priority 
than claims to external validity and generalisability. To that end we extended 
escalation of commitment literature through the use of mixed factorial designs (both 
within- and between-subjects) to give a truer picture of escalation occurring over 
time. This has been a perennial weakness of extant literature to date. By failing to 
experimentally validate theoretical escalation phenomena without these designs 
givens a partial, incomplete of the phenomenon and fails to address face validity 
within experimental design. Using computer-aided simulations (in Experiments 2 
and 3), we overcame the limitations of traditional pencil and paper studies and 
created decision tasks that were dynamic and more complex than previous research 
designs. In doing so we opened up possibilities of more detailed and thorough 
experimental investigation into decision-making and resource allocation behaviour. 
Contributions to Practice 
. 
This research programme demonstrates how organisational contexts affect the micro-
decisions made within it. Projects are rarely if ever ad hoc but rather reside within 
portfolios of related action, and these interdependencies are of crucial importance to 
maintaining continued management support and funding. We held the micro-
decisions of project management practice 'under the microscope' and significant 
questions are posed about the effectiveness of conventional project management 
tools and techniques in controlling behavioural tendencies that contribute to sub-
optimal resource allocation. It is argued that such practices need to be held to account 
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against the realities of human judgement and decision-making behaviour, and it is 
shown through these empirical studies that manipulating Zones of Tolerance have 
significant effects of human judgement within the organisational context and 
represent, in some cases, stronger controls against escalation of commitment 
behaviour than conventional project management techniques. 
Of the project management tools currently available to decision-makers in projects 
there are few if any commonly accepted project management techniques that 
advocate the imposition of bright line budget limits, of which a breach would 
represent serious correction or stoppage of the project. Rather, budget overruns are 
usually dealt with on an ad hoc basis - and decisions to approve resource 
expenditures in excess of budget expectations depend greatly on the level of 
tolerance for these overruns expressed either by decision-makers or through the 
environments in which they operate. The standard project management technique of 
incorporating resource slack into project plans is evidence of this phenomenon. 
Fu(ure Research Directions 
Several interesting avenues of research can be scaffolded upon the theoretical and 
empirical findings of this research. One of the simpler inquiries that could be 
conducted would be to investigate the effect of variable ZOTs over time. In other 
words, one may ask how decision-makers react to changing tolerance and variable 
ZOTs over time. This may occur, for example, upon changes to senior management 
or staff during a project's development, or shifting competitive pressures from the 
external environment. 
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Project management research is constantly looking for (perhaps non-existent) early 
warning indicators that signal impending trouble and the potential for failure. One 
proposed avenue of inquiry would be to discover other early warning signals (beyond 
that of budget variances) that would indicate that a project is experiencing a loss of 
contro/14 Even when operating within ZOTs, are there metrics or indicators that a 
project manager is losing control over the project? How do project managers react to 
a perceived loss of control? Do permissive ZOT conditions mask this loss of control 
and, by extension, do certain ZOT conditions heighten a project managers awareness 
of control? 
Another interesting avenue of inquiry is to incorporate signal detection theory into a 
theory of tolerance (Swets 1964). Signal detection theory and its related theories 
(such as statistical detection processing and receiver operating characteristic (ROC) 
analysis) are used within the management sciences and psychology to discriminate 
between signal and noise. In this way, we would be able to discriminate between the 
'noise' from the inherent ambiguity, variability and imprecision of budget 
esti111ations and a 'signal' from more systematic variations from expectations that 
indicate a project is troubled. In this way, one might be able to develop a model of 
detecting systematic variability even while they are occurring within ZOTs that might 
not otherwise be picked up by project managers. Furthermore, one might be able to 
combine a theory of ZOTs into signal detection by using ZOTs to vary the sensitivity 
with which signals are detected within the project or portfolio. 
14 This research programme is already underway with a colleague at Clemson University. 
-333-
Closing Remarks 
CLOSING REMARKS 
In the opening of the literature review we analogi sed tolerance thus: you are sitting in 
a restaurant waiting to meet a blind date who is running late. Unsure of whether she 
will tum up at all, how long would you wait before your tolerance runs out and you 
decide to go home? We speculated that if your blind date shows up and the date is 
worthwhile, then your persistence would be considered rational, indeed rewarded. 
You only 'fail' if you decide to go home. Similarly, a project manager continuing 
their support for an escalating project may be rewarded if it turns out to be an 
eventual success and punished if it were eventually abandoned. 
Then again, perhaps our tolerance for setbacks will always be driven by the value 
and substanc_e of the goal we are pursuing. As Holden Caulfield sagely observes in 
Catcher in the Rye, 
"If a girl looks swell when she meets you, who gives a damn if she's late? 
Nobody." 
(Salinger, 1994, pl24-125) 
Appendix A - Summary of Research Programme 
---APPENDIX A---
SUMMARY OF RESEARCH PROGRAMME 
Summary of Research Programme 
Research Objective 
We posit a Zone of Tolerance (ZOT) as the extant set of boundary conditions within 
which variations from expectations are recognized, but carry no significant utility or 
disutility to the decision-maker. 
Overarching Research Questions 
I. To what extent are setbacks tolerated by a project's constituents? 
2. To what extent can setbacks be absorbed by the environment within which 
the project is undertaken? 
3. Is there an interaction between a decision-makers tolerance of project 
setbacks and the extant conditions evident in the organisational environment? 
Experiment 1 -Proof of Concept 
Proposition 1: Decision-makers' reactions to variations from expectations associated 
with a project (overruns, errors, setbacks and other problems) depend upon Zones of 
Tolerance inherent within the project context. 
HI: There is a main effect of Zones of Tolerance on the willingness of a decision-
maker to tolerate escalating commitment to troubled projects. 
Marginally Not Supported (F(2, 409) = 11.375, p = .000, partial eta squared 
= .053). 
H2: The magnitude of budget variance has a negative effect on the willingness of 
a decision-maker to tolerate said variances. 
Supported (F(2,409) = 92.013, p = .000, partial eta squared= .310). 
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Proposition 2: Zones of Tolerance are constructed through the interplay of 
organisational and structural factors within the decision context that define the 
economic, social and moral incentives and disincentives for continuing with projects 
experiencing setbacks. 
H3: There is an interaction effect between the magnitude of budget variance and 
Zones of Tolerance on a decision-maker's willingness to accept said 
variances. 
Supported (F(4.409) = 2.479, p = .012, partial eta squared= .033). 
Proposition 3: The availability of alternatives has a negative effect on the tolerance 
for variances outside a ZOT. 
H4: Decision-makers are more likely to escalate commitment to a course of action 
when there are no alternatives to the investment. Not Supported. 
Not Supported (F(1,409) = 2.695, p = .101, partial eta squared= .007). 
H5: There is an interaction effect between alternatives and Zones of Tolerance on 
a decision to escalate commitment to a course of action. Not Supported. 
Not Supported (F(2,409) = .091, p = .913). 
Experiment 2 - Tolerance Over Time 
It is our conjecture that budget variances occurring in later time periods are more 
likely to be accepted than in earlier time periods. 
H 1: Time has a positive effect on the tendency to escalate troubled projects. 
Supported (F(8, 736) = 4.893, p = .000). 
Non-systematic setbacks that are viewed as temporary or ephemeral by decision-
makers may not be corrected by decision-makers, particularly if the costs of not 
correcting them are immaterial, negligible or zero. 
H2: Zones of Tolerance have a positive effect on the tendency to escalate troubled 
projects. 
Not Supported (F(1,92) = 9.467, p = .064). 
H3: Zones of Tolerance have a positive interaction effect with Time on the 
tendency to escalate troubled projects. 
Not Supported (F(8,736) = .5.329, p = .140). 
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Time may have the effect of inuring project managers to budget variances that persist 
at stable levels over time. By contrast, budget overruns that frequently change in 
magnitude over time may be less palatable to the decision-maker, who would be 
unable to settle on a status quo point of reference for an acceptable threshold of 
variation. 
H4a: Stable budget variances over time are less likely to be corrected than unstable 
budget variances of the same magnitude. 
Marginally Not Supported (F(J,92) = 0.157, p = .693). 
H4b: Zones of Tolerance have an interaction effect with the stability of budget 
variances on the tendency to escalate troubled projects. 
Marginally Not Supported (F(J,92) = 3.801, p = .054). 
We re-explore the effect of the magnitude of budget variances with the addition of 
the Time construct: 
H5a: Small budget variances are less likely to be corrected than large budget 
variances. 
Not Supported (F(J,92) = 2.350, p = .129). 
H5b: Zones of Tolerance have an interaction effect with the magnitude of budget 
variances on the tendency to escalate troubled projects. 
Not Supported (F(l,92) = .682, p = .411). 
A decision-maker will weigh their risk preferences against the magnitude of budget 
variances. 
H6: As variances increase as a proportion of a budget, decision-makers are likely 
to become increasingly risk-seeking. 
Not Supported (stable variances: /(I, N = 249) = .265, p > .05), unstable 
budget variances:/ (1, N = 238) = .000, p > .05). 
H7: The size of a Zone of Tolerance has a moderating effect on the effect of 
Budget Variances on a decision-maker's attitude to risk. Not Supported. 
Not Supported(/ (4, N = 487) = 6.151, p > .05). 
Note: H7 implied that ZOTs had an interaction effect with ZOTs in its effect on risk 
preference, yet we found an unexpected main effect of ZOTs on risk-seeking 
behaviour. 
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Experiment 3- Resource Allocation Behaviour in Troubled Project Portfolios 
Research Objective 1 
To investigate how budget overruns within one project affect decision-making within 
an entire project portfolio. 
Research Question 1 
To what extent do decision-makers efficiently allocate resources between projects 
when faced with escalating commitment to a project within a portfolio? 
HI: Resource allocations will be relatively closer to optimal under conditions of 
low ZOTs than high ZOTs within project portfolios. That is, there is an 
independent effect of ZOTs on the efficient allocation of resources to 
escalating projects. 
Supported (F(1,30) = 26.166, p = .000). 
Research Question 2 
How do decision-makers react to budget variances in a project that exists within a 
project portfolio and how adequate are their resource allocation adjustments when 
faced with setbacks to one or more projects within a portfolio? 
H2: Resource allocations will be relatively closer to optimal, under conditions of 
strict rather than loose resource constraints within project portfolios. That is, 
there is an independent effect of resource constraints on the efficient 
allocation of resources to escalating projects. 
Not Supported (F(1,30) = 2.323, p = .138). 
H4: Decision-makers will skew their resource allocation behaviours towards 
escalating projects when budget variances increase over time to one or more 
projects within a project portfolio. 
Supported (F(8, 232) = 3. 790, p = .000). 
H6: There is an interaction effect between resource constraints and tolerated 
budget variances over time within project portfolios. 
Not Supported (F(8,240) = .316, p = .817). 
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Research Objective 2 
How to compare decision-making under ZOTs to a decision-maker's achievement of 
optimal resource allocations? 
Research Question 3 
How do Zones of Tolerance affect a decision-maker's ability to adequately adjust 
resource allocations when faced with setbacks to one or more projects within a 
portfolio? 
H3: There is an interaction effect between Zones of Tolerance and resource 
constraints within project portfolios in the directions implied by H2 and H3. 
Supported (F(J,30) = 4. 704, p = .038). 
H5: There is an interaction effect between Zones of Tolerance and tolerated 
budget variances over time within project portfolios. 
Supported (F(8, 232) = 5.008, p = .000). 
H6: There is an interaction effect between resource constraints and tolerated 
budget variances over time within project portfolios. 
Supported(F(8,240) = .316,p = .817). 
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